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Summary 
 
 This thesis presents a comparative account of the theory of fetishism and its 
role in the social constitution and constituent properties of Marx’s, Lukács’, Adorno’s 
and Lefebvre’s theories of social domination. It aims to bring this unduly neglected 
aspect of fetishism to the fore and to stress its relevance for contemporary critical 
theory.  
  The thesis begins with an introductory chapter that highlights the lack of a 
satisfactory theory of fetishism and social domination in contemporary critical theory. 
It also demonstrates how this notion of fetishism has been neglected in contemporary 
critical theory and in studies of Marxian theory.  
 This frames the ensuing comparative, historical and theoretical study in the 
substantive chapters of my thesis, which differentiates, reconstructs and critically 
evaluates how Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre utilize the theory of fetishism to 
articulate their theories of the composition and characteristics of social domination. 
Chapter 1 examines Marx’s theory of fetish-characteristic forms of value as a theory of 
domination socially embedded in his account of the Trinity Formula. It also evaluates 
the theoretical and sociological shortcomings of Capital. Chapter 2 focuses on how 
Lukács’ double-faceted account of fetishism as reification articulates his Hegelian, 
Marxian, Simmelian and Weberian account of dominating social mystification. Chapter 
3 turns to Adorno’s theory of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction and unpacks 
how it serves as a basis for his dialectical critical social theory of domination. Chapter 
4 provides an account of how Lefebvre’s theory of fetishism as concrete abstraction 
serves as the basis for a number of theories that attempt to socially embody an 
account of domination that is not overly deterministic. The critical evaluations in 
chapters 2-4 interrogate each thinker’s conception of fetishism and its role in their 
accounts of the genesis and pervasiveness of social domination.   
 The conclusion of the thesis consists of three parts. In the first part, I 
bring together and compare my analysis of Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre. In part 
two, I consider whether their respective theories provide a coherent and cohesive 
critical social theory of fetishism and of the mode of constitution and the constituents 
of social domination. In part three, I move toward a contemporary critical theory of 
fetishism and social domination by synthesising elements of Lukács’, Adorno’s and 
Lefebvre’s theories with a model of social constitution, reproduction and domination 
modelled on Marx’s account of the Trinity Formula.  
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Introduction 
 
 The Marxian theory of fetishism is certainly capable of describing the current 
economic and social crisis: volatile world markets and the sovereign debt crises have 
acted like autonomous entities, and their social repercussions possess the character of 
inverted forms of domination in which these collectively constructed social entities 
have turned back on the individuals who have constituted them. These circumstances 
are reflected in Marx’s famous statement that ‘magnitudes of value vary continually, 
independently of the foreknowledge and action of exchangers. Their own movement 
within society has for them the form of a movement made by things, and these things, 
far from being under their control, in fact control them.’1 Yet much contemporary 
critical social theory, despite the degree to which it now finds itself ill-suited to 
describe and understand the present socio-economic crisis, has moved away from 
drawing on Marx’s theory of fetishism and social domination or subsequent Marxian 
social theories that utilised feithism in their theories of social domination, diminishing 
the relevance such critical theory has to our present day.  
 Whilst on the whole it is surprising that the recent social and economic crisis 
has not contributed to reconsidering the relationship of critical theories to Marx2, the 
recent work of two of the leading figures of contemporary critical social theory might 
be seen as countervailing examples of this tendency. Both Axel Honneth and Moishe 
                                                
1 Marx (1992, 176)  
2 This can be seen in the astonishing fact that neither of the three leading critical 
theory journals—Constellations, Telos and Thesis Eleven—have any articles on the social 
and economic crisis or its relation to critical theory in the period of 2008-2013. 
Furthermore, (1) the recent special issue of Constellations volume 19 issue 3 on 
‘rethinking critical theory’ did not have any articles re-assessing the Marxian legacy of 
critical theory (2) the two recent issues of Telos (Winter 2009 and Summer 2011) on 
Adorno did not discuss Adorno’s relation to Marx, political economy or domination. 
(3) As survey articles on contemporary critical theory by (Brincbat 2012) and (Piá Lara 
2008) point out contemporary critical theory is not engaged with these theoretical 
approaches or questions. 
  
11 
Postone have formulated important theories that offer reinterpretations of what they 
construe as critical theory’s classic thematic of reification, which itself can be said to 
have offered an interpretation of fetishism as a theory of social domination. Yet, 
despite this rapproachment with critical theory’s Marxian legacy, both Honneth and 
Postone’s work are inadequate for the task of a contemporary critical social theory of 
fetishism and social domination.  
 This is because on the one hand, Honneth’s rejuvenation of reification 
acknowledges many of the problems of Lukács’ account of the genesis and  
pervasiveness of reification.3 However, these criticisms lead Honneth to abandon any 
account of supraindividual domination for an intersubjective account of reificiation. 
Thus any theory of the relationship between fetishism and social domination is 
eschewed for Honneth’s problematic of recognition. As a result whilst such a theory 
may prove fruitful in approaching the way intersubjective relations dehumanise 
individuals, it is inadequate for addressing a theory of supraindividual social domination.  
 Moishe Postone’s work, on the other hand, attempts to ground an account of 
social domination on his reinterpretaion of Marx. Yet whilst Postone’s work does 
focus on the question of supraindividual social domination, there are several reasons 
why it is unsatisfactory. In the first place, as Postone himself points out, his account of 
social domination is fragmentary and incomplete.4 This has the consequence of making 
his account of the genesis and pervasivenes of social domination fall prey to many of 
the same criticisms that Honneth makes of Lukács’ theory.5 Secondly, Postone’s work 
has been met with many perceptive criticisms that point to the weakness of his 
                                                
3  See (Honneth 2008, 27-29) I provide my own account of these problems below. 
4 See (Postone 1996, 19-111)  
5 For instance like Honneth’s criticism that ‘It isn’t clear from the text how’ Lukács’s 
‘social generalization’ of reification ‘theoretically occurs,’ (Honneth 2008, 29). The 
same can be said of Postone’s reinterpretation of Marx’s theory of value as a theory of 
social domination. In Postone’s account it is particularly not clear what drives and 
reproduces capital and consequently how this process constitutes social domination. 
This is due to the fact that: (a) despite Postone’s interpretation of capital as a subject 
that possesses what he describes as an ‘historically specific dynamic’ and (b) the 
fundamental importance that Postone attributes to the historical specificity of abstract 
labour it is unclear how abstract labour and capital are constituted in their historical 
specificity and how this pervasive process, and its dynamic structures, compels and 
dominates society. (Postone admits the need to address this problem, 396-97). Yet at 
this point he has not and in doing so his interpretation of Marx mirrors Lukács by 
extending rather than developing the categories Marx presents in part one of Capital. I 
show how this method of Lukács’s differs from Marx’s below.       
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reinterpretation of Marx.6 Finally, Postone’s criticisms of ‘traditional Marxism’ and 
‘critical theory’ prevent any possibility of a productive dialog between Marx and 
Marxian theories of social domination. 
  This means that Postone’s own reinterpetation of Marx is inadequate and that 
he negelcts, a strand of Marxian critical social theory which does exist that can be said 
to have grappled with with the issue of fetishism and social domination, which may be 
helpful in addressing the theoretical defecits of his theory. For the thinkers involved, 
Marx’s account of fetishism played a fundamental role in their theories of ideological 
mystification, and in their discussions of the constitution and constituent properties of 
capitalist social domination.  
    In this thesis I move toward developing a contemporary critical theory of 
fetishism and social domination that draws on Marx and Marxian theories of fetishism 
and social domination. I aim to bypass these weaknesses in Honneth and Postone’s 
theory by eventually developing a theory of supraindividual social domination that is 
grounded on a coherent account of the way that domination is constituted and socially 
embodied.7  I do this by focusing on bringing these Marxian theories of the fetishism 
and social domination to the fore, whilst also considering the contemporary relevance 
that their theories of fetishism and social domination may hold for contemporary 
critical theory. 
 This thesis is therefore concerned with a comparative history of the role 
played by the concept of fetishism in Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre’s theories of 
the constitution and constituents of social domination. In the latter fetishism is used as 
a theory to articulate the collective constitution of social phenomena that possess 
constitutent autonomous and inverted properties that structure, compel and ‘maim’ 
individuals. While the term social domination is intended to convey that there is an 
integral link between the way a society is structured and those fetishistic types of 
domination that are held to be characteristic of this society. 8 
                                                
6 See the criticisms of (Arthur 2004), (Bonefeld 2004), (McNally 2004) and others in 
Historical Materialism Volume 12 Issue 3. See also (Goldner 2005) 
7 By socially embodied I refer to the way in which theories of domination are said to 
be instantiated in the complex social world.  
8 My use of this term social domination is left deliberately open and is intended to 
bypass terms typically associated with the Marxian conception of social domination 
such as alienation or reification.  
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  I choose to focus on these thinkers for several reasons; in the first place, they 
all offer theories of social domination in which the theory of fetishism is used to 
articulate how this domination is constructed and what it consists in.9 Secondly, these 
theories are more theoretically complex and fully-fledged than other Marxian critical 
social theories of fetishism and social domination.10 Thirdly, the combination of these 
authors and the respective similarities and differences of their theories can provide an 
illuminating theoretical map of this topic whilst also shedding new light on and pointing 
to the new relevance of these authors’s theories of social domination.  
 As I explain below in my literature review, although fetishism is often conflated 
with reification, I focus on uncovering these thinkers’s distinct conception of fetishism 
for several reasons: (1) as Honneth and others such as Elbe, Colletti and Reichelt have 
pointed out, the theories of reification deployed by Lukács and the Frankfurt School 
are problematical because they overextend the pervasiveness of reifiation without 
adequately grounding it. Whilst fetishism is often conflated with these theories of 
reification, to disambiguate them may provide adequate grounding for a critical theory 
that does not offer a simplistic or a reductive theory of society. At the very least, I will 
substantiate their distinction by pointing to a different strand of fetishism and 
domination that might be drawn on. This is also connected to (2) in which I contend 
and I substantiate below in the literature review that receptions of theories of 
reification construe domination differently than the accounts of fetishism I will present 
in the thesis. This is because the aspects of fetishism that emphasise the autonomous 
function of things and compel individual actions in the form of personification provide 
an account of the dynamics of domination in a different manner than the receptions of 
reification which attribute these dynamics to things as such and describe domination in 
terms of humans being thingified or dehumanised. Both of which signal (3) that in 
contrast to accounts of alienation and reification that tend to treat fetishism in terms 
of its relation to a theory of dehumanisation, my study - in the context of a theory of 
constitution and of the constitutent properties of social domination- examines 
                                                
9 Thus other potentially interesting subjects such as Pashukanis’ study of Law and 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s study of epistemology remain outside the purview of this topic 
because of their focus on particular aspects of society 
10 For instance, it could also be argued that Guy Debord and Walter Benjamin offer 
theories of social domination that draw on fetishism. However, while Benjamin’s 
account is certainly intriguing it remains unfinished, whereas as (Bunyard 2011) shows, 
Debord’s notion of the spectacle is less complex and devotes much of its time to 
issues of historicity and temporality rather than domination.  
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fetishism as a theory which endevours to explain how and why such a form of social 
domination is constituted rather than what it is (alienated human essence dominated 
by things). My distinct focus on the concept of fetishism and its distinction from 
reification is thus concerned with drawing out the articulation of the genesis, 
properties, dynamics and reproduction in these theories of social domination.  
 My approach is theoretical, comparative and broadly historical. It is theoretical 
in the sense that I aim to provide what I think to be an accurate and critical account of 
each thinker’s conception of fetishism and of the role that fetishism plays in their 
theories of the constitution and of the constituents of social domination. It is 
comparative in the sense that I compare each respective theorist’s conception of 
fetishism to that of the others, considering the particular role that fetishism plays in 
each theory and it is historical in the sense that I provide a conceptual ‘history’, or 
perhaps a mapping, a genetic account of how each of these thinkers has conceived 
fetishism and has utilised it in accounting for social domination.11 
 To that end I critically examine how these writers use fetishism in their 
respective theories of the constitution12 and the constituents13 of social domination. I 
track the ways in which these distinctive conceptions of fetishism and social 
domination compare with each other. Finally, I consider the coherence of these 
theories and their contemporary relevance. 
 The following thesis thus provides a substantial and original contribution in the 
following manner. (1) My comparative study will show and discuss how each thinker 
                                                
11 Despite fetishism’s importance to ‘Western Marxism,’ there is no work in English 
that examines the development of fetishism in ‘Western Marxism.’ Merlau Ponty, who 
coined the phrase ‘Western Marxism’ focuses on The Adventures of the Dialectics, 
Martin Jay focuses on totality, Russell Jacoby on The Dialectic of Defeat and Perry 
Anderson levelled a number of criticisms at the tradition in his Considerations on 
Western Marxism. This thesis takes inspiration from these approaches. However, my 
focus differs in two respects: (1) I begin with a substantive chapter on Marx and I trace 
the concept of fetishism from Marx through Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre’s 
interpretations.  (2) I narrow my field of examination from the rather broad category 
of ‘Western Marxism’, to a focus on thinkers who share a similar Hegelian 
interpretation of Marx, and who use fetishism as a central part of their social theory. 
The conceptual history of fetishism that I trace maps a concept that has not been 
utilised in any in-depth histories or studies on Marx and Western Marxism. 
12 By ‘constitution’ I refer to how the theory of fetishism, as an account of the ways in 
which a social relation between people becomes a social relation between things, 
constitutes these theories of social domination. 
13 By ‘constituents’ I refer to how the properties of these conceptions of fetishism are 
used to convey the way in which fetishism structures social domination.  
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conceives of fetishism and how each of these conceptions of fetishism functions as a 
basis for their respective theories of the construction and characteristics of social 
domination.  (2) I will criticise each thinker’s conception of fetishism, focussing on the 
ways in which it fits into their theories of the constitution and of the constituents of 
social domination. (3) I will study Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre in a comparative 
manner from this perspective; such an analysis has never been performed before. (4) 
The thesis will conclude by presenting original considerations on the coherence of 
these theories as models of fetishism and social domination, and in regard to the 
relevance of these theories for articulating a contemporary critical social theory of 
fetishism and social domination that moves towards developing a conception of 
fetishism and social domination standing as an alternative to Honneth’s and Postone’s 
theories. I believe a contemporary critical theory of this sort, in contrast to much 
contemporary critical social theory, could prove illuminating in articulating accounts of 
how, why and of what nature are the current forms of domination and of the crises 
we face. My concluding considerations intend to highlight the pertinence such aspects 
of these authors’s thought have for such a theory. They pinpoint also to a way they 
could be combined in order to form the basis for a contemporary theory of fetishism 
and social domination.  
 
1 Literature Review 
 
The focus of this thesis is therefore different from the voluminous and disparate body 
of extant writings on fetishism which (a) use the term in a manner that differs from its 
Marxian origins;14  or (b) treat fetishism as exemplary of a different concept, such as 
‘false consciousness’, ‘ideology’ or ‘reification’, whilst presenting surveys of the latter 
concepts.15 In what follows I outline a conceptual typology of how these different 
                                                
14 Many accounts of commodity fetishism say more about the particular disciplines they 
were written within than they do about the phenomenon itself. This is particularly true 
in disciplines such as literary theory or cultural studies, where the Marxian term is 
often applied in a way that has little to do with the Marxian conception of fetishism. 
Several examples suffice: Coffee and Commodity Fetishism, From Hegel to Madonna: 
Toward a General Economy of Commodity Fetishism and Yoga and Fetishism: Reflections on 
Marxist Social Theory. These approaches are not relevant to this study.  
15 See (Rosen 1996) and (Vandenberghe 2009)  
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interpretations construe fetishism.16 I then discuss how the historical and conceptual 
accounts that fall into these types address the development of the concept of fetishism 
in Marx and Western Marxism.  This will demonstrate that these accounts do not 
provide an exclusive focus on fetishism in terms of a theory of the constitution and of 
the constituent properties of social domination but instead treat it as a metonymy 
representing a larger concept. It will also show that there is not a comparative 
theoretical account of how the distinct concept of fetishism is conceived and deployed 
in theories of social domination   
 
1.1 Conceptual Typologies of Fetishism 
 Norman Geras’s classic article on fetishism ‘Essence and Appearance: Aspects 
of Fetishism in Marx’s Capital’17 presents a distinction that provides a convenient 
means of framing the different conceptions of fetishism. Geras distinguishes between 
two distinct aspects of fetishism: mystification and domination. The different 
interpretations that I will now outline can be seen to correspond to Geras’ distinction, 
as they either conceive fetishism primarily as constitutive of a type of mystification, as 
a type of domination, or as a combination of the two.  
 
1.2 Fetishism as False Consciousness 
 
The interpretation of fetishism as ‘false consciousness’ has a long history and can be 
seen as far back as Karl Kautsky’s highly influential The Economic Doctrines of Karl 
Marx.18  This conception is now prevalent among Anglophone and analytic 
                                                
16 My typology does not address Lacanian interpretations of Marx. To my knowledge 
this interpretation does not engage with conceptual accounts of fetishism in Marx, 
Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre. Žižek’s scattered remarks are an exception to this, 
however since these remarks do not add up to a detailed study of these figures, they 
are too fragmentary to warrant their own typology.  
17 (Geras 1971) 
18 ‘Characteristics which had appeared mysterious because they were not explained on 
the basis of the relations of producers with each other were assigned to the natural 
essence of commodities. Just as the fetishist assigns characteristics to his fetish which 
do not grow out of its nature, so the bourgeois economist grasps the commodity as a 
sensual thing which possesses pretersensual properties.’ (Kautsky 1903) from 
www.Marxists.org.  This interpretation can also be seen in the canonical Marxist 
accounts of Sweezy. For a further discussion of these accounts see  (Geras 1971) and 
(Rubin 2007) 
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philosophical accounts of fetishism. 19 The most prominent examples of such 
interpretation include those of the important analytic Marxists G.A. Cohen and Jon 
Elster. We can see two prevalent explanations of why fetishism is false consciousness 
in Cohen’s and Elster’s work. For Cohen, fetishism is a form of false consciousness, 
because of the illusory independence that fetishised commodities possess. 20 Elster 
describes this illusion in a similar fashion with recourse to a naturalisation and an 
embodied fallacy. 21 In fetishism as ‘false consciousness’, fetishism is therefore seen as a 
mystified type of ideological false consciousness that veils domination in capitalist 
society. Fetishism is thus conceived as an epistemological error, or as what Elster calls 
a ‘cognitive illusion’22 that is generated by the complex appearance of the capitalist 
mode of production; an illusion that also leads to these appearances being naturalised. 
In this account, fetishism consists in a category mistake concerning what Michael 
Rosen terms a ‘theoretical illusion about the economy’23 that conceives of the 
exchange value that commodities possess as being intrinsic to those commodities, 
instead of seeing it as something that is produced by exploited human labour. In some 
accounts, once this mistake is corrected the fetishism of commodities is dispelled and 
de-naturalised. In others, this illusion is objectively generated by capitalist production.24 
In both cases, fetishism is an illusion about conceptions of capitalist social production: 
an illusion that is generated by the mystified appearance of the capitalist circulation 
process. It is not something inherent to capitalist social production, and nor is it the 
mode of social domination that is constitutive and constituted by capitalist social 
production.  
 
1.3 Althusserian Conceptions of Fetishism 
                                                
19 See also (Eyerman1981),  (Pines 1993), (Gabel 1975) and (Rosen 1996) 
20  ‘Commodities possess exchange-value, and capital is productive. But these powers 
belong to them only by grace of the material process. Yet they appear to inhere in 
them independently of it. That appearance is fetishism….The illusion is that it has… 
power independently, whereas in fact it is delegated by material production.’ (Cohen 
2000, 116) 
21 Elster lucidly states: ‘by this [fetishism] Marx means that the social relations of men 
come to appear as the (natural) properties of objects.’ Thus, ‘[c]ommodity fetishism is 
the belief that goods possess value just as they have weight, as an inherent property.’ 
(Elster 1985, 95)  
22 Elster (1985, 99) 
23 (Rosen 1996, 294)  
24 For a discussion of both sides see (Rosen 1996, 200-219) 
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As the name implies, the Althusserian conception of fetishism was developed by Louis 
Althusser in the 1960s.25 Althusser argued that the aspect of alienation in Marx’s 
conception of fetishism was a vestige of the Hegelian legacy of the young Marx’s 
thought and that it was separate from Marx’s scientific critique of political economy. 
Fetishism was consequently seen as irrelevant to Marx’s critique of political economy; 
so much so that Althusser even argued that the first chapter of Capital could be 
skipped.26 He later amended his view that there was an epistemological break between 
the young Marx and the mature Marx. Nevertheless, in his interpretation, fetishism is a 
trans-historical form of mystification that veils production, and which is of secondary 
importance to the later analysis presented in Capital. Marx’s criticism of the fetishism 
of commodities therefore ‘replaces the false conception of this ‘economy’ as a relation 
between things by its true definition as a system of social relations.’27 This unveils 
fetishism because: ‘A social (‘human’) relation cannot therefore be found among 
‘things’ in general, but only behind the thing of this capitalist relation.’28 In contrast to 
the conceptions of fetishism in Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre, Althusserian Marxists 
also treat fetishism as a concept that is specific to Marx’s account of the labour 
process rather than something that is indicative of fetishised social totality.29   
 These interpretations of fetishism as ‘false consciousness’ and the Althusserian 
interpretation of fetishism differ from the other prevalent strands of commentary on 
fetishism: fetishism as ‘alienation’, fetishism as ‘reification’ and fetishism as ‘value’.30 In 
                                                
25 (Althusser 2005; Althusser and Balibar 2009; Balibar 2007)  
26 ‘The greatest difficulties, theoretical or otherwise, which are obstacles to an easy 
reading of Capital Volume One are unfortunately (or fortunately) concentrated at the 
very beginning of Volume One, to be precise, in its first Part, which deals with 
‘Commodities and Money’. I therefore give the following advice: put the whole of Part 
One aside for the time being and begin your reading with Part Two.’ (Althusser 1969, 
2)  
27 (Althusser 2005, 216)  
28 (Althusser 2005, 217)  
29 In this view, Marx’s conception of fetishism ‘does not consist of a general reification of 
all relationships, as some humanist interpretations of Marx argue, but only of this 
particular relationship.’ (Althusser 2005, 313)   
30 As G. Petrovic points out in A Dictionary of Marxist Thought there is often an overlap 
between conceptions of alienation, reification and fetishism. Reification and fetishism 
are often treated as types of alienation, fetishism is treated as synonymous with 
reification, or they are all treated interchangeably. Sometimes all of these overlaps 
occur in the course of one article. There are, however, grounds for distinguishing 
these types of interpretations of fetishism. 
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these interpretations fetishism is conceived as a central aspect of Marx’s thought and 
as being integral to his theory of social domination. However, these interpretations 
also treat fetishism as constitutive of the concepts that they use to characterise this 
theory of social domination.  
 
1.4 Fetishism as Reification 
 
Fetishism as reification was first conceived in what many consider to be the founding 
document of Western Marxism: Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness.31  
In this type of interpretation of fetishism the influence of Lukács’ theory of 
reification leads to the term ‘fetishism’ being used interchangeably with ‘reification.’ In 
these conceptions fetishism and reification are treated as: (a) synonymous terms that 
describe the transformation of social processes into things which dominate and 
deceive people as a form of mystified false consciousness;32 or alternatively fetishism is 
treated as (b) half of the basis for Lukács’s and the Frankfurt school’s Weberian 
Marxist theory of reification. 33  In all of these instances, reification is said to be 
synonymous or continuous with the aspects of fetishism that it draws from Marx and 
constitutive of a theory of social domination and of mystified false consciousness.34 
Some people who can be grouped into this strand of interpretation also contend that 
Lukács’s theory of reification somehow discovered or at least anticipated Marx’s 
theory of alienation prior to the discovery of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
of 1844.35 
                                                
31 (Lukács 1972) The concept is also used by leading Western Marxists such as Karl 
Korsch, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jurgen Habermas in their respective social theories to signify 
objective and subjective types of social domination. The ways these uses differ from 
Lukács’s deserve a study of their own.  
32 See (Cook 1996) 
33 Prominent examples include (Honneth 2008, 97), (Wiggershaus 1995, 80), (Jay 1986; 
Jay 1996), (Cook 2004), (Dupree 1988), (Grondin 1988) For Lukács and the Frankfurt 
School as Weberian Marxists see (Löwy 1996) and (Dahms 2011) Some of these 
works complicate the issue to some degree by treating fetishism as part of the basis 
for theories of reification that encompass Marx, Weber and other theories. 
34 These conceptions of fetishism as reification are particularly prominent in work that 
is conceived from within or that focuses on the Frankfurt School. 
35See Harry Dahms’s statement that ‘At the time, Marx’s Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts with their emphasis on the category of alienation had not been discovered 
yet, and when Lukács wrote History and Class Consciousness, he was not familiar with 
Marx’s earlier critique of political economy in terms of alienation. Yet he was able to 
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Thus, despite (a) its literal meaning – which is usually traced to the Latin term 
res and is defined as the transformation of human processes into things or the 
confusion of human processes with things – or (b) its general use which includes 
describing society as thingified (signifying that social relations between people are 
mediated by or take place through the exchange of things) or (c) that society is 
fragmented, accounts of fetishism as reification adopt Lukács’s widespread use of the 
term and apply it to other thinkers’ entire theories of social domination. This entails 
confusing the part with the whole in analyses of other thinkers where the 
transformation of human processes into things, the mediation of social relations 
between things or social fragmentation forms an aspect, but not the entirety, of the 
majority of these thinkers’ social theories of domination. As a result, the term that 
designates what mediates social relationships – reification –  is often conflated with 
how, why and in what way social relationships are mediated in this manner i.e. through 
the personified properties of things. 
 
1.5 Fetishism as Alienation 
 
The interpretation of fetishism as ‘alienation’ was triggered by the discovery of Marx’s 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts following the publication of History and Class 
Consciousness. The place that alienation has in Marx’s later writings became a matter of 
contention during the debates between Humanist and Althusserian interpretations of 
Marx, but there now seems to be a general acknowledgement that fetishism relates to 
alienation. There are however a number of different conceptions of how they relate, 
and all of them depend on how alienation is conceived.  
 What I will term the classic Marxist Humanist conception of fetishism as 
‘alienation’ was initially formulated by Western Hegelian Marxists.36 In this 
interpretation, alienation is seen as the core problematic of Marx’s thought. Marx’s 
                                                                                                                                          
reconstruct Marx’s critique of alienation as the foundation for the critique of 
commodity fetishism.’ (Dahms 2001,102) See also (Vandenberghe 2009, 147), (Grimes, 
and Simmons 1970), (Patnaik 2009) as well as (Arato 1979) These interpretations 
differ with Lukács’ own comments in the 1967 preface to History and Class 
Consciousness that his theory of reification commits the fundamental and crude error of 
equating alienation with the Hegelian concept of objectification. (Lukács 1972, XXIV) 
36 This account can be seen in the classic Marxist humanist works of Henri Lefebvre, 
Herbert Marcuse, and Eric Fromm. For a similar interpretation from this era, from a 
non-Hegelian Marxist standpoint, see: Lucien Goldmann and Daniel Bell.  
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formulation of the theory of alienation in the Manuscripts is thus seen as the key 
formulation of this problematic. Marx’s later focus on political economy, on the other 
hand, is seen as the less expansive, ‘economist’ conception of alienation. In these 
accounts the classic formulation of alienation is said to underlie Marx’s entire critique 
of political economy. Fetishism is therefore interpreted as the economic type of 
alienation. This analysis is concisely summarised in Henri Lefebvre’s statement that 
‘fetishism is the economic form of alienation.’37 In this interpretation, alienation is an 
objective and subjective state generated by capitalist production in which humans are 
alienated from their products and cut off from their human essence.38  
A position similar to this classic Marxist humanist viewpoint was also taken up 
as a counterpart to Althusser. This viewpoint emphasises a strong continuity between 
Marx’s theory of alienation and fetishism. Fetishism is designated as a sub-species of 
alienation.  Thus as in the classical Marxist Humanist interpretation, fetishism consists 
in alienation and underlies Marx’s critique of political economy. This can be seen 
among other places in Bertell Olmann’s work on alienation,39 which follows the 
classical humanist view that Marx’s theory of alienation is the core problematic of his 
thought.40  What Olmann terms fetishism and reification merely represent Marx’s later 
formulations of alienation.  
A thinner conception of fetishism as ‘alienation’ can also be found in works on 
Marx. These works argue for continuity between the young and later Marx, but in 
contrast to the other accounts of fetishism as ‘alienation’, they also emphasise 
important developments that give fetishism a conceptual and explanatory complexity 
that is lacking in The Manuscripts. In this strand, Marx’s theory of alienation might not 
include or emphasise the alienation of human essence and consists solely in the way 
that labour becomes an alien form of domination that is external to the human social 
relations that constitute it.41 Prominent examples of this strand include the work of 
Lucio Colletti42, Norman Geras43 and Fredy Perlman.44  
                                                
37 (Henri Lefebvre 2008a) 
38 Fromm shares this view with the additional contention, as evident in one of his more 
popular books Beyond the Chains of Illusion, that the alienation of humans from their 
products is illusory. See (Fromm 2006) 
39 (Ollman 1977) 
40 Other examples from this period include (Meszaros 2005), (Wilde 1998), (Avineri 
1968) and (Eagleton 2007) For a recent example see (Sayers 2011) 
41 See (Geras 1971) 
42 (Colletti 1973), (Colletti 1989) 
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For the majority of these views, fetishism as ‘alienation’ overlaps with fetishism 
as ‘reification’ on one of two points. Unlike fetishism as ‘reification’ these accounts 
often treat mystification as a separate but related to fetishism.  Like fetishism as 
‘reification’, fetishism as ‘alienation’ provides a constitutive account of fetishism in 
which human social relations constitute external and alien entities that dominate 
society. However, these accounts are often centred on substantiating the underlying 
continuity between the early and later Marx rather than articulating how the theory of 
fetishism fits into Marx’s critique of political economy. As a result they tend to refrain 
from an explanation of how or why the characteristics and constitution of social 
domination offered in Marx’s theory of fetishism differ from Marx’s theory of 
alienation, 45 let alone providing a comparative account of fetishism and social 
domination in Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre. 
 
1.6 Fetishism as Value 
 
 The interpretation of fetishism as value is exemplary of what is termed value-
form theory. 46 Value-form theory’s founding documents are generally attributed to 
Soviet Scholars in the 1920s, who were later purged by Stalin.47 The Japanese Ono 
school also began working on Marx’s theory of value following World War II. 
However, value-form theory did not receive much attention until the 1960s in the 
context of the formation of the Neue Marx-Lektüre, which apart from singular 
exceptions like Coletti, can be said to have popularised value-form theory.  
 Many of the foremost pioneers of the Neue Marx-Lektüre were students of 
Adorno, including Alfred Schmidt, H.G. Backhaus, Helmut Reichelt and Hans-Jurgen 
                                                                                                                                          
43 (Geras 1971) 
44 (Perlman, 2007)  
45 (Colletti 1973) and Perlman’s writings on Marx are an exception. How they 
differentiate Marx’s account of alienation in The Manuscripts and Capital is discussed in 
my chapter on Marx.  
46 This term designates an array of theorists who offer a different interpretation of 
Marx’s theory of value. Notable contemporary figures who can be grouped into this 
school include Michael Heinrich, Dieter Wolf, Ricardo Belofiore, Patrick Murray, Fred 
Moseley, Moishe Postone, Chris Arthur, Gert Reuten and Werner Bonefeld and the 
Capital and Class / Open Marxism school. 
47 Foremost among these works is (Rubin 2007) and (Pashukanis 1987) Ryzanov’s 
MEGA were also influential to the methodology and philological approach taken up by 
value-form theory.   
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Krahl. These students seized on the Marxian concepts that Adorno used in his work 
as a basis for their studies of Marx. To study Marx they used philological methods 
that utilised previously neglected documents from Marx’s later research on the 
critique of political economy, such as The Grundrisse and the first edition of Capital.  
In this interpretation, fetishism is conceived as a central component of Marx’s 
monetary theory of value. This relationship is well summarised in Kuruma’s concise 
formulation that Marx’s section on the value-form provides an analysis of how money 
develops; the theory of fetishism describes why money develops.48 Fetishism is thus 
conceived as articulating Marx’s theory of value as a ‘real’ or ‘practical’ abstraction 
generated by the social form of capitalist production in which reified social relations 
personifies things, culminating in the abstract social domination of capital.  
The value-form interpretation can be seen to further distinguish itself from the 
other two typologies that conceive of Marx’s theory of fetishism as a central 
component of his theory of domination. In contrast to the classic Marxist Humanist 
conception of fetishism as ‘alienation’, value-form theorists have emphasised the 
shifting and developing nature of Marx’s thought. Along with the thin conceptions of 
fetishism as ‘alienation’ this strand therefore emphasises the differences in 
development and explication between the young and mature Marx.49 In contrast to the 
fetishism as ‘reification’ reading, value-form theorists also make a distinction between 
fetishism, reification and mystification in recent studies.50 Yet, as I will show in the next 
section, this interpretation predominantly focuses on Marx with little comparative 
work on Marx and his interpreters. 
 As can be seen, all of these types treat fetishism as constitutive of a larger 
conception of mystification or domination. This is reflected in historical or 
comparative accounts of fetishism.   
 
 
 
                                                
48 See (Kuruma 1957) 
49 Much of the work in this typology is based on emphasising the differences between 
different editions of Capital. 
50 Examples include: (Arthur 2013), (Belliofiore, 2011, 2012), (Heinrich 2012), (Clegg 
2007), (Schulz 2013), (Gray 2013) and (Ehrbar 2009) who distinguish between the 
fetish character of commodities, the fetishism of political economists and reification. 
This distinction is also similar to the conception of reification and fetishism as chiasmus 
in Valences of the Dialectic. (Jameson 2009) 
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2 Conceptual Histories 
 
 Despite the lack of a study of the development of the concept of fetishism from 
Marx through Western Marxism, a number of the foremost studies of the thinkers 
concerned assert similarities or differences between Marx and his interpreters in their 
respective conceptions of fetishism. There are also studies that provide continuous 
and discontinuous conceptual histories in these conceptual types that provide 
historical accounts of concepts that include fetishism. Yet, as I will show, neither of 
these types provides a sophisticated comparative history of the concept of fetishism or 
its role in theories of the construction and characteristics of social domination.  
 
2.1 Conceptual Continuity 
 
 Accounts of conceptual continuity between Marx and the figures associated 
with Western Marxism can fall into the following brackets. Historians of ideology such 
as Michael Rosen trace their conception of fetishism as ‘false consciousness’ through 
Marx, Adorno and Benjamin;51 other studies assert continuity in fetishism as 
‘reification’ between the work of Marx, Lukács and Adorno.52 Other studies of Lukács, 
Adorno and Lefebvre describe the continuity of their theory with Marx’s theory of 
alienation or estrangement.53 Finally, some value-form theorists stress similarities in 
themes between Marx, Lukács and Adorno.54 In many instances, these 
characterisations are hampered by the lack of an in-depth discussion of what the 
conceptions of fetishism, reification or alienation and estrangement consist in. Instead, 
the usual procedure is to assert continuity by presupposing a definition. This tends to 
be an expansive thematic definition, based on themes or conceptions that these 
                                                
51 For an opposing view see (McCarney 1980a) Social Theory and The Crisis of Marxism. 
Available at www.josephmccarny.com 
52 See (Arato 1979; Wiggershaus 1995; Cook 1996; Cook 2004) 
53 For Lukács see (Arato 1979) For Adorno see (Benzer 2011) and (Cook 1996; Cook 
2004) For Lefebvre see (Elden 2004) and (Jay 1986) 
54  Studies in this strand focus primarily on philological studies of Marx. So they have 
not provided any in-depth studies of other figures’ theory of fetishism. The closest that 
comes to comparative accounts can be seen in Backhaus and Reichelt’s frequent use of 
Adorno for their exegesis of Marx’s theory of value. For a similar contemporary 
comparison see two recent articles by Bonefeld on Adorno in (Holloway, Matamoros, 
and Tischler 2008) and Bonefeld (2012) For a comparison between Marx and Lukács 
see (Postone 2003) 
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theories hold in common, or which relies on claims of the theorist concerned that he 
or she is faithfully using the concept concerned.55 In order to demonstrate how these 
types of continuity are deployed in a historical study I will turn to Federic 
Vandenberghe’s A Philosophical History of German Sociology, which as the most in depth 
example of such a historical study, will demonstrate how such an approach prevents a 
close, rigorous, and comparative analysis of fetishism as a theory of the constitution 
and of the constituent properties of social domination.  
 In his ‘philosophical history’ Vandenberghe maps the concept of reification 
from Marx through Simmel, Weber, Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas.56 In 
order to do so, Vandenberghe offers an expansive thematic definition of reification 
that incorporates the differences in each respective thinker’s conceptions of social 
domination into his own conception of reification. Part of this expansive thematic 
definition includes grouping alienation and fetishism under the rubric of reification. In 
the course of the study Vandenberghe also makes frequent conceptual missteps that 
undermine his definitions of concepts and of the relations between concepts.  
 These errors, together with Vandenberghe’s expansive thematic definition of 
reification, can first be seen in his discussion of Marx in the introduction to this book. 
Vandenberghe begins by following Gillian Rose in pointing out that Marx only used the 
German word for reification (verdinglichung) twice; yet by the next page, and without 
any explanation as to why he has done so, one finds that he has moved to defining 
Marx’s social theory of domination solely in terms of reification. Vandenberghe then 
adds more unwarranted attributes to this definition of reification by amalgamating the 
related phenomenon of ‘personalization’ into this nebulous and unfounded definition.57 
This culminates in Vandenberghe’s development of a conception of reification that is 
                                                
55 This may be one of the reasons that Lukács or classic Marxist Humanist conceptions 
of fetishism have become popular conceptions of fetishism. 
56 The English translation is a truncated version of his longer two-volume study.  
57 ‘Reification is the opposite of personalization and is therefore conceptually related. 
While reification transforms something which is not a thing into a thing, personification 
transforms that which is not a person into a person […] Reification in Marx’s sense, 
can also be seen as personification: social or pseudo-natural forces are perceived and 
understood as quasi-human forces that rule the world.’ ((Vandenberghe 2009, 9)  
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expansive enough to include a methodological and social conception, each of which 
features several subtypes.58  
Like his discussion of reification, Vandenberghe’s studies of individual thinkers 
are also loose. Having defined Marx’s social theory in terms of reification in the 
introduction, his chapter on Marx begins by defining all of Marx’s work through the 
core theme of alienation.59 From there Vandenberghe moves to a discussion of the 
development of Marx’s work, wherein he argues that Marx’s thought moved from a 
philosophical-anthropological approach to a historical-structuralist one and remained 
based upon an underlying humanism and a conception of alienation. Along the way the 
terms alienation, reification and fetishism are treated interchangeably. The term 
‘fetishist-reification’ is eventually coined to describe the fetishism of commodities. Yet 
despite this terminological fusion, Vandenberghe’s able exposition of five aspects of 
fetishism – amongst which are included domination and mystification – omits a 
discussion of how his characterisation of the different aspects of fetishism relate to 
reification or alienation. Nor is it clear how fetishism is constituted, how it is 
constitutive, or how it relates to other aspects of Capital. We are left to assume they 
are somehow synonymous and stand at the core of Marx’s theory.  
Vandenberghe concludes with a reconstruction of Marx’s thought. This 
reconstruction is based on the theme of inversion that runs throughout Marx’s work, 
and on what he defines as the three aspects of Marx’s theory of reification: alienation, 
exploitation and fetishism. Vandenberghe places these aspects together in a synoptic 
table, in which alienation is defined as social reification and is confined to the 
production process. Commodity fetishism is termed the reification of consciousness 
and is treated as a mystified veil that is generated by the production process; this 
however goes against his earlier account of fetishism as including mystification and 
                                                
58 ‘Methodological reification subtypes are the critique of reism and naturalism. Social 
reifications are the social critique, the critique of false consciousness and the critique 
of science.’ (Vandenberghe 2009, 31) 
59 ‘All Marx’s work can be systematically reconstructed through the single, central 
concept of alienation. The theory of alienation, as Marx first developed it in his 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, is the core of his thought […] one 
might say that most, if not all of Marx’s thought, as well as the critical categories of 
Capital, are already discernable in their early form in this text […] the Manuscripts 
anatomy in effects provides a key to the ‘anatomy’ of Capital.’ (Vandenberghe 2001, 33) 
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domination.60 In the end, we are left with a rather vacuous summary of Marx’s social 
theory, according to which ‘reification, defined as the imposition of social order 
through the external constraint of material forces, that results from and leads to the 
reduction of action to its solely strategic dimension, is not history’s last word.’61   
Moving to Lukács, Vandenberghe makes a strong claim for continuity between 
his work and that of Marx and other Western Marxists. In Vandenberghe’s view there 
is continuity between Lukács’s theory of reification and Marx’s theory of fetishism.62 At 
the same time Lukács’s theory of reification forms the Kuhnian paradigm of western 
Marxism.63 For Vandenberghe, Lukács’s theory of reification therefore ‘generalizes the 
theory of commodity fetishism beyond the field of economics.’64 This, he claims, is 
done in an objective and subjective manner: objectively ‘reification is related to the 
autonomous functioning of market pseudo-things as ‘second nature’;65 subjectively, 
‘reification refers to alienation, the objectifying attitude that humans adopt towards the 
products of work that confront them as foreign objects.’66 Thus, in a passage that 
                                                
60 Compare Vandenberghe’s earlier definition of three of the facets of commodity 
fetishism (Vandenberghe 2009, 62) in that social relations between people are 
mediated by economic relations between things, and become confused with them; that 
commodities exist independently as pseudo- persons; that things, commodities and 
their movement lead, dominate and direct men, not vice versa, with his later definition 
of commodity fetishism in the synoptic table on (Vandenberghe 2009, 66) There he 
writes that  ‘commodity fetishism, defined as a well-founded distortion of perception 
induced by the structure of the market economy, makes practical processes and social 
relations disappear behind a veil of naturalness and materiality’. In the first discussion, 
fetishism would seem to include alienation and domination. In the second, it seems to 
solely consist in false consciousness. Yet Vandenberghe provides no discussion or 
grounds for this change.  
61 (Vandenberghe 2009, 68) 
62 In the first part of the essay, entitled ‘The Phenomenon of Reification’, Lukács 
develops his concept of reification on the basis of the Marxist analysis of commodity 
fetishism. The central idea of this analysis is that in an economic system that is totally 
oriented around market production of exchange values, human actions are 
coordinated by the market, with the result that human social relations take the form 
of an abstract and pseudo-natural objectivity which disguises the trace of its origins and 
social determinants behind a rigorous system of autonomous and oppressive laws 
(Vandenberghe 2009,146) Note that this definition of fetishism possesses some of the 
characteristics of Vandenberghe’s original definition in which fetishism possesses the 
attributes of autonomous domination, rather than his second definition which treated 
fetishism solely as a form of mystification.  
63 (Vandenberghe 2009, 140) 
64 (Vandenberghe 2009,146) 
65 (Vandenberghe 2009, 146) 
66 (Vandenberghe 2009, 146) 
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synthesises his theoretical conflations and missteps Vandenberghe makes the following 
claim: 
 
 [I]nspired by Simmel, Lukács deduces and rediscovers the theory of alienation of 
labour from the theory of commodity fetishism.  Marx's Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 were only published in 1937, Lukács could not have known them 
any more than Simmel. However, in this instance, it is less through a synthesis of Marx 
and Simmel- as was the case in Towards the Sociology of Modern Drama-- than through a 
fusion of the Marxist category of 'abstract work' and Weber's category of formal 
rationality that Lukács reconstructs the theory of economic alienation67 
 
In Vandenberghe’s view this fusion of the Marxist category of abstract labour 
and Weberian formal rationality is achieved through what he terms Lukács’ s theory of 
the ‘cash nexus.’68 Vandenberghe argues that Lukács follows Marx’s theory of 
commodity fetishism – and the theory of alienation that Lukács discovers in it – in 
holding that the ‘coordination of action….is imposed from outside by the autonomous 
movement of things on the market. (cash nexus)’.69 This leads ‘actors’ to ‘adopt the 
objectifying attitude of instrumental-strategic action towards themselves and others’ 
and for ‘thingness’ to become the determining modality of thought.’ It is also where 
the Weberian conception of formal rationality is fused with Marx. 
Vandenberghe’s account of Lukács’s theory of reification therefore posits a 
strong continuity between Lukács’s and Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism and 
alienation as subtypes of their theories of reification. No consideration is given to how 
Lukács’s conception of reification may differ from Marx’s conception of commodity 
fetishism. Furthermore, as with his account of Marx, no space is devoted to how 
Lukács conceives of the social constitution of reification, or to the interrelated 
constitution of its many different facets. 
The same is the case for Vandenberghe’s study of Adorno. He makes a strong 
claim for continuity between Lukács and Adorno, and holds that Lukács’s theory of 
reification ‘is the paradigmatic kernel of critical theory.’ Critical theory, he claims, 
modifies this kernel in two ways: on the one hand, it ‘abandons’ Lukács’s theory of 
                                                
67 (Vandenberghe 2009, 147) 
68 Unfortunately, it is difficult to understand what aspect of Lukács’ s theory is being 
referred to with this term. 
69 (Vandenberghe 2009, 148) 
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‘class consciousness’; on the other, ‘it radicalizes the Weberian-Marxist theory of 
reification.’70  
According to Vandenberghe, this radicalisation starts from the premises that 
‘every aspect of Adorno’s sociology is so centred on reification that it becomes a 
virtually ontological category.’71 Ironically, the same is true for Vandenberghe’s 
treatment of the different aspects of Adorno’s thought, which in Vandenberghe’s view 
are all part of Adorno’s theory of reification. Thus, Adorno’s criticism of reification in 
Negative Dialectics does not ‘imply’ that he ‘rejects the category of reification as such.’ 
Nor is it even a ‘rejection of Lukács’ category of reification.’72 Instead, Adorno ‘simply 
strips Lukács’ s category of its humanist and optimistic connotations, inflecting it in a 
proto-structuralist direction that is closer to the older than the younger Marx, and 
more fatalist than revolutionary in its implications.’73 Unfortunately, since: (a) 
Vandenberghe’s prior discussions of Marx do little to distinguish between the young 
and old Marx, and (b) he doesn’t define what Adorno’s proto-structuralism consists of, 
we are left to guess why what seems like a discrepancy between Adorno and Lukács’ s 
conception of reification is not a rejection of it, or at least discontinuous with it.   
Vandenberghe’s treatment of Adorno’s social theory as tantamount to his 
theory of reification can be seen in his discussion of the exchange principle. In 
Vandenberghe’s view the exchange principle’s ‘importance cannot be underestimated.’ 
This is because – in another curious misstep that seems to separate Lukács from 
Marxism, leaving Marxism untreated – it ‘enables both the articulation of the negative 
dialectics and Marxism and the conjunction of Lukács’ and Nietzsche’s categories of 
reification.’74 But little consideration is given to how these forms are derived from 
exchange. Instead we get a characterisation of the Nietzschean strand of reification as 
being equivalent to the Dialectic of Enlightenment, while the Lukácsian strand is 
concerned with modern capitalist societies and the cash ‘nexus.’ In so doing, 
Vandenberghe furthers the claim of continuity between the conceptions of commodity 
fetishism put forward by Marx, Lukács and Adorno, together with that between Lukács 
and Adorno’s conceptions of reification.  
                                                
70 (Vandenberghe 2009, 158) 
71 (Vandenberghe 2009, 191) 
72 (Vandenberghe 2009, 189) 
73 (Vandenberghe 2009, 189) 
74 (Vandenberghe 2009, 190) 
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As a consequence, Vandenberghe’s philosophical history of German sociology 
can really be said to be a sociologist’s account of German social philosophy. This is 
because Vandenberghe’s definition of reification is so broad that: (a) there is no 
discussion of why distinct aspects of each thinker’s social theory which they define  as 
alienation or fetishism are interpreted as reification nor (b) any consideration of 
whether these distinct aspects of each writer’s theory may vary with their conception 
of reification or with the other authors he covers.  Furthermore there is no 
consideration of how each thinker conceives of these interpretations in tandem with 
the constitution of these social forms of domination; nor is there any focus on how 
each thinker understands the ways in which the different aspects of their theories 
relate to each other. Finally, there is no discussion of how the conceptual bases of 
reification differ in each respective thinker. As a result, rather than a comparative 
history that accounts for these elements in regard to the concept of fetishism as a 
theory of the constitution and of the constituent properties of social domination, 
Vandenberghe’s ‘philosophical’ history merely summarises each specific thinker’s social 
theory under the thematic of reification. 
 
   2.2 Conceptual Discontinuity 
 
 In contrast to accounts of fetishism that stress continuity there are also a 
number of studies that stress discontinuity. By ‘discontinuity’ I mean that these studies 
stress important conceptual differences between the thinkers’ conceptions of 
fetishism. In the majority of these accounts, Lukács, Adorno and other theorists are 
characterised as presenting inferior accounts to Marx’s theory that are discontinuous 
with the latter. This can be seen in the account of fetishism as ‘false consciousness’ 
that can be found in the work of Joe McCarney;75 it can also be seen in the 
Althusserian accounts of fetishism developed by Althusser and Balibar,76 and in the 
type of fetishism as ‘alienation’ in Lucio Colletti’s criticism of Lukács and Hegelian 
Marxism.77 Furthermore, a great many of these accounts of discontinuity can be found 
                                                
75 See (McCarney 1980a) 
76 See (Althusser 2005), (Althusser and Balibar 2009) and (Balibar 2007) 
77 See (Colletti 1973, 1989) For another account of discontinuities see (Frisby 1992) 
and (Geras 1971) 
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in the value-form interpretations of fetishism.78 While these discontinuous accounts 
often provide pertinent insight into the differences between thinkers, they often do so 
to the detriment of considering how aspects of each thinker’s interpretation of 
fetishism might prove complementary, which I will draw out in my conclusion. 
Furthermore, these accounts of discontinuity lack a detailed comparative account that 
focuses on fetishism and social domination. The closest there is to the later is Gillian 
Rose’s comparative study of reification, which I will now show that it has the virtue of 
pointing out important differences and deficencies in theories of reification, but 
nevertheless it involves a problematic analysis of fetishism. 
This is because Gillian Rose’s influential treatment of reification in Marx, 
Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno is symptomatic of fetishism as ‘reification’.79 However, in 
contrast to Vandenberghe, Rose’s work is exceptional in three respects: (1) it 
emphasises the conceptual differences between Marx, Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno’s 
theories; (2) it bases these conceptual differences on the different aspects of Marx’s 
theory of commodity fetishism that Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno drew on; (3) it also 
points out some areas of weakness in how reification has been used by neo-Marxism. 
Yet, Rose’s work is also indicative of the type of fetishism as ‘reification’. This is 
because Rose draws an unsatisfactory distinction between Marx’s theory and those of 
Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno: she designates Marx’s theory as ‘commodity fetishism’, 
and Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno’s as ‘reification.’ On the one hand, this distinction is 
unsatisfactory because of Rose’s weak contention that Marx did not have a theory of 
reification; a contention that rests on Marx having only used the word verdinglichung 
twice.80 On the other hand, it is also unsatisfactory because Rose gives no grounds for 
why she designates Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno’s social theories of domination as 
theories of reification. The latter is actually in contradiction to her philological 
treatment of Marx, because Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno use the terms ‘fetishism’ 
                                                
78 Cf. Postone’s criticism of Lukács and The Frankfurt School in (Postone 1996) See 
also (Reichelt 2007) 
79 (Rose 1979)  
80 This ignores: (a) the fact that Lukács uses several words other than vergdinglichung to 
describe his theory of reification; and (b) that Marx uses phrases such as veraslichung 
and dinglich to describe the process of social constitution that results in fetishisation 
and reification, or indeed in what Ehrbar translates as the ‘personification of things and 
reification of persons.’ 
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and ‘reification’ for what Rose defines solely as reification.81 This leads Rose to draw a 
problematic distinction between Marx’s theory of fetishism and Lukács and Adorno’s 
theories of reification which prevents her from analyzing the role of fetishism in Lukács 
and Adorno’s theories of social domination.  
In addition, the grounds upon which Rose bases her distinction between Lukács 
and Adorno’s utilisation of Marx’s theory of fetishism are problematic. This is because 
she draws an erroneous distinction between Marx’s theory of the labour process and 
his theory of value; a distinction that leads her to argue that Lukács’ theory of 
reification is based on the former, and that Adorno’s is based on the latter. Yet, as I 
will show, Marx’s theory of value incorporates the labour process as well as the forms 
of value, such as exchange value and use-value. 82 This undermines the bases upon 
which Rose grounds her distinction.  
Finally, Rose makes some prescient criticisms of the ways in which neo-
Marxists have used the concept of reification to generalise Marx’s theory of value to 
social institutions and culture whilst omitting from their claims, accounts of surplus 
value, of the state or of power. Rose does not however apply these criticisms to 
Lukács and Adorno’s particular theories, although she does note that their theories fail 
to make the distinction between concrete and abstract labour83, and that they do not 
provide an account of surplus-value. This is true, as I will show; but it is not clear, 
simply on the basis of the identification of these omissions, as to how the inclusion of 
these categories would solve the problems in Lukács and Adorno’s theories.  
Despite these problems, Rose’s work is highly influential and is used as the 
basis for defining or distinguishing Marx, Lukács and Adorno’s conception of fetishism 
as ‘reification’ in the work of prominent scholars such as Martin Jay and Deborah 
Cook.84 It is also a sophisticated and compact study of reification that comes closest to 
my aims in this thesis. This is because, in contrast to Vandenberghe, Rose’s work 
provides a comparative examination of how each thinker’s different interpretation of 
                                                
81 This distinction is especially egregious in Benjamin, who used the term ‘fetishism’ far 
more than he used the term ‘reification’.  
82 One of these points of disagreement will be that Lukács and Adorno use Marx’s 
theory of value not for an explanation of how value is socially constituted, but rather 
for social critique. The problem, contra Rose, is not their decision to omit the concept 
of surplus-value, but rather that their theories do not include a substitute concept that 
covers the role that surplus-value would otherwise play.   
83 This criticism is also put forward by (Postone 1996)  
84 See also recent examples in (Jarvis 1998), (Dahms 2011) and (Hall 2011)  
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commodity fetishism provides a basis for their theories of social domination. However, 
her ungrounded distinction between fetishism and reification, as well as the thinkers 
she focuses on, leaves ample room for a comparative study of fetishism as a theory of 
the construction and of the characteristics of social domination in Marx, Lukács, 
Adorno and Lefebvre. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
 As the preceeding has shown, there is a large amount of literature on fetishism. 
I have offered an overview of this literature by placing it within a typology. These types 
differ in conceiving fetishism as constitutive of a type of domination, forms of 
mystification, or combinations of the two. They also differ over the matter of whether 
these conceptions entail continuity or discontinuity between Marx and Western 
Hegelian Marxists. Those who argue for continuity usually do so in comparative or 
historical analyses that stress continuity between their expansive thematic 
conceptions; those who stress discontinuity usually do so through a comparative 
analysis that finds the claims of the writers involved to be inferior to those of Marx.  
What these accounts do not provide, however, is an accurate and in-depth 
explanation of how each respective thinker’s conception of fetishism differs from each 
other, and of how these different conceptions of fetishism factor into their respective 
theories of the constitution and the constituents of social domination. In contrast, this 
thesis orients itself by focusing on fetishism as a distinct concept rather than treating it 
as a type of alienation, reification etc, and by providing a comparative account of how 
this distinct conception is conceived and deployed in theories of the composition and 
of the characteristics of social domination.  
To that end the overall aim of my thesis is to provide this comparative account, 
considering the coherence of these respective theories of fetishism and social 
domination and the possibility of their contemporary relevance. Each of my chapters 
on Marx, Lukács Adorno and Lefebvre therefore differs with the accounts assayed 
above by focusing on: (1) how each particular thinker conceives of fetishism; (2) how 
these particular conceptions of fetishism fit into each particular thinker’s theory of the 
constitution and the constituents of theories of social domination; (3) an evaluation of 
the problems with these theories’ conception of fetishism and social domination. I 
proceed in chronological order starting by examining the role Marx’s theory of 
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fetishism plays in the Capital. I then turn to examine how Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre 
interpret Marx’s theory in order to formulate a theory of social domination inclusive 
of social entities that were not covered in Marx’s analysis.  I first look at how Lukács 
interprets fetishism in his theory of reification. Following this I examine the role 
fetishism plays in Adorno’s social theory. I then examine how Lefebvre’s interpretation 
of fetishism fits into his ongoing attempts to theorise how domination is socially 
embedded. I finish with a three-part conclusion that summarises and compares: (1) my 
analysis of each thinker (2) my criticisms of each thinker and (3) my consideration of 
the possible relevance of these theories for a contemporary Marxian critical theory of 
fetishism and social domination.  
 In Chapter One I focus on how Marx conceives of fetishism in the constitution 
and the constituents of his theory of social domination. Since Marx is also the 
foundation for typological accounts of fetishism, and of Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre’s 
interpretation of fetishism, I begin by distinguishing Marx’s theory of fetishism from his 
theory of alienation. I then examine how Marx conceives of fetishism and the role it 
plays in the composition and the characteristics of his theory of social domination.   
 I argue that Marx’s conception of what I deem fetish-characteristic forms is 
central to his theory of value.85 This theory conceives of value as a real or practical 
abstraction that is constituted by the social form of capitalist production. The term 
‘fetish-characteristic form’ is used to describe the abstract and autonomous property 
of these forms. It is deployed in Marx’s discussion of how the fetish-characteristic 
forms of commodities, money and capital invert, dominate and thereby compel 
individual actions through reified social relations and the personification of things; a 
discussion that culminates in Marx’s analysis of fetishism’s role in the constitution and 
the constituent of social domination in the Trinity Formula. I criticise Marx’s theory by 
pointing out how its ambiguities, contradictions and unfinished status undermine its 
coherence. I also point out how Capital’s analysis of capitalism at its ideal average raises 
the problem of relating its theory to empirically complex social reality. 
  In chapter two I turn to the role that Lukács’ conception of fetishism plays in 
his theory of the social constitution and the constituents of the social domination of 
                                                
85 Marx uses the terms fetish-character (Fetischarakter), fetish-form (Fetischform and 
Fetischgestalt) and fetish-characteristic form (Fetishcharatig form) in his analysis of this 
aspect of his theory of fetishism. For the sake of simplicity I render these as fetish-
characteristic forms. 
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reified society. I argue that Lukács’ utilises a double-faceted interpretation of fetishism 
to articulate these aspects of his theory of reification. As this interpretation of 
fetishism is premised on replacing Marx’s account of the abstract and autonomous 
properties of capitalist labour with the idea of social objectification as such, I argue 
that the first component of this interpretation is a view according to which fetishism 
arises through a process of objectification that separates subject from object. This 
process is reflected in the second component of Lukács’ interpretation, which is the 
contention that these objects are transformed into things that possess the fetishistic 
properties of false objectivity. This notion of fetishism fuses his Hegelian, Marxian, 
Simmelian and Weberian positions and allows him to articulate a theory of fetishism 
and social domination which I will refer to as the dominating mystification of his theory 
of reification. I criticise Lukács’ theory of reification by arguing that; (a) his conflation 
of objectification and fetishism and (b) his method of social generalisation fail to 
articulate an account of how and why reification is indicative of pervasive social 
domination.    
   In Chapter Three I argue that Adorno’s conception of fetishism and social 
domination can be distinguished into two phases. The first phase utilises commodity 
fetishism in conjunction with his concepts drawn from Lukács, Benjamin, Freud and 
Marx as a means of conducting micrological studies of domination within the field of 
mass culture. In the second phase, he uses the concept of fetishism to treat the 
abstraction of exchange as an autonomous objective abstraction and to conceive of the 
social constitution of objective and subjective forms of domination. These forms of 
domination are conceived as being constitutive of the exchange abstraction by 
interpreting elements of Hegel, Weber, Freud, Kant, and Heidegger’s theory in 
conjunction with it. I close by criticising Adorno’s theory for its insufficient account of 
the genesis of the exchange abstraction and for his insufficient account of how it is 
constitutive of society. These insufficiencies ultimately undermine his critical theory as 
a critical theory of society.   
 In Chapter Four I argue that Lefebvre conceives of fetishism as a ‘concrete 
abstraction’ that is generated by social praxis, but which is never entirely determinate 
of it. I further argue that this conception forms the basis for three phases in which 
Lefebvre attempts to theorise how social domination is socially embedded. I begin with 
an examination of Lefebvre’s classical humanist conception of socially embedded 
domination in his Critique of Everyday Life, which uitilises fetishism as the basis of his 
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proposed study of analogous forms of objective and subjective alienation in everyday 
life. In phase two I show that Lefebvre’s revision of the critique of everyday life 
abandons this classic Marxist humanist model in favour of a study of objective 
‘terrorist’ forms of domination that are modelled on his conception of concrete 
abstraction, and which are coupled with a fragmented conception of alienation that is 
no longer based on his classic Marxist-humanist notion of the total man. In phase three 
I show how Lefebvre’s writings on cities and space transpose his theory of concrete 
abstraction to the urban form and the production of space while jettisoning the 
explanatory power of the concept of alienation. I close by criticising the unsystematic 
nature of Lefebvre’s theory and his reliance on a simplistic dualistic opposition, which, 
as in Lukács and Adorno, leads Lefebvre to undermine his theory of social domination 
through omitting a coherent account of its constitution and constituents. 
 The conclusion of the thesis is composed of three parts. In the first part I 
substantiate the lineage of fetishism and social domination I have provided by drawing 
together and comparing my analysis of fetishism and social domination in Marx, Lukács, 
Adorno and Lefebvre. In part two I move to consider the relevance of these particular 
theories for a contemporary critical theory of fetishism and social domination that 
avoids the pitfalls of Honneth’s and Postone’s theories. I begin by drawing out my 
criticisms of each thinker and considering whether their respective theories provide a 
coherent and cohesive critical social theory of fetishism that articulates the 
constitution and constituents of social domination. I conclude that each of these 
theories ultimately fails to provide one. I argue that in order for a critical theory of 
society to have a more cohesive standpoint, the question of a complex account of the 
social genesis of these types of fetishism must be addressed. Failing to do so leaves 
critical theory reliant on an account of fetishism in which social relations are said to 
underlie but do not adequately ground pervasive forms of social forms of domination. I 
close in part three by considering how elements of these theories of Marx, Lukács, 
Adorno and Lefebvre might be integrated into a contemporary critical theory that 
provides an account of the genesis and interrelation of aspects of each of these 
theories thus providing the potential basis for a contemporary Marxian critical theory 
of fetishism and social domination.
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I. Marx, the Fetish-Characteristic Forms 
of Value and Social Domination 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I focus on how Marx conceives fetishism and on the role that it 
plays in the constitution and the constituents of his theory of social domination. I close 
by evaluating the coherence of this theory.  As I mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, I examine how fetishism is used as a theory to articulate the collective 
constitution of social phenomena that possess autonomous and inverted properties 
that structure, compel and maim individuals. The term social domination is intended to 
convey that there is an integral link between the way a society is structured and these 
fetishistic types of domination that are held to be characteristic of this society. In my 
examination of Marx I focus on how this theory of fetishism is articulated in Capital and 
how it is indicative of a theory of social domination.  
 Since this chapter also provides the grounds for: (a) differentiating my focus on 
fetishism from the interpretations of fetishism that I covered in my literature review, 
and (b) my subsequent comparative study of Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre, my 
interpretation is necessarily accompanied by a lengthy exposition and clarification. In 
attempting to elucidate Marx’s account I will distinguish (a) my own interpretation of 
the role that fetishism plays in Marx’s account of social domination from the functions 
that it performs in other notions of fetishism qua domination, such as the fetishism as 
‘alienation’ and the fetishism as ‘reification’ readings. Furthermore, these expository 
elements also aim (b) to provide a clear basis upon which the subsequent chapters of 
the thesis can establish the way in which Marx’s own notion of fetishism and social 
domination differs from that advanced, under the rubric of fetishism, by Lukács, 
Adorno and Lefebvre.  
  To these ends, the chapter will draw on and develop the analyses presented in 
existing studies of Marx’s work that have interpreted his theory of fetishism in the 
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context of his monetary theory of value.86 In doing so, I will argue that: (1) Marx’s 
theory of fetishism integrates his form-analysis87 with his account of reified social 
relations and the personification of things and that it thereby provides an account of 
the social constitution of the forms of value. This will constitute one of the most 
important arguments in the present chapter. My contention here is that the fetish is 
not only intimately wedded to the forms of value, but that it also pertains directly to 
their constitution, i.e. to their production and reproduction within society. 
Consequently, I will show that it directly informs the inversion of subjects and objects 
entailed by the operation of the form of value within capitalist society. I will thus aim 
to demonstrate that Marx’s account of fetishism is not simply an account of reification 
or alienation but rather a sophisticated theory of impersonal social domination. 
  In addition, and by extension, I will argue (2) that Marx’s concept of what I 
term ‘fetish-characteristic forms’88 describes the autonomous and personified 
constituent properties of these forms of value: forms that invert and thereby dominate 
and compel individuals’ actions. In other words, I will show that the fetish is not the 
exclusive preserve of the commodity. Instead, I will argue that the numerous forms of 
value described within Marx’s account are themselves possessed of fetishistic 
characteristics and that this is due to the manner in which they function as aspects of a 
sovereign and entirely dominant economic system.   
                                                
86 These interpretations by I.I. Rubin, H.G. Backhaus, Helmut Reichelt, Werner 
Bonefeld, Chris Arthur and Michael Heinrich form an aspect of the value-form 
interpretation of fetishism. As discussed in my literature review, this interpretation: (1) 
examines fetishism as an aspect of Marx’s monetary theory of value, and (2) conceives 
of Marx’s theory of value as explication of the genesis and sui generis properties of 
capitalist social domination. However, these authors’ analysis of fetishism is usually 
focused on the commodity. Thus by drawing on it I indicate that I extend the 
orientation and analysis of this interpretation to Marx’s analysis of the fetish-
characteristic forms of money and the Trinity Formula.  
87 The term form-analysis is used to refer to Marx’s analysis of the forms of value in 
part one of Capital. It is also used to emphasise that Marx’s analysis focuses on these 
forms prior to his analysis of the particular social relations that constitute them.   
88 This term draws on the distinction that authors such as (Bellofiore 2011; Bellofiore 
2012), (Ehrbar 2009), (Clegg 2008), (Arthur 2013), (Schulz 2013) and (Gray 2013) 
show Marx to make between fetish-character and fetishism. As they demonstrate, the 
former refers to the socially specific properties of Marx’s theory of value, while the 
latter refers to political economists’ trans-historical hypostatisation of these socially 
specific properties. The term ‘fetish-characteristic form’ is drawn from Marx’s various 
designations of the fetish-characteristic properties of the forms of value such as 
Fetischcharakter, Fetischform, Fetischgestalt and Fetischcharatigform. I use fetish-
characteristic forms to designate these properties for the sake of clarity.    
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 Consequently, I will argue (3) that Marx’s account of these fetish-characteristic 
forms, and indeed of their socially constituent and as a result dominating properties, 
proceeds – within the pages of Capital – from the commodity, through money and 
capital (where these forms become more autonomous at the same time as their 
dominating properties become more concrete and socially embedded), and ultimately 
culminates in Marx’s account of The Trinity Formula. The Trinity Formula provides an 
account of the constitution, of the constituents and of reproduction of the ‘enchanted, 
perverted topsy-turvy world’89 of capital and therefore the terminus in how Marx’s 
theory of fetishism articulates his theory of social domination.90  
 One of the first steps that I will make towards demonstrating these claims is to 
distinguish Marx’s theory of social domination from his account of alienation. To that 
end, I begin in this chapter by placing Marx’s early conception of social domination in 
relation to the positions developed in his late work. Having done so I then move to 
examine how Marx employs fetishism as an aspect of his theory of the constitution and 
the constituents of social domination. I begin by defining how Marx understood the 
object and method of both Capital and of his theory of value, and I then outline how 
his monetary theory of value conceived capitalism as an historically and socially specific 
(a) class-based form of labour allocation, and (b) as a collectively constituted form of 
social domination. I demonstrate the former by presenting an overview of the general 
formula of capital. In order to substantiate the latter, I turn to fetishism, and thereby 
to the three primary arguments of this chapter (as set out above).  The chapter closes 
with some criticisms of Marx’s theory. I point out that its endemic ambiguities, 
contradictions and its unfinished state undermine its coherence. I also argue that 
Marx’s technique in Capital of engaging with capitalism through the study of ideal 
averages invites problems as regards the difficulty of relating its theory to the 
complexity of empirical social reality. 
 
1. The Young Marx and Social Domination 
 
 Helmut Reichelt, H.G. Backhaus and Lucio Colletti point out that Marx’s 
mature work has a degree of continuity with his earlier conception of social 
                                                
89 (Marx 1993a)  
90 As I will demonstrate in the ensuing chapters, Marx’s technique of applying fetishism 
to social domination differs from Lukács’s, Adorno’s and Lefebvre’s.  
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domination. Yet, as they also point out, the theory of value in his later work 
represents what Colletti calls the ‘ever-deepening grasp of a single problematic’, in 
which ‘the limitations of the early texts are constituted […] by the decisive importance 
of Marx’s own later advances in his mature economic writings.’ 91 In this section, I 
highlight these similarities and differences between Marx’s early and later positions in 
order to distinguish his theory of fetishism from his theory of alienation.  
Since much of the literature on fetishism was written within the context of the 
debate between humanist and Althusserian Marxists my discussion is led to engage 
with both sides of this debate. On the one hand, I argue against the Althusserian 
notion of an ‘epistemological break’; on the other, I also argue against the classic 
Marxist humanist notion that the theory of fetishism amounts to what Lefebvre refers 
to as the ‘economic form of alienation.’92 In contrast, I argue that contrary to popular 
interpretations and assumptions, many of the structural concepts of Marx’s theory of 
social domination involved in his critique of political economy were formulated prior to 
his development of a theory of alienation in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. 
In addition, I also argue that the theory of alienation that Marx puts forward in The 
Manuscripts represents the first time that the conceptual structure of his theory of 
domination is conceived in terms of a mode of social production.  
Consequently, my discussion will show that the theory of fetishism does indeed 
constitute a continuation of Marx’s early work, but that this continuation only refines 
some aspects of the theory of alienation propounded in The Manuscripts. 
 
1.1 The Conceptual Structure of Marx’s Theory of Domination 
 
 As Reichelt shows, what he terms the ‘construction’ of Marx’s theory of social 
reality serves as ‘the organizing skeleton’ that runs throughout Marx’s works, albeit 
‘dressed in various costumes.’93 This ‘construction’ consists in several key aspects that 
form the structure of Marx’s theory of social domination. The steps are as follows: (1) 
Marx conceives social reality as constitutive of forms that are created by a process of 
social constitution; (2) this process of social constitution consists in a dynamic and 
                                                
91 Colletti in (Marx and Marx 1975, 47) 
92 (Henri Lefebvre 2008a) 
93 (Reichelt 2005, 57) and (Reichelt 2000) See also numerous articles by Werner 
Bonefeld such as (Bonefeld 2001a) 
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contradictory process in which essence must appear and hide itself in appearance; (3) 
these forms of social reality are constitutive of a sensuous-supersensuous and inverted 
world in which people are dominated by the abstractions they collectively constitute. 
In Reichelt’s view these aspects of Marx’s conceptual structure of domination 
are evident as far back as his doctoral thesis and become fleshed out prior to the 
Manuscripts in the period in which Marx’s theory of social reality was influenced by 
Ludwig Feuerbach. As Backhaus points out, Feuerbach’s influence on Marx can be seen 
in three ways: Marx thinks (1) that social inversion can be grasped because essence can 
be conceived independently from its forms of appearance; (2) the conception of 
essence as a process of human constitution that appears in ‘alienated’ and 
contradictory forms; and (3) his critical-genetic method as the derivation of these 
estranged and contradictory forms of appearance from human social constitution.94 I 
will refer to these elements of Marx’s account, outlined by Reichelt and Backhaus, as 
the conceptual structure of Marx’s theory of social domination. For the time being I 
refrain from providing a general definition of the content of these concepts of 
‘appearance’ and ‘inversion’ due to the different forms they take in Marx’s account of 
the state, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and in Capital. The ensuing 
analysis demonstrates how the content of this conceptual structure shifts.  
These elements can be seen as a whole in The Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the 
State,95 where Marx conceives of the bourgeois state as an abstract form of what 
‘amounts to an autonomisation and inversion of human social practice.’96 By the time 
that he wrote this text, Marx had already developed his structural conception of social 
domination and he had applied it to a theory that cast the social constitution of the 
state as a form of social domination.97 This is why Colletti rightly states that The 
Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State can be seen as the embryo of the concept of 
fetishism that Marx presented in Capital. However, it is not until The Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts that the conceptual structure of Marx’s account of domination 
is applied to political economy, albeit in the context of a theory of alienation. 
 
 
                                                
94 (Backhaus 2005) 
95 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
96 (Reichelt 2005, 57) 
97 (Marx and Marx 1975)  
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1.2  Social Domination in the Theory of Alienation  
 
 One of the important consequences of Marx’s conceiving of political economy 
as constitutive of social domination is that it leads him to grant primacy to productive 
activity. Chris Arthur points out that the conception of productive activity that Marx 
develops in The Manuscripts is more complex than is generally appreciated.98 This is 
due to an important distinction that Marx makes between the ontology of productive 
activity and the socially specific form that this activity takes in ‘labour.’ For Marx, 
productive activity consists in the process of objectification that occurs in the course 
of the interaction between human beings and the natural world.99 This conception of 
ontology thus grants a central role to human relations with things, and conceives of 
society as constitutive of relations between people and things. ‘Labour’ thus consists in 
the socially specific way in which productive activity is conducted in capitalist society. 
100   
At this point in his development, Marx’s explication of the genesis of these 
forms is marked by his Hegelian conception of abstract labour, his Smithian conception 
of capital, and the absence of a monetary theory of value.101  However, Marx still 
conceives of this socially specific activity – ‘labour’ – as constituting the political 
economic forms of private property. These innovations are crucial for how Marx 
conceives of ‘labour’ as constitutive of a mode of social domination in which the forms 
of political economy are analysed as external and alien things: as forms that function as 
autonomous, inverted mechanisms of domination that operate through aggregating 
social labour along class-antagonistic lines. The emergence of these innovations can be 
seen in Marx’s theory of alienation, where this nascent theory of domination is still 
wedded to Marx’s idea of human nature and human estrangement. 
                                                
98 (Arthur 1986) 
99 I will show in the next chapter that this conception of objectification differs from the 
Hegelian and Simmelian idea of objectification that is integral to Lukács’s theory of 
reification.  
100 For a more detailed discussion of this distinction see (Arthur 1986) This conceptual 
distinction between social activity and labour will also be utilised in Capital in the 
distinction Marx makes between the trans-historical activity of labour and the specific 
social character of capitalist labour. 
101 See (Chitty 1998) 
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The distinction that Marx makes between alienation and estrangement in his 
theory of alienation is often missed by commentators.102 This distinction is however 
important because it shows that Marx defines alienation in terms of the constitution of 
social domination through alienated labour and estrangement as the dehumanised state 
that humans are reduced to insofar as this alienated form of social constitution 
estranges them from their human essence. 103  
Alienated labour is thus the result of the socially specific activity of ‘labour’. It 
consists of workers creating and alienating the products they produce to owners in 
exchange for wages. This alienates the workers’ product which, as alienated labour, 
‘now stands opposed to it [the worker] as an alien being, as a power independent of the 
producer.’104  
This alien power consists in the autonomous forms of political economy. For 
Marx ‘private property is […] the product, result, and necessary consequence, of 
alienated labour.’105 Private property thus functions as ‘the means’106 through ‘which 
labour alienates itself” as ‘the realization of this alienation.’107 This process is therefore 
constitutive of social reproduction (i.e. that reproduction in which ‘[t]he labourer 
produces capital and capital produces him, which means that he produces himself; man 
as a labourer, as a commodity, is the product of this entire cycle’108) and it forms a 
dynamic in which ‘the devaluation of the human world increases in direct relation to 
                                                
102 This distinction is often neglected because the two separate words that Marx uses – 
Entäusserung and Entfremdung – are usually both translated as either alienation or 
estrangement. Chris Arthur convincingly argues that they are distinct. He translates 
Entäusserung as alienation and Entfremdung as estrangement. See the appendix in 
(Arthur 1986) 
103 This conflation is particularly true of commentary that amalgamates fetishism with 
alienation. These types of commentary often describe fetishism as part of Marx’s 
theory of alienation or estrangement with little discussion of why they have chosen 
either term, or if they see any relation between alienation and estrangement.  
104 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
105 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
106 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
107 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
108 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
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the increase in the value of the world of things’.109 This causes alienated labour to 
become an autonomous, alien and inverted form of social domination:  
 
The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour 
becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists 
independently, outside himself, and alien to him, and that it stands opposed to him 
as an autonomous power.  The life which he has given to the object sets itself 
against him as an alien and hostile force.110 
 
 Alienated labour is also constitutive of three types of dehumanisation in which 
humanity is estranged from its essence. These types of dehumanisation rely on the 
mirror-image of human nature as ‘species-being’ that Marx develops in The 
Manuscripts.111 These types of estrangement are ‘consequences’ that ‘follow from the 
fact that the worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object.’112  The 
first two types of estrangement thus occur in the condition of alienated labour, where 
the workers become estranged from their own species-activity of production and from 
their product.113 These two primary forms however lead to two broader types of 
estrangement: for since workers are alienated from their own activity, they become 
estranged from their own essence; and as a result, humanity is estranged from its own 
nature.   
As I have shown, The Manuscripts contain a number of rich and intriguing 
comments that represent Marx’s first insights into social production and political 
economy.  In these comments, Marx translates the elements of his structural 
conception of social domination from the political form of the state into forms of 
political economy. Private property is thus interpreted as the form in which the 
                                                
109 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
110 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
111 The term mirror-image is taken from (Reichelt 2005) who includes it as another 
element of Marx’s theory of social reality. For perspectives that offer more in-depth 
investigations of species-being and which argue for it as a normative ground, see 
(Dyer-Witheford 2004)  and (Chitty 1993 and 1997) 
112 (Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
113 This is what Marx terms self-estrangement. As Marx notes 'Here we have self-
estrangement’ whereas in alienated labour ‘we had the estrangement of the thing.’ 
(Marx and Marx 1975) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm 
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essence of alienated labour appears as an external, alien, autonomous and inverted 
form of domination. This aspect of Marx’s theory of alienation is developed in Marx’s 
critique of political economy. Yet there are two important points of difference that the 
critique of political economy has with The Manuscripts. In the first place, there is little 
evidence that Marx held onto the anthropological elements of his theory of alienation 
as the basis for this theory of the constitutive elements of social domination. 114  
Secondly, Capital provides a more sophisticated explanation for the constitution and 
the constituents of capital as a form of social domination than is provided by The 
Manuscripts.  
 
2. The Critique of Political Economy 
 
 Before proceeding to an analysis of Marx’s conception of fetishism and its role 
in this theory of the composition and characteristics of social domination it is 
necessary to show how fetishism fits into Marx’s analysis in Capital. In order to do so it 
is important to outline what Capital is, and to state how Marx conceives of capital 
itself. To see this in more detail, we need to understand how Marx characterised: (1) 
the object of his analysis in Capital; (2) the method of Capital; and (3) his theory of 
value. 
  
2.1 The Object of Capital 
 
 The object of Marx’s analysis in Capital relies on the notion of scientific 
abstraction that can be found in a few stray comments throughout that work. This can 
be seen in Marx’s comment that Capital’s analyses rely on ‘the power of abstraction.’115 
In this case, Marx’s use of abstraction refers to the abstract, ‘ideal’ model of capital; 
hence Marx’s comment in volume Three that he is ‘only out to present the internal 
                                                
114 This is not to say that Marx refrained from describing social domination with similar 
constituent elements. There are many passages in his mature writings that focus on 
how capitalist labour deforms people; there are also passages that discuss the 
importance of indifference between people. However, these passages are not based on 
an explicit theory of human nature, nor are they portrayed as estranged human 
essence.  
115 (Marx 2004, xviii) 
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organization of the capitalist mode of production’ in ‘its ideal average, as it were.’116 
The way in which this ideal average relates to Marx’s empirical examples can be seen 
in the introduction to Capital I. There Marx states that he uses England as a ‘main 
illustration of the theoretical developments’ of this ‘ideal’, and that in doing so he aims 
to demonstrate how the ‘natural laws of capitalist production’ operate in their ‘iron 
necessity.’117 The object of Marx’s analysis is therefore an ideal model of capital.118  
  
2.2 The method of Capital 
 
 The method of Marx’s analysis pertains to the distinction that he makes 
between his method and his presentation.119 The former is the scientific formulation of 
his critical genetic method in which he demonstrates how essence appears and hides 
itself in appearance. This is reflected in his definition of science vis-à-vis social reality 
(‘all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things 
directly coincided’)120 and in his scientific analysis of capital: ‘where science comes in is 
to show how the law of value asserts itself.’121 These strands are tied together in 
Marx’s analysis in Capital by his double-faceted critique of political economy. On one 
level, this critique unites essences and appearances by ‘exposing’ how the law of value 
asserts itself as a socially constituted and constitutive form of social domination. On 
another level, it criticises the discipline of political economy, in which ‘the fetishism 
peculiar to bourgeois political economy […] metamorphoses the social, economic 
character impressed on things in the process of social production into a natural 
character stemming from the material nature of those things.’122 
Marx’s method of presentation concerns how he presents this critique of ‘the 
internal organization’ of capital at its ‘ideal average.’ This notion of presentation is 
                                                
116 (Marx 1993, 970)   
117(Marx 1992, 970) 
118 This point was first made by Michael Heinrich. See (Heinrich 1999 and Heinrich 
2012). 
119 The issue of Marx’s method has of course received much attention and is still a 
matter of debate, much of which is not germane to the topic of this thesis. However, 
the distinction Marx makes between method and presentation is relevant. For a 
further discussion of this issue see (Schmidt, Arthur)  
120 (Marx 1992, 970) 
121 (Marx 1988) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_07_11.htm 
122 (Marx 1993a) http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1885-c2/ch11.htm 
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based on another sense of abstraction. Marx’s analysis of capitalism is presented at 
different levels of abstraction in Capital. There is some inconsistency, but on the whole, 
Capital moves from the level of the form-analysis of the commodity through to more 
concrete levels of abstraction. This movement proceeds in what can be termed a 
genetic ‘dialectical’ fashion, in which the different categories presented at different 
levels of abstraction are shown to logically derive and internally relate to each other.123 
However – and this point should be stressed – this dialectical method of presentation 
does not mean that Marx’s method itself can simply be characterised as ‘dialectical.’ As 
Marx puts it: 
 
[I]t is one thing for a critique to take a science to the point at which it admits of a 
dialectical presentation, and quite another to apply an abstract, ready-made system of 
logic to vague presentiments of just such a system.124  
 
The method of Marx’s analysis in Capital therefore unites his critical-genetic 
account of the constitution and constituents of social domination with his presentation 
of this analysis at different levels of abstraction.  
 
2.3 Marx’s Theory of Value 
 
 The object and the method of analysis of capital are applied in his theory of 
value. Marx is often read as advocating a neo-Ricardian and ‘substantialist’ conception 
of value, and on this reading Marx amends Ricardo’s theory by showing that 
exploitation is a necessary part of the process of production of capital. However, as 
Marx stated in several places, he considered his analysis of the value-form to be one of 
his most important contributions.125 Marx’s analysis in fact provides a monetary theory 
                                                
123 This can be seen in comments Marx makes reflecting on his method in Notes on 
Wagner 73-75 of Hans G. Ehrbar’s translation. Some people also draw on Marx’s 
discussion of the method of his presentation in the preface to The Grundrisse to 
account for the method of presentation in Capital. However, there is some variation 
between the two. For instance the presentation in Capital does not consistently 
proceed from the abstract to the concrete. This is discussed to some extent below. 
For a more detailed discussion see (Heinrich 2012) 
124 (Marx and Engels 1984, 261) As I will show in the course of this thesis this 
emphasises an important difference between Marx’s method and Lukács’s, Adorno’s 
and Lefebvre’s ‘dialectical’ interpretations of Marx’s method.  
125 See Marx’s statement that ‘Political economy has indeed analyzed value and its 
magnitude, however incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within 
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of value that is different from the neo-Ricardian interpretation of Marx, and which 
conceives value as the historically specific social character of capitalist labour.126 Marx’s 
monetary theory of value is concerned with how the social character of capitalist 
production is constituted by social relations, and with how these social relations 
function through the medium of money to distribute labour. Marx makes this clear in 
his letter to Kugelmann;  
 
It is self-evident that this necessity of the distribution of social labour in specific 
proportions is certainly not abolished by the specific form of social production; it can 
only change its form of manifestation. Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only 
thing that can change, under historically differing conditions, is the form in which those 
laws assert themselves. And the form in which this proportional distribution of labour 
asserts itself in a state of society in which the interconnection of social labour 
expresses itself as the private exchange of the individual products of labour, is 
precisely the exchange-value of these products.127   
  
As I will show, this concept of value, and the socially specific importance of 
exchange that it entails, is reflected in two aspects of Marx’s theory of capitalism: the 
means by which labour is distributed in capitalism through the socially specific 
mechanism of exchange and the class relation; and the way in which the allocation of 
labour through exchange lead to the social constitution and constituents of a socially 
unique form of domination in which the jointly composed autonomous forms of value 
invert and thereby coerce and rule individuals.  
 This can be seen firstly by applying the structural conception of Marx’s theory 
of social domination - first discussed above in reference to Marx’s early works - to his 
theory of value. By doing so, I will demonstrate that Marx  
 
(1) Uses his critical-genetic method to account for the social constitution of capital 
by deriving it from the dynamic and contradictory process in which social 
labour appears and hides itself in the socially specific forms of value. 
                                                                                                                                          
these forms. But is has never once asked the question why this content has assumed 
that particular form.’ (Marx 2004, 174)   
126 As discussed in the conclusion below there are vestiges of a neo-Ricardian theory 
of value in Marx’s work that undermine the coherence of his monetary theory of 
value.  
127 (Marx 1968) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_07_11.htm 
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(2)  Conceives of capital as constitutive of sensible-supersensible alienated and 
inverted forms of abstract domination that are collectively constituted and 
reproduced by the socially specific type of social labour that appears in these 
forms of value.  
 
Although these two issues are clearly interrelated and are presented together 
by Marx, I will separate them here for the sake of clarity. I will outline the former 
whilst presenting an account of how commodities, money, capital and the class relation 
function to allocate labour through the impersonal money form; I will then show how 
the two issues relate to the allocation of labour in Marx’s theory of fetishism which 
accounts for the constitution and constituent dominating properties of this historically 
specific social form. I end by showing how they are drawn together in his account of 
the Trinity Formula.   
 
3. Capital 
   
 As I have noted, Marx’s analysis of capital proceeds from the abstract to the 
concrete. What I have not yet mentioned, however, is that it does so in a complex 
manner. Marx would later present a helpful résumé of the structure of this 
presentation in his Notes on Wagner, in which he also demonstrates the link between 
the form-analysis undertaken in the first part of Capital with the rest of the latter 
work: 
 
In my analysis of the commodity I do not come to a halt with its dual way of presenting 
itself, but immediately proceed to show that in this duality of the commodity there 
presents itself the dual character of the labour whose product it is: of useful labour, i.e. 
the concrete modes of the labours which create use-values, and of abstract labour, of 
labour as expenditure of labour power, regardless of the ‘useful’ way in which it is 
expended (on which the presentation of the production process later depends); that in 
the development of the value form of the commodity, in the final instance its money 
form, and thus of money, the value of a commodity presents itself in the use-value of the 
other commodity, i.e. in its natural form; that surplus-value itself is derived from a 
‘specific’ use-value of labour power belonging to it exclusively128  
 
In what follows below I outline the relevant aspects of this trajectory, beginning 
with the form-analysis of simple circulation and then moving to the general formula for 
                                                
128 (Marx 1996) http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1881/01/wagner.htm 
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Capital, to surplus value and to the class-relation. This form-analysis accounts for the 
forms of value – commodities and money – within which capitalist social labour 
necessarily appears as a result of atomised production for exchange. 
 
3.1 The Form-Analysis 
 
 The form-analysis begins with the commodity and unfolds in a complex manner. 
Marx moves from defining the commodity as consisting of use-value and exchange-
value to arguing that exchange-value consists of the form of appearance of a ‘third 
thing’ that commodities have in common when they are brought into relation with 
each other. Different commodities have this ‘third thing’ in common when their use-
values, and thus the particular, concrete type of labour necessary for their production, 
are abstracted away.129 What remains is abstract labour, which is the substance of 
what Marx defines as value. Abstract labour is not generated by concrete production 
nor is this abstraction carried out conceptually prior to the act of exchange. Rather, it 
is an abstraction that stems from atomised production and is realised in exchange.130  
This abstraction is therefore generated ‘behind the backs of individuals’131 who 
                                                
129 This is made clearer in the French edition of Capital where Marx added the 
following sentence: ‘it is evident that one abstracts from the use-value of the 
commodities when one exchanges them and that every exchange relation is itself 
characterized by this abstraction’ Quoted in (Ehrbar 2009. 439) 
130  This is made clear in the following: ‘If we say that, as values, commodities are 
merely congealed masses of human labour, our analysis reduces them to the 
abstraction ‘value’ but does not give them a form of value distinct from their bodily 
forms. It is otherwise in the value relation of one commodity to another. The first 
commodity’s value-character steps here forward through its own relationship with the 
second commodity. By setting the coat, for example, as a thing of value equal to the 
linen, the commodity owners also set the labour embedded in the coat equal to the 
labour embedded in the linen […] by equating tailoring with weaving, the commodity 
owners reduce tailoring in fact to what is really equal in the two kinds of labour, that 
they are both human labour. Through this detour over tailoring they say that weaving 
too, in so far as it weaves value, has nothing to distinguish it from tailoring, and, 
consequently, is abstract human labour. Only the expression of different sorts of 
equivalents makes the specific character of value creating labour apparent, by in fact 
reducing the different kinds of commodities to their common quality of being human 
labour in general.’ (Marx 2009, 132)  
131 ‘The different proportions, in which different sorts of labour are reduced to simple 
labour as their standard, are established by a social process that goes on behind the 
back of the producers and, consequently, seems to be fixed by custom.  In the values 
coat and linen, abstraction is made from the difference of their use-values; now we have 
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participate in exchange,132 and appears in the exchange-value of commodities in the 
form of the value-relation between them, where the ‘common substance that 
manifests itself in the exchange-relation [and thus in the] exchange-value of 
commodities is their value.’ 133  
 The magnitude of value – which derives from socially necessary labour time – is 
also determined in exchange. Commodities are only ‘realised’ as bearers of value if 
they are successfully exchanged on the market. For this to occur, the time it took a 
specific commodity to be produced is not compared with another specific commodity. 
Rather, the specific commodity is compared to the total abstract labour of society. In 
this comparison, socially necessary labour time establishes whether or not the 
commodity will be exchanged. If the commodity is exchanged, value is realised in it in 
the form of exchange-value. If the commodity is not exchanged then it is deemed not 
to possess value. Since this process goes on behind the backs of individuals it is 
contingent on whether or not commodities are exchanged. There is no assurance that 
commodities will be exchanged and realised as values in exchange. 
 Marx points out that people are already aware that commodities operate 
within this value-relation in the value-form of money. But Marx moves to logically 
                                                                                                                                          
seen that also in the labour that represents itself in these values, abstraction is made 
from the difference of its useful forms of tailoring and weaving.’ (Marx 2009, 134-5)  
132 Marx uses some unfortunate physiological metaphors when describing abstract 
labour in later editions of Capital.  But the majority of his other descriptions counter 
these clunky metaphors. These descriptions show that abstract labour is not a 
substance that is produced by the burning of calories, nor is it a purposive mental 
operation. As Marx states later, ‘not an atom of matter’ enters into this process of 
abstraction in which ‘value is realized only in exchange, i.e. in a social process.’ (Marx 
2009, 105) Later, while discussing the three peculiarities of the equivalent form, Marx 
further clarifies the specific social character of these categories by stating that the 
‘objective character as values is purely social and that this objective character only 
appears in ‘the social relation between commodity and commodity.’ (Marx 2009, 110) 
Finally, in the French edition, Marx unequivocally states that ‘[t]he reduction of various 
concrete private acts of labour to this abstraction of equal human labour is only 
carried out through exchange, which in fact equates products of different acts of 
labour with each other.’  These elements of abstract labour are also mirrored in 
Marx’s discussion of how capitalist labour 'achieves practical truth as an abstraction’ in 
The Grundrisse (Marx, 1973) For a more in-depth treatment of the controversy see 
(Bonefeld 2010) For in-depth discussions see (Rubin 2007) and (Arthur forthcoming)  
133 Marx clarifies what he means by substance in Notes on Wagner: ‘nowhere do I speak 
of the common social substance of exchange-value. I rather say that the exchange-
values (exchange-value without at least two of them, does not exist) represent 
something common to them, which is ‘quite independent of their use-values [i.e. their 
natural form], namely value.’ (Marx 1996, 18)  
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derive the money-form from this specific character of atomised social production for 
exchange; ‘a task never attempted by bourgeois economists.’134  
 The logical derivation starts with the simple form of value. Marx states that the 
secret of all forms of value ‘lies’ in this simple form. The ‘secret’ that Marx describes 
here is the necessary asymmetrical relationship in the value relation. In this relation 
one commodity necessarily serves as the equivalent form of value. The other 
commodity serves as the relative form of value. This means that the relative form 
expresses its value in the equivalent form.  As a consequence, the value of the relative 
form is ‘expressed’ in the ‘natural’ body of the equivalent form. Thus the relative form 
acquires a value form different from its bodily form. The equivalent form thus 
‘becomes a thing in which value is manifested, or which represents value in its tangible 
form.’135 This entails that ‘the first commodity plays an active role; the second a passive 
one.’ The equivalent form therefore possesses an exclusive and asymmetrical power 
over the relative form: it exclusively ‘embodies’ value because the relative form must 
successfully equate itself with the equivalent form in order to be exchanged. The 
equivalent form is consequently ‘the form of being directly exchangeable with other 
commodities’ and expresses ‘the magnitude of commodities in the relative form.’ 
 This asymmetrical power of the equivalent form establishes its three 
peculiarities. Because the equivalent form embodies the value of other commodities its 
value becomes a use-value. The ‘natural form’ of the commodity thus becomes the 
form of value.136 This is what Marx calls the first peculiarity of the equivalent form. The 
natural form of the equivalent form thus ‘represents a supra-natural property: their 
value, which is something purely social.’137 At the same time, the equivalent form, ‘just 
                                                
134 Here we see one of the points in which Marx’s theory of value distinguishes itself 
from Ricardian theories of value.  
135 (Marx 2009, 143) 
136 The first peculiarity which strikes us when we consider the equivalent form is that 
the use-value becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, value. The natural form 
of the commodity becomes the form of value. But, note well, this reversal happens for 
the commodity b (coat, or maize, iron, etc.) only if some arbitrary other commodity A 
(linen etc.) enters into a value relation with it, and this reversal holds only within this 
relation. Since a commodity cannot relate to itself as equivalent and therefore it 
cannot make its own physical skin into the expression of its value, it must relate to 
another commodity as equivalent, and therefore must make the physical skin of 
another commodity into its own value form. (Marx 2009, 148)  
137 (Marx 2009, 149)  
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as in everyday life, expresses value, as if its value form were given by nature.’138 The 
first peculiarity of the equivalent form leads to the second peculiarity of the equivalent 
form: ‘concrete labour becomes the form of manifestation of its opposite, abstract 
human labour.’139 This means that an inversion occurs whereby the product of 
concrete labour that produced the equivalent form ‘becomes the expression of 
abstract human labour.’140 In Marx’s view, there is ‘nothing mysterious’ about the fact 
that a coat and linen ‘possess’ labour. But ‘in the value expression of the commodity 
the matter is stood on its head.’ The second peculiarity of the equivalent form leads to 
its third peculiarity: for ‘private labour becomes the form of its opposite, namely 
labour in its immediately social form.’141  
At this point Marx expands his analysis from the simple picture that he has 
given of the equivalent and relative form to the money form. In his ensuing analysis, 
Marx argues that the money form – or what Marx also terms the general equivalent – 
is thus a logical necessity that is generated by the acts of atomised commodity 
exchange and that it enables exchange per se.  
 
It thus becomes evident that because the objectivity of commodities as values is the 
purely ‘social existence of these things’, it can only be expressed through an all-sided 
social relation consequently the form of their values must be a socially valid form.142  
 
This makes the ‘bodily form’ of the general equivalent ‘count as the visible 
incarnation, the general social chrysalis state, of all human labour.’143 This ‘bodily form’ 
thus represents abstract labour ‘positively’ by equating itself with all other forms of 
labour, and by reducing ‘all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being 
labour in general.’144 For Marx, this shows that capitalist social production necessarily 
leads to the generation of a socially valid, general equivalent money form; a form that 
would serve as the socially valid expression of value: 
 
The General form of value, in which all products of labour are presented as mere 
congealed quantities of undifferentiated human labour, shows by this general coverage 
                                                
138 (Marx 2009, 149) 
139 (Marx 2009, 150) 
140 (Marx 2009, 150) 
141 (Marx, 2009, 150) 
142 (Marx 2009, 158) 
143 (Marx 2009, 159) 
144 (Marx 2009, 159) 
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alone that is the social expression of the world of commodities. Thus it makes it plain 
that within this world the general human character of labour forms its specific social 
character.145 
 
In Marx’s view, any commodity can play the role of the general equivalent. But 
it is not until the general equivalent has been established as a particular commodity 
that it gains ‘objective fixity and general social validity.’146 Once this is established, ‘the 
natural form’ of the commodity playing the role of the equivalent ‘grow(s) together’ 
with its equivalent function.147 The equivalent thus ‘becomes the money commodity’ 
and assumes the money function: ‘Playing the part of General equivalent within the 
world of commodities becomes its specific social function and consequently its social 
monopoly.’148 As a consequence, atomised social production for exchange is realised in 
the value relationship between commodities and money. 
 
3.2 The General Formula of Capital, Surplus Value and the Class 
Relation 
  
 These forms of value compose the general formula of capital, which is a 
process that consists in a movement between money, commodities and more money 
(M-C-M’). While this process of circulation accounts for how value is realised it does 
not account for valorisation. Such an explanation is provided in Marx’s analysis of how 
surplus value originates in ‘the hidden abode of production’149 and is measured through 
another form of monetary exchange: the wage relation. The wage relation also forms 
the basis of the reproduction of the class relation. Both are dependent on the 
historically unique position of the proletariat, which as a result of the ongoing process 
of primitive accumulation, consists in a class of individuals ‘who are free in a double 
sense.’150 Since the proletariat does not own property and is legally free, workers are 
compelled to sell their productive activity in the commodified form of labour-power to 
the property-owning capitalist class. This commodity of proletarian labour-power is 
the ‘source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself’, or of what Marx 
                                                
145 (Marx 2009, 159)  
146 (Marx 2009, 161) 
147 (Marx 2009, 161) 
148 (Marx 2009, 162) 
149 (Marx 2009, 279) 
150 (Marx 2009, 873) 
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terms ‘surplus value.’ Surplus-value is generated because the wage form – as the non-
equivalent exchange of equivalents – does not compensate proletarians for the entirety 
of the value their labour generates. Instead, the wage form only pays proletarians 
enough to reproduce themselves at the bare minimal social average. The remainder of 
the value they produce – surplus value – becomes the property of the capitalist who 
endeavours to transform it into capital on the market.  
  This has several consequences. The wage form is the basis of (1) ‘The law of 
capitalist production’ which ‘can be reduced simply to this: the relation between 
capital, accumulation and the rate of wages is nothing other than the relation between 
the unpaid labour which has been transformed into capital and the additional paid 
labour necessary to set in motion this additional capital’.151 It is also central to (2) the 
class relation in which the capitalist class endeavours to valorise capital through the 
exploitation of proletarian labour, and through the other means that Marx outlines in 
the rest of Capital; means that constitute the law of value. Thirdly, it founds (3) the 
manner in which labour is allocated in the specific form of capitalist social production 
(which, at this level of abstraction is divided among class-based lines) in the endeavour 
to valorise capital. This, as we shall see, receives its most concrete treatment in the 
Trinity Formula. Thus capital consists in a specific form of social labour that is 
generated by the class relation, is expressed by the private exchange of individuals in 
the impersonal form of money and is premised on the exploitation of a ‘doubly free’ 
work force.  
 However, this account of Marx’s analysis of the socially specific manner in 
which capital allocates labour does not account for the other aspect of Marx’s theory 
of value, such as the way in which the collectively constituted forms of value function 
as the autonomous entities – personified things that invert, compel and dominate 
individual actions. It is this aspect of Marx’s theory of value that is brought out in his 
theory of fetishism. 
 
4. Fetishism 
 
As I will demonstrate Marx’s theory of fetishism explains the way in which 
these forms arise within the mode of social domination that they engender and 
                                                
151 (Marx 2009, 771) 
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perpetuate. It does so by showing them to be the socially specific forms in which social 
labour appears within capitalist society, and by showing that these forms are possessed 
of the fetish-characteristic attributes that I referred to above.  In demonstrating this 
latter point Marx shows that these forms function autonomously, that they operate 
through inverting the relation between subject and object, and that they thereby 
dominate the individuals concerned. As I indicated above, one of the points that I want 
to stress here is that these fetish-characteristic forms are not aspects of a mode of 
false consciousness but rather of the social character of capitalist labour. They pertain 
to the sense in which the manifestations of abstract social labour, as bearers of value, 
function as personified autonomous entities that dominate and compel the actions of 
the individuals who collectively constitute them.  It will also be made clear that this 
theory of fetishism differentiates itself from Marx’s account of social domination in his 
theory of alienation by providing an account for the constitution of social domination 
that relies on the categories of abstract labour, capital, surplus value and the 
constituent properties of social domination that include Marx’s development of the 
fetish characteristic forms of the personified properties of things. 
I’ll begin here by showing how these elements of Marx’s theory are expressed 
and identifiable within the section of the first chapter of Vol. 1 that deals with the 
fetish-character of commodities. I will then move on to demonstrate that they are 
magnified in the fetish-characteristic form of money and in the fetish-characteristics of 
capital. When capital is introduced in Marx’s unfolding exposition, the fetish-form 
becomes more abstract and autonomous, whilst conversely domination becomes more 
concrete in the personifications of the class-relation. I draw this out in an examination 
of the Trinity Formula. This is because the Trinity Formula, according to Marx’s own 
résumé of the three volumes of Capital, provides the most concrete application of the 
concept of fetishism; for it presents a theory of the composition and characteristics of 
social domination which also accounts for the particular manner in which social labour 
is allocated.  
 
4.1 The Fetish Character of Commodities 
 
 Commodity fetishism has received ample commentary and has also provided 
the basis for many social theories.  In these commentaries and theories, the section of 
Capital that details ‘[t]he fetish-character of commodities and its secret’ is often 
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interpreted independently of the first three sections of the chapter in which it is 
located. This reductive interpretation misses that the four sections in chapter one of 
Capital form a conceptual whole, so that Marx’s analysis of the fetish-character of 
commodities relies on understanding ‘its secrets’, i.e. that which Marx has shown in 
the chapter’s first three sections. Marx refers to this relationship between the four 
sections of part one at a later point in Capital152 
 
Immanent in the commodity there is an antithesis between use-value and value, 
between private labour which must simultaneously manifest itself as directly social 
labour, and a particular concrete kind of labour which simultaneously counts as merely 
abstract general labour, between the personification of things and the reification of 
persons.153 
 
It also neglects that just as Marx understands the commodity to be the elementary 
form of wealth (‘[t]he wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of 
production reigns, presents itself as an ‘immense heap of commodities.’ The single 
commodity presents itself as the elementary form of wealth.’154), so too is the fetish-
character of the commodity the elementary form of fetishism. The neglect of such 
factors often leads to interpretations of fetishism as what Lefebvre terms the 
economic form of alienation, and grant to this section a pervasive importance such as 
Lukács’ statement that the fetish character of commodities ‘contains within itself the 
whole of historical materialism’155, and form the basis for a number of interpretations 
                                                
152 Backhaus’ remark on the ramifications of this analysis of fetishism are pertinent qua 
the relationship between alienation and fetishism: ‘The presentation of commodity 
fetishism which misses its essence can be thus characterized: the authors refer to 
some sentence from the fetishism chapter of Capital and interpret them, conceptually 
and also for the most part terminologically, in the manner of the German Ideology, a 
manuscript in which the meaning of the labour theory of value was still unknown. The 
usual quote is ‘the social connections of their private labour appears as what they are 
ie., not as immediate social relations of persons in their labouring activity but rather as 
thing-like relations of persons and social relations of things. From this quote it is simply 
read that social relations have ‘made themselves autonomous’ vis-a-vis humans. A 
comment which constitutes the theme of the early writings and has become a 
common-place of conservative cultural critique under the catchword of alienation or 
depersonalization. The point of the critique of political economy, however, is not the 
mere description of this existing fact, but the analysis of its genesis.’ (Backhaus 1980, 
103-4)  
153 (Marx 2009, 209) Fowkes also translates this passage as ‘the conversion of things 
into persons and persons into things.’ 
154 (Marx 2009, 125)  
155 (Lukács 1972, 170)  
  
58 
of fetishism as ‘false consciousness’, fetishism as ‘alienation’, and fetishism as 
‘reification’.  
In contrast to these accounts, I will now show how Marx’s theory of 
commodity fetishism integrates his form-analysis of the commodity into an account of 
the collective constitution of the fetish-character of the commodity through the reified 
social relations of persons and the personification of things,156 and that it conceives the 
constituent fetish-characteristic properties of the commodity as the autonomous 
personification of things which invert, and thereby dominate and compel individuals.  
The integration of Marx’s theory of fetishism with his preceding analysis is 
signalled in the third paragraph of the fetish-character section. What Marx attributes 
to the ‘mysterious character’ of the commodity-form refers to the arguments of the 
first three sections of the chapter. For the first time, Marx also describes how human 
activity is reified and objectified in the process of constituting this form. The first 
sentence in this paragraph – ‘the equality of the kinds of human labour takes on a 
physical form in the thing-like objectivity of the products of labour as values’157 – thus 
refers to abstract labour and its ‘embodiment’ in the value of commodities; an 
‘embodiment’ that was laid out in the first three sections. The second sentence refers 
to socially necessary labour time’s determination of value.158 The final sentence 
addresses how social relations are reified as value is realised in exchange:  ‘the 
relations between the producers, in which those social determinations of their labours 
asserts themselves and are sustained, take the form of a social relation between the 
products of labour.’159  
 The next paragraph is the celebrated passage on the fetish-character of 
commodities. It is here that Marx moves to discuss ‘the personification of things’ in the 
fetish-characteristic form of the commodity. His description of the fetish-characteristic 
form of the commodity is thus reliant upon his previous analysis, because the fetish-
characteristic form of the commodity is generated by that which he summarised in the 
previous paragraph: 
                                                
156 A similar distinction between personification and reification is made by Rubin and 
Althusser in the entry on fetishism in the glossary to Reading Capital. See (Althusser 
and Balibar 2009, 313)  
157 (Marx 2009, 164)  
158  ‘[T]he measure of labour by time takes the form of the quantity of the value of the 
commodities.’ (Marx 2009, 281-82)  
159 (Marx 2009, 164)  
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What is mysterious about the commodity form is therefore simply that the 
characteristics of men’s own labour are reflected back to them as objective 
characteristics inherent in the products of their labour, as quasi-physical properties of 
things and that therefore also the social relation of the producers to the aggregate 
labour is reflected as a social relation of objects, a relation which exists apart from and 
outside of producers. Through this quid pro quo, the products of labour become 
commodities, sensuous things which are at the same time extrasensory or social. The 
commodity form of the products of labour, and the value-relation in which it 
represents itself, have absolutely nothing to do with the physical nature of the 
products or with any relations they have as physical objects. It is the specific social 
relation of the people themselves which assumes for them, as in an optical illusion, the 
form of a relation of things … I call this the fetishism of commodities, which sticks to 
products of labour as soon as they are commodities.  
 
It is important to stress here that this fetish-characteristic form of the 
commodity is described as ‘the personification of things’ or as relations between 
personified things. This is because the personification of the fetish-character of 
commodities refers not to how labour is transformed into things160 but to Marx’s 
discussion of value and the value relation, which takes place in exchange in the 
relations between things. The fetish-character of the commodities – like the 
peculiarities of the equivalent form – therefore refers to properties that stick to 
commodities by virtue of the process of atomised production and exchange, and 
through the value form, which make commodities the bearers of value.161 This can also 
                                                
160 As is the case with Lukács and the adherents of the fetishism of ‘reification’ account 
of fetishism. 
161 Marx refers to this relationship between the fetish-character of commodities and 
analysis of value in Notes on Wagner where the properties of the fetish-character of 
commodities are referred to as the social character of labour in which value appertains 
essentially to the thing itself. ‘Now if Rodbertus – and I will point out later why he did 
not see it – had gone on to analyse the exchange-value of commodities - for it only 
exists where commodity occurs in the plural, different sorts of commodities, then he 
would have found ‘value’ behind this form of appearance. If he had further gone on to 
investigate value, he would have further found that here the thing, the ‘use-value’, 
amounts to a mere concretisation of human labour, as the expenditure of equal human 
labour-power, and therefore this content is presented as the concrete character of the 
thing, as a character appertaining essentially to the thing itself, although this objectivity 
does not appear in its natural form which, however, necessitates a special form of 
value.  He would have found, then, that the ‘value’ of the commodity merely expresses 
in a historically developed form something which also exists in all other historical 
forms of society, albeit in a different form, namely the social character of labour, insofar as 
it exists as expenditure of ‘social’ labour-power.  If, then, ‘the value’ of the commodity is 
merely a particular historical form of something which exists in all forms of society, the 
same must be true of the ‘social use-value,’ as it characterises the ‘use-value’ of the 
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be seen in Marx’s description of the value component of the commodity as a ‘sensible-
supersensible’, ‘absurd’ or ‘perverted’ form. The later term is a translation of verru ̈ckte 
Form which has two meanings that signify the mad, insane and displaced social 
characteristics of the commodity form.162      
  In addition, the paragraphs that follow the definition of the fetish-character of 
commodities demonstrate the link between the phenomena of reified social relations, 
the personification of things and Marx’s form-analysis.  This can be seen in Marx’s 
explicit statement that, as his ‘foregoing analysis has already demonstrated, this fetish-
character of the world of commodities arises from the peculiar social character of 
labour which produced them.’163 Marx uses some unfortunate terminology such as 
‘reflection’ and some similarly unfortunate metaphors taken from the natural sciences 
in his definition of the fetish-character of commodities. However these paragraphs 
signify that the latter is not a false consciousness generated by the complexity of 
exchange, but rather a practical abstraction, collectively constituted by people 
performing the activities of atomised production for exchange that renders the value 
relation necessary and which necessarily constitutes commodites as personified 
bearers of value. 
 The first paragraph that follows this famous passage thus provides an 
explication of the necessarily reified social relationships that occur as a result of 
atomised production for exchange. This means that ‘since the producers do not come 
into social contact until they exchange the products of their labour, the special social 
characteristics of private labour appear only within this exchange.’164 So ‘that the 
private labours take effect, through their activity, as elements of the social aggregate 
labour only through the connections which the act of exchange establishes between 
                                                                                                                                          
commodity. Mr. Rodbertus has the measure of the magnitude of value from Ricardo; 
but he himself has neither examined nor grasped the substance of value any more than 
Ricardo did; e.g. the ‘communal’ character of the [labour process] in the primitive 
community as the common organism of the labour-powers belonging together, and 
hence that of their labour, i.e. the expenditure of these powers. (Marx 1996) 
162 For a further discussion of the translation of this term see (Werner Bonefeld et al. 
1995), (Heinrich 2012)  
163 As Ehrbar notes Marx’s draft of this sentence makes the relation even more 
explicit. ‘If we ask the further question where this fetish-character of the commodity 
stems from, this secret has already been resolved by the preceding analysis. It springs 
from the special social character of labour which produces commodities and the 
corresponding peculiar social relation of the commodity producers.’ (Marx 2009, 458)   
164 (Marx 2009, 165)  
  
61 
the products and, through their products’ mediation, between the producers.’165 As a 
result Marx’s conception of appearance qua perverted social constitution - in which 
the social relation appears in the value relation - can be seen in the following: 
 
To the producers therefore, the social relations between their private labours appear 
as what they are, i.e., not as direct labour processes themselves, but rather as material 
relations of persons and social relations of things.166  
 
 The second paragraph integrates this account of reified social relationships with 
the form-analysis of the first three sections. This paragraph also emphasises that the 
practical activity of atomised production’s realisation in exchange is constitutive of the 
practical abstraction of value. The former can be seen in relation to abstract labour 
and value in the value-relation when Marx states that ‘It is only during […] exchange 
that the products of labour acquire a uniform social objectivity as values, which is 
distinct from their varied sensuous objectivities as use-values.’167 These issues are fused 
in the following statement: ‘Equality of entirely different kinds of labour can be arrived 
at only by an abstraction from the real inequality, by a reduction to the characteristic 
they have in common, that of being the expenditure of human labour in the 
abstract.’168 A sentence that Marx put into the French edition, stresses the importance 
of the practical activity of exchange for this process of abstraction:  ‘exchange 
accomplishes this reduction by bringing into mutual presence on an equal footing the 
products of the most diverse labours.’169 
                                                
165 (Marx 2009, 165)  
166 (Marx 2009, 165) This can also be seen in several other comments Marx makes in 
the section that this abstraction is ‘valid for this particular form of production 
(production of commodities), namely, that the specific social character of independent 
private labours consists in their equality as human labour and assumes the form of the 
value-character of the product’ (Marx 2009, 165) and that ‘[t]he categories of 
bourgeois economics […] are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore 
objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined 
mode of social production’ (Marx 2009, 167). Finally it is also echoed in The 
Contribution: ‘A social relation of production appears as something existing apart from 
individual human beings, and the determined relations into which they enter in the 
course of production in society appear as the specific properties of a thing - it is this 
perverted appearance, this prosaically real, and by no means imaginary, mystification 
that is characteristic of all forms of labour positing exchange-value.’ (Marx 2010, 49)  
167 (Marx 2009, 167)  
168 (Marx 2009, 167)  
169 This phrase is quoted in (Ehbar 2009) 
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 In Marx’s view, this fetish-character of the commodities is thus constituted by 
collective acts of exchange in which people are unaware that the value relation that 
they are entering into involves positing different kinds of abstract human labour as 
being abstractly equivalent to one another.170 Although they are not immediately aware 
of this, their actions are structured by the very same logic of production for exchange 
that is posited in the value-relation, and which constitutes this abstraction by imbuing 
commodities with the ‘common character, as values’ possessed by these materially 
different things.’171 
 
This division of the product into a useful thing and an embodiment of value is only then 
carried out in practice when exchange has become sufficiently extensive and important 
to allow useful things to be produced for the exchange, so that their character as value 
is already taken into account during production. From this moment on, the labour of 
the private producers in fact acquires a two-fold social existence. On the one hand it 
must, as a specific useful kind of labour, satisfy a specific social need, and thus prove 
itself as an element of aggregate labour, as a branch of the spontaneously developed 
social division of labour, on the other hand, it can satisfy the manifold needs of its 
producer only in so far as each particular useful private labour can be exchange with, 
i.e. counts as the equal of, every other kind of private labour.172  
 
As a result, producers focus on production for exchange rather than reflecting 
on their actions whilst the appearance of exchange becomes the naturalised standpoint 
of political economy.173  
 Thus Marx’s account of the constitution of the fetish-characteristic form of the 
commodity integrates his form-analysis with reified social relations and the 
personification of things. Reified social relations arise from the social character of 
capitalist labour in which atomised production for exchange transforms social relations 
into relations between things. This process also causes these things to possess fetish-
                                                
170 This component of Marx’s theory—that people participate in these relations 
without being aware of them—can be seen to coincide with his reference to this 
collectively constituted social process of exchange occurring behind the backs of 
individuals. Rather than fetishism consisting in false consciousness these phrases point 
toward the peculiar social character of labour that capitalism consists in.    
171 (Marx 2009, 167)  
172 (Marx 2009, 166) 
173 Since the naturalisation of the social character of capitalist production pertains to 
the mystifying aspect of fetishism that I am not concerned with, I will refrain from 
further discussion. However, I will reiterate that I follow the distinction made by 
(Ehrbar 2009), (Schultz 2013), (Gray 2013) and made elsewhere by (Arthur 2013) that 
Marx’s discussion of naturalisation in this section pertains to political economists 
rather than to the agents engaged in production and exchange.  
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characteristic forms. Their fetish-characteristic forms consist in things being imbued 
with ‘quasi-physical’ and objective characteristics that function as inherent properties 
of these things. The fetish-characteristics of these forms further consist in the way in 
which they function autonomously by relating to each other ‘apart from and outside’ 
their producers. Thus the fetish-characteristic properties of the commodity consist in 
these qualities of personification, which arise from the perverted, mad and displaced 
social character of the value relation.  
 The manner in which these autonomous properties of the fetish-form of the 
commodity are collectively constituted is also constitutive of an abstract form of social 
domination that is also referred to by Marx in several passages in this section. At this 
point in his presentation Marx’s analysis is concerned with presenting the form-analysis 
of capitalism. He has not introduced the class relation, nor demonstrated how this 
relation functions to reproduce this overall form of domination. Marx’s statements on 
domination are therefore concerned with the ways in which these forms are 
constitutive of an abstract form of social domination that inverts, and thereby 
collectively subordinates the social relations that collectively constitute it. This can be 
seen in his earlier comment that commodities function ‘apart from and outside’ their 
producers it can also be seen in his statement that the precarious levelling qualities of 
socially necessary labour possess the qualities of a ‘regulative law of nature’ – so much 
so that he likens it to gravity causing a house to collapse – because the magnitude of 
value varies ‘continually, independently of the will, foreknowledge and actions of the 
exchangers.’174  
 This can also be seen in Marx’s statement that this form of social production 
has ‘mastery over man’, and in his claim that the fetish-characteristic of the value 
relations of commodities consists in an inversion whereby: 
Their own movement within society has for them the form of a movement made by 
things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact control them.’175  
 
Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism thus demonstrates:  how the fetish-
character of the commodity is constituted. It does so by integrating his form-analysis 
with an account of the collectively reified social relations that are engendered by 
                                                
174 (Marx 2009, 168)  
175 (Marx 2009, 168) Anticipating Lukács’s and Adorno’s utilisation of the term ‘second 
nature’ to describe this type of supra-individual domination, Marx also describes 
socially necessary labour time ‘asserting itself as a regulative law of nature.’ 
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production for exchange and which subsequently involve the personification of things. 
It also demonstrates that the fetish-characteristic properties of these personified and 
autonomous things function in the relation of exchange to invert and dominate the 
people who collectively constitute them. In Marx’s ensuing analyses of the fetish-
characteristic forms of value, these autonomous properties are magnified whilst their 
dominating properties are concretised. 
  
4.2 The Fetish-Characteristic Form of Money 
 
 This can first be seen in Marx’s discussion of the fetish-characteristic form of 
money, the properties of which are reliant upon its logical derivation in the value-form 
section. The fetish-characteristic form of money therefore stems from the function of 
money as the universal equivalent. Its properties are based on the peculiarities of the 
equivalent form, which make the commodity serving the function of the general 
equivalent independent, and which also cause it to appear as though it was granted by 
this role the ‘natural’ aspects of the thing itself. These peculiarities are ‘crystallized’ in 
the money form, which means that although the money form only possesses its 
function when it operates as the general equivalent, it nonetheless ‘seems’ to work the 
other way around, i.e. as if ‘all other commodities universally express their value in a 
particular commodity because it is money.’176 Money’s function as the general 
equivalent grants it personified and autonomous properties which Marx refers to as 
the ‘magic of money’, and through which ‘money becomes […] the immediate 
incarnation of all human labour.’177 
 Like the fetish-characteristic form of commodities, the ‘magic of money’ is 
therefore not a false impression that masks some real underlying process. In Marx’s 
view the fetish-characteristic form of money is socially constituted by the atomised 
social production for exchange that is specific to capitalism, and which logically 
requires the general equivalent of the money form.  
                                                
176 Although a particular commodity only becomes money because all other 
commodities express their values in it, it seems, on the contrary, that all other 
commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is 
money. The movement which mediated this process vanishes in its own result, leaving 
no trace behind. Without any initiative on their part, the commodities find their own 
value-materiality ready to hand, in the form of a physical commodity existing outside 
and alongside them. (Marx 2009, 187) 
177 (Marx 2009,187)  
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They can only bring their commodities into relation as value, and therefore as 
commodities, by bringing them into an opposing relation with some other commodity, 
which serves as the universal equivalent. We have already reached that result by our 
analysis of the commodity. But only the action of society can turn a particular 
commodity into the universal equivalent. 178 
 
This means that: 
 
The money crystal is a necessary product of the exchange process, in which different 
products of labour are in fact equated with each other, and thus are in fact converted 
into commodities.179  
 
Money’s fetish-characteristic form, as the universal equivalent, is therefore a 
more pronounced development of the way in which Marx’s theory of fetishism 
describes the social constitution of forms of value and uses the notion of fetish-
character to describe the autonomous and personified properties of these forms of 
value. This can be seen in Marx’s summary of how the fetish-character of money is 
constituted by the social character of capitalist labour. There he compares the money 
fetish with the fetish-character of commodities as follows: 
 
The merely atomistic behaviour of men in their social process of production, and 
hence the fact that their own relations of production take on an objectified form 
independent of their conscious individual striving, manifests themselves at first in the 
fact that the products of labour generally take the form of commodities. The riddle of 
the money fetish is therefore merely the riddle of the commodity fetish that has 
become visible and blinding to the eyes.180  
 
                                                
178 (Marx 2009, 180)  
179 (Marx 2009, 181) 
180 (Marx 2009, 187) A similar passage in the Critique also demonstrates that Marx 
views money as possessing the qualities that I am attributing to the term fetish-
character: ‘Nature no more produces money than it does bankers or a rate of 
exchange. But since in bourgeois production, wealth as a fetish must be crystallised in a 
particular substance gold and silver are its appropriate embodiment. Gold and silver 
are not by nature money, but money consists by its nature of gold and silver. Gold or 
silver as crystallisation of money is, on the one hand, not only the product of the 
circulation process but actually its sole stable product; gold and silver are, on the 
other hand, finished primary products, and they directly represent both these aspects, 
which are not distinguished by specific forms. The universal products of the social 
process, or the social process itself considered as a product, is a particular natural 
product, a metal, which is contained in the earth's crust and can be dug up.’ (Marx 
2010, 29)  
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In contrast to the analysis in chapter one, Marx’s account of the dominating 
properties of the money form accounts for the agents who exchange commodities. 
However, Marx’s analysis still focuses on how these autonomous forms of value 
determine the actions of the agents who exchange them. These autonomous 
properties stem from the social conditions that Marx elaborates later in his discussion 
on money: 
 
Our owners of commodities therefore find out that the same division of labour that 
turns them into independent private producers, [also] makes the social process of 
production and their relations within that process independent of them themselves, 
and that the seeming mutual independence of the individuals from one another is 
supplemented by a system of all-round material dependence.181  
 
As a result the autonomous form of money inverts, structures and dominates 
in Marx’s account, the agents, in a way which is more concrete than in the fetish 
character of commodities.  Marx shows that this is the case in two ways: by deriving 
(a) the conceptual structure of legal contracts from the exchange structure, and (b) 
the function of the commodity owner from the commodity.   
Marx elucidates how the value-relation of commodity exchange determines the 
legal contract by arguing that it necessitates a certain ‘juridical relation.’ This juridical 
relation relies on conceiving commodity owners as atomised individuals who recognise 
each other as owners of private property.182 In Marx’s view, this conception ‘mirrors’ 
the economic relation of commodity exchange. The ‘juridical relation’ is therefore 
‘determined’ by this socio-economic relation.183  
In Marx’s view, this is likewise the case for the commodity owners. Owning a 
commodity determines inter-subjective behaviour and ultimately compels the 
behaviour of subjects. In the inter-subjective act of exchange ‘the persons exist here 
for one another only as representatives of commodities.’184 The behaviour of these 
subjects is compelled to conform to models according with commodity exchange 
because the persons’ economic character masks are mere personifications of the 
                                                
181 (Marx 2009, 87)  
182 In this instance Marx derives the juridical form of law from exchange in a manner 
that differs from the way in which Lukács treats law as analogous to the properties of 
the commodity in his social theory of reification as I will show in the following chapter.  
183 This is drawn out in Marx’s comments on freedom, equality and Bentham (Marx 
2009, 280)    
184 (Marx 2009, 178) 
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economic relations as whose carriers they confront each other.185 These strands are 
drawn together in Marx’s discussion of commodity owners. Marx turns to assess the 
relationship between form-determination and rationality in the behaviour of 
commodity owners by asserting that commodity owners ‘have already acted before 
thinking.’186 As ‘character masks’ the determination of exchange asserts itself in the 
actions and instincts of commodity owners: ‘The natural laws of the commodity have 
manifested themselves in the natural instinct of the owners of the commodities.’187  
I argued earlier that Marx’s account of the fetish grows more complex as his 
analysis progresses, and one can see from the above that the fetish-character of money 
possesses more pronounced characteristics than the fetish-character of commodities. 
On the one hand, money is socially constituted as the general equivalent by the logic of 
the relations of commodities, which grants it the autonomous and personified 
properties of the universal incarnation of human labour. On the other hand, the means 
by which these autonomous properties invert and dominate individual action is 
concretised in the determinate form of the legal contract and the determination of the 
actions of commodity owners.  
 
4.3 The Fetish-Characteristic Properties of Capital 
 
 Having dealt with the fetish-attributes of money we turn now to those of 
capital itself; and we can begin here by remarking that since, as we have seen, the 
general formula of capital is composed by the commodity form and money form; and 
since these forms, as we’ve seen, possess fetish-characteristics, capital – because it is 
the constant, socially pervasive movement between these forms of value – also 
possesses fetish-characteristic properties. This can be seen in Marx’s description of the 
autonomous and personified properties of capital. In Volume 1 of Capital Marx 
describes capital as an ‘automatic subject’, composed of ‘self-valorising value’: as a 
process that ‘is continually changing from one form into another, without losing itself 
                                                
185 (Marx 2009, 179)  
186 (Marx 2009, 180) Here we have a continuation of Marx’s argument of the fetish-
character of commodities as the practical abstractions of exchange generated by 
activity that agents participate in without being aware of it.  
187 (Marx 2009, 180) Marx is using ‘natural’ in a critical sense here as he does 
throughout Capital. As we have seen in our discussion of the fetish-character of 
commodity, commodities are socio-natural phenomena that assert themselves like a 
‘regulative law of nature’.    
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in this movement’,188 and thus as a ‘self-moving substance’:  ‘value is […] the subject of 
a process, in which, while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and 
commodities, it changes its own magnitude [...] By virtue of being value, it has acquired 
the occult quality to add value to it-self.’189  Finally, the social reality of these practically 
constituted forms of value can be seen in Marx’s comments that ‘those who consider 
the autonomisation of value as a mere abstraction, forget that the movement of capital 
is this abstraction in action.’190  
Comments on the manner in which these autonomous properties of capital 
invert and thereby compel and dominate individuals are also littered throughout 
Capital, perhaps most famously evidenced in the following remark: ‘just as man is 
governed, in religion, by the products of his own brain, so, in capitalist production, he 
is governed by the products of his own hand.’191  
It is also reflected in how these abstract forms invert and thereby compel both 
sides of the class relation. ‘Capital employs labour. This in itself exhibits the 
relationship in its simple form and entails the personification of things and the 
objectification [versachlichung] of persons.’192 
Finally it can also be seen in the more concrete levels of Marx’s analysis, where 
the autonomous properties of capital as an automatic subject invert, coerce and 
govern the actions of individuals in both sides of the class relation. 
For the capitalist, this form of domination consists in functioning as a ‘character 
mask’ or as the ‘personification of capital.’193 The capitalist functions in this manner 
because the atomised, competitive structure of capitalism and the autonomous fetish-
characteristic forms of value enforce the inherent laws of capitalist production as 
‘external coercive necessities confronting the individual capitalist.’194 These external 
necessities ‘enter into the consciousness of the capitalist as his or her ‘driving 
motives.’’195 The capitalist is therefore compelled to compete with fellow capitalists as 
‘hostile brothers’ and to act as a ‘despotic’ manager of his workforce in order to ‘keep 
                                                
188 (Marx 2009, 255) 
189 (Marx 2009, 255, corrected translation) 
190 (Marx 2009, 185)  
191 (Marx 2009 772) 
192 (Marx 2009, 1054)  
193 (Marx 2009, 739) 
194 (Marx 2009, 381) 
195 (Marx 2009, 381) 
  
69 
constantly expanding his capital, in order to preserve it.’196 Thus, the capitalists’ ‘mania 
[…] is the result of the social mechanism in which he is but one of the drive wheels.’197 
Yet there is no guarantee that the capitalist can expand his or her capital. The 
contingency inherent in the capitalist market may ruin her and force her into the other 
side of the class relation. The domination exerted by the capitalists results from their 
actions, but the latter are in turn shaped by their role as personifications of capital; as 
individuals determined by the fetish-characteristic forms of value that are external to 
them, and which compel them to dominate and exploit the proletariat. Thus, because 
capitalists - as capital personified - are ‘fanatically intent on the valorization of value’ 
they ‘ruthlessly compel the human race to produce for production’s sake.’198 
This, of course also means, that domination is more acute for the proletariat.199 
As doubly free individuals who are compelled to sell their labour-power in order to 
survive they are prey to the ‘dull compulsion’ of these economic relations in which 
they have ‘brought their ‘own hide to market and now’ have ‘nothing else to expect – 
but a good tanning.’200 This is because the way in which domination manifests itself for 
the proletariat is embodied in the proletariat’s function in the class relation where they 
‘produce material, objective wealth […] in the form of capital [...] an alien power that 
dominates and exploits him.’201 This is reflected in a situation in which ‘[w]ithin the 
capitalist system all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into 
effect at the cost of the individual worker; this means that they become means of 
domination and exploitation of the production, they distort the worker into a 
fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine.’202 As a 
result the worker ‘exists to satisfy the need of the existing value for valorisation, as 
opposed to the inverse situation, in which objective wealth is there to satisfy the 
worker’s own need for development’203  
                                                
196 (Marx 2009, 738) 
197 (Marx 2009, 776) 
198 (Marx 2009, 739)  
199 Marx’s clearest explication of this comes in The Results of the Immediate Process of 
Production - ‘The functions fulfilled by the capitalist are no more than the functions of 
capital […] the capitalist functions only as personified capital, capital as a person, just as 
the worker is no more than labour personified. That labour is for him just effort and 
torment.’ (Marx 2009, 989)  
200 (Marx 2009, 280)  
201 (Marx 2009, 716)  
202 (Marx 2009, 548) 
203 (Marx 2009, 772) 
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As I have shown, Marx’s theory of value accounts for: (1) the socially specific 
manner in which social labour is allocated in capital; and (2) the constitution and the 
constituents of a fetish-characteristic form of social domination of capital, in which the 
collectively constituted fetish-characteristic forms of value invert, coerce and dictate 
individual action. I will now account for how these elements are fused in the Trinity 
Formula as the culmination and concrete embodiment of Marx’s theory of fetishism 
where I will demonstrate how Marx’s analysis of the Trinity Formula embeds the 
fetish-characteristic properties of his theory of value in the concrete forms of the 
Trinity Formula in his account of how surplus value constitutes the perverted revenue 
streams of rent, wages and capital.  
 
4.4 The Trinity Formula 
 
 Before setting out that demonstration it is however first necessary to outline 
two factors that have detracted from the analysis of the way in which fetishism informs 
the Trinity Formula. The first is the egregious error that Engels made when compiling 
Marx’s fragments on the Trinity Formula in the incorrect order.204 The second is the 
problem of terminological variation. The terms that Marx uses in the Trinity Formula 
are somewhat inconsistent with his usage in his other analyses of the fetish-
character.205 Some of his usage of these terms in the Trinity Formula is also ambiguous. 
The term ‘fetishism’ is only used once in reference to interest-bearing capital, and 
fetish-character, fetish form etc. are not used at all. Marx also uses the terms 
‘mystification’ and ‘mystical character’ to describe the conceptions about capitalism 
that are generated by its complexity. These mystified conceptions are generated by the 
same process that constitutes fetish-characteristic forms of value. Like the fetishism of 
political economy, these mystified conceptions consist in distorted conceptions that 
people have about capitalism. Yet unlike the fetishism of political economy, these 
conceptions are objectively generated. The similarity between fetish-characteristic 
                                                
204 As (Heinrich 1996/1997) points out, Engels thought he had found three separate 
fragments that Marx had written on the Trinity formula. Engels labelled the two 
shorter fragments I and II and the longer fragment III. The Trinity Formula is published 
in this order in Capital III. Subsequent analysis of Marx’s manuscripts revealed that 
fragments I and II fit into one of the gaps in part III. Structuring the Trinity Formula this 
way makes Marx’s analysis of the Trinity Formula more coherent. 
205 This may be because the ‘trinity formula’ was composed prior to volume 1. 
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forms, the fetishism of political economy and mystification can lead to Marx’s entire 
analysis of the Trinity Formula being treated as an analysis of mystification, in which 
mystification, fetish-characteristic forms and the fetishism of political economy are all 
collapsed into one another.  However, the properties of the forms of value that we 
have seen Marx describe with the term fetish-character are present in his description 
of the ‘perverted’, ‘autonomous’ and personified ‘social character of things.’ I will 
therefore show that what exists of the Trinity Formula can be seen to mark the 
culmination of Marx’s theorisation of fetish-characteristic forms in Capital. This is 
because Marx’s analysis in the Trinity Formula: (a) demonstrates how the fetish-forms 
of value are embodied in the Trinity Formula, (b) fuses the fetish aspects of his theory 
of value with the distributive aspect of his theory of value, and (c) posits the Trinity 
Formula as the apex of his analyses in Capital, as the ‘perverted topsy-turvy world’ of 
the Trinity Formula is constitutive of his concrete analysis of fetishism.   
 The ‘agents of production’, ‘bearers of various functions’206 and political 
economists conceive of the Trinity Formula of land-rent, labour-wages and 
interest/profit-capital as three separate revenue-generating entities. Marx’s analysis of 
this formula utilises his critical genetic method to disclose its social genesis. 
  The starting point of this analysis exemplifies the conceptual structure of 
Marx’s theory of social domination, in which the essence of social labour appears in 
the Trinity Formula. Marx’s analysis of the social constitution of the Trinity Formula 
thus begins with his definition of what it presupposes: capital as a socially specific form 
of production; a form of production that consists of the way in which social labour 
interacts with things and nature, and thereby constitutes society.207  
 The analysis of the Trinity Formula that follows shows how this historically 
specific form of production is indicative of the Trinity Formula. 
                                                
206 (Marx 1993, 950) 
207 ‘We have seen how the capitalist process of production is a historically specific 
form of the social production process in general. This last is both a production process 
of the material conditions of existence for human life, and a process, proceeding in 
specific economic and historical relations of production, that produces and reproduces 
these relations of production themselves, and with them the bearers of this process, 
their material conditions of existence, and their mutual relationships, i.e. the specific 
economic form of their society. For the totality of these relationships which the 
bearers of this production have towards nature and one another, the relationships in 
which they produce, is precisely society, viewed according to its economic structure.’ 
(Marx 1993, 957)   
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 In the first place, since capital is a historically specific social form of production, 
so too are the other elements of the Trinity Formula. As Marx’s analysis of so-called 
‘primitive accumulation’ demonstrated, capitalist production is the result of the 
historical process that transformed common land into monopolised private property, 
thereby creating a work force compelled to sell their labour-power to survive. 
Consequently:  ‘Wage-labour and landed property, like capital, are historically specific 
social forms; one of labour, and the other of the monopolised earth, both in fact being 
forms corresponding to capital and belonging to the same economic formation of 
society.’208  
  In the second place, the fetish-characteristics of capital are mirrored in the 
Trinity Formula. Capital is a mode of social production in which the atomised 
constitution of the class relation creates fetish-characteristic forms of value that 
possess personified autonomous, properties, and which invert, and thus induce the 
action of capitalists, and govern the proletariat.209 So too are the Trinitarian forms of 
revenue. This can be seen initially in the self-generating properties that all branches of 
the Trinity Formula share where the individual streams of revenue for interest and 
profit, rent and wages appear as the ‘productive fruits’ of capital, land and labour, ‘in 
such a way that each individual source is related to its product as something extruded 
from it and produced by it.’210 It can also be seen in the role of the land-owner, who 
takes on the role of the personification of property.211 Finally, it is evident in the 
properties of the different elements of the Trinity Formula, which share the 
personified and autonomous properties of the fetish-characteristic forms of value: 
 
It is not only the workers' products which are transformed into independent powers, 
the products as masters and buyers of their producers, but the social powers and 
interconnecting form of this labour also confront them as properties of their product. 
                                                
208 (Marx 1993, 956)   
209 ‘Capital, land, labour! But capital is not a thing, it is a definite social relation of 
production pertaining to a particular historical social formation, which simply takes the 
form of a thing and gives this thing a specific social character. Capital is not the sum of 
the material and produced means of production. Capital is the means of production as 
transformed into capital, these being no more capital in themselves than gold or silver 
are money. It is the means of production monopolized by a particular section of 
society, the products and conditions of activity of labour-power, which are rendered 
autonomous vis-a.-vis this living labour-power and are personified in capital through 
this antithesis.’ (Marx 1993, 954-55)  
210 (Marx 1993, 953)  
211 (Marx 1993, 952) 
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Here we therefore have one factor of a historically produced social production 
process in a definite social form.212 
  
  In the third place, the socially specific character of capitalist production is 
responsible for the constitution of the Trinity Formula. It is this aspect of Marx’s 
analysis that accounts for the constitution of the Trinity Formula by demonstrating 
how social labour appears within the former as the annual income of the capitalist 
class, the landowning class and the working class. These types of income thus appear 
as the ‘perennial fruits’ of land, labour and capital. However, they ‘presuppose[s]’[…] 
‘the total value of the annual product, which is nothing more than objectified social 
labour’213 in the ‘perverted form’ of the Trinity Formula. Marx’s explanation of the 
genesis of the Trinity Formula thus links this perverted form with what it presupposes. 
In doing so this also demonstrates my argument that Marx’s theory of the Trinity 
Formula is the culmination of how his conception of fetishism formulates a theory of 
social domination.  
 This account begins with an analysis of what these elements share in common: 
they are ‘portions of value’214 and are ‘expressed in money.’215 It then moves to an 
account of how these portions of value are constituted by the surplus-value that is 
expressed in money. In this account, the surplus-value that is created by labour 
through the mechanism of the wage relation constitutes capital, rent and wages. This is 
because surplus-value is divided into income, which is distributed in the forms of 
capital, rent and wages. Surplus-value is distributed in these forms because land, labour 
and capital are integral aspects of the socially specific form of capitalist production: 
Labour because of its aforementioned role in the constitution of surplus value; Capital 
because it is premised on ‘pumping surplus-value’ out of labour; and Land – in the form 
of monopolised property – because its instrumental role in creating the socially 
specific conditions of capitalist production makes it a   ‘permanent magnet for 
attracting a part of the surplus-value.’ As a result: 
 
Landed property, capital and wage-labour are therefore transformed from sources of 
revenue in the sense that capital attracts to the capitalist a portion of the surplus-value 
which it extracts from labour, in the form of profit; monopoly in the earth attracts 
                                                
212 (Marx 1993, 955)  
213 (Marx 1993, 961) 
214 (Marx 1993, 961)  
215 (Marx 1993, 962)  
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another part to the landowner in the form of rent ; and labour gives the worker the 
final portion of value that is still available in the form of the wage - from sources by 
virtue of which one part of the value is transformed into the form of profit, a second 
into the form of rent and a third into the form of wages - into real sources from which 
these portions of value themselves arise, together with the portions of the product 
related to them, in which they exist or against which they are convertible, the value of 
the product therefore itself arising from these as its ultimate source.216  
 
 The way this perverted form of the Trinity Formula appears has several further 
repercussions. In the first place, the manner in which surplus-value appears in the 
internally related distribution of revenue in the branches of the Trinity Formula causes 
these historically specific conditions to be trans-historically hypostatised.217 In the 
second place, the manner in which the Trinity Formula is constituted necessitates the 
reproduction of wage-labourers leading to the production and reproduction of these 
autonomous and dominating conditions of capitalist social production.218 
Marx’s analysis of the Trinity Formula thus embeds the fetish-characteristic 
properties of his theory of value in the concrete forms of the Trinity Formula by 
demonstrating how surplus-value constitutes these personified and autonomous 
revenue streams. These streams are premised on the socially specific form of capitalist 
production and are constitutive of the personification of the capitalists and land-
owners, and of the domination and reproduction of the conditions of existence of the 
                                                
216 (Marx 1993, 950)  
217 ‘Labour as such, in its simple characterization as purposive productive activity, is 
related to the means of production not in their characteristic social form but rather in 
their material substance, as the material and means of labour in which they are 
distinguished from one another only materially, as use-values, the earth as non-
produced means of labour, the others as produced. If labour and wage-labour thus 
coincide, so too do the particular social form in which the conditions of labour 
confront labour, and their own material existence. The means of labour are then 
capital as such, while the earth as such is landed property. The formal autonomy these 
conditions of labour acquire vis-a-vis labour, the particular form of this autonomy they 
possess, is then a property inseparable from them as things, as material conditions of 
production; an immanently ingrown character that necessarily falls to them as 
elements of production. Their social character in the capitalist production process, 
determined by a particular historical epoch, is an innate material character natural to 
them, and eternally so, as it were, as elements of the production process.’ (Marx 1993, 
964)   
218 ‘Capital for the capitalist is a perpetual pumping machine for surplus labour, land for 
the landowner a permanent magnet for attracting a part of the surplus-value pumped 
out by capital, and finally labour is the constantly self-renewing condition and means 
for the worker to obtain a part of the value he has produced, and hence a portion of 
the social product measured by this portion of value, his necessary means of 
subsistence, under the heading of wages.’ (Marx 1993, 964) 
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proletariat. Finally, these revenue streams account for how labour is socially 
apportioned in these perverted forms of distribution. In the final third of the Trinity 
Formula Marx places this analysis as the culmination of Capital.  
  This is done by placing the Trinity Formula at the end of a summation of 
Capital. In the course of this summary Marx also accounts for the constitution and 
constituents of the fetish-characteristic forms of value and the mystifying appearance of 
capitalist society. Marx’s summary makes an ambiguous use of the later term 
‘mystification’: sometimes it means the mystified appearance generated by the 
complexity of capitalist production and circulation; sometimes it includes the 
properties of the fetish-characteristic forms of value, and sometimes it includes both.  
 Marx begins this summary by recalling his account of the constitution of the 
‘simple categories of the capitalist mode of production.’ In this context ‘the mystifying 
character ’219 mirrors his usage of fetish-characterisation which transforms ‘social 
relations’ into the ‘properties’ of things themselves (commodities), still more explicitly 
transforming the relation of production itself into a thing(money). 220 However, he then 
uses ‘mystic’ to exemplify mystification and fetish-characterisation, when he then goes 
on to point out how this ‘bewitched and perverted world develops much further’221 
with relative surplus value causing capital to ‘become[s] a very mystical being, since all 
the productive forces of social labour appear attributable to it, and not to labour as 
such, as a power springing forth from its own womb.’222  
 Marx’s summary of this process of ‘perversion’ and ‘bewitchment’ moves to the 
‘actual process of production.’ This process includes the perverted constitution of the 
fetish-characteristic forms of value with ‘the relations of production becoming 
independent of one another and the components of value ossifying into independent 
forms. ’223 It also mystifies capital by making the ‘threads of the inner connection get 
more and more lost.’224 The latter occurs through a number of factors that Marx lays 
out whilst recalling his arguments in volume II and III in terms of the movement of his 
                                                
219 This use of ‘mystifying’ signifies one of Marx’s inconsistent uses of the term since: 
(a) he is using the term to describe what he elsewhere terms the fetish-characteristic 
properties, and because (b) this use of ‘mystifying’ differs from his other uses of 
mystification.  
220 (Marx 1993, 968)  
221 (Marx 1993, 968) 
222 (Marx 1993, 969) 
223 (Marx 1993, 969)  
224  (Marx 1993, 969)  
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presentation from capital to capitals, and of the circulation and valorisation of these 
capitals, which as a whole, ‘conceals the true nature of surplus-value more and more, 
concealing therefore the real mechanism of capital.’225 At the same time these factors 
consist in the highest level (insofar as the Trinity Formula constitutes the apex of 
Marx’s account) of perversion and fetish-characterisation in the detachment of profit 
from exploitation, which ‘completes the autonomisation of the form of surplus-value, 
the ossification of its form as against its substance, its essence.’ 
 This complete autonomisation culminates in the fetish-characteristic and 
mystifying properties of the Trinity Formula.  In the case of interest-bearing capital: ‘If 
capital originally appeared on the surface of circulation as the capital fetish, value-
creating value, so it now presents itself once again in the figure of interest-bearing 
capital as its most estranged and peculiar form.’226 Whereas for land, since a part of the 
surplus-value ‘seems directly bound-up …with a natural element’, this makes ‘the form, 
of mutual alienation and ossification of the various portions of surplus-value […] 
complete.’227 This leads to mystification, in which ‘the inner connection’ between these 
components is ‘definitively torn asunder and its source completely buried’ by their 
                                                
225 (Marx 1993, 969)  
226 Marx describes the fetish-characteristic form of interest-bearing capital earlier in 
volume III as what amounts to the most autonomous form of fetishism. Interest-
bearing capital consists in the ‘perversion and reification’ (versachlichung) of production 
relations in their highest degree. This ‘perversion’ makes the ‘the result of the entire 
process of reproduction appear as a property inherent in the thing itself.’ Interest-
bearing capital possesses autonomous properties because it is self-valorising. Marx 
characterises these properties as the ‘automatic fetish (fetisch) of interest-bearing 
capital’ which consists in ‘self-expanding value’ in which ‘the social relation is 
consummated in the relation of a thing, of money, to itself’ in the form of ‘self-
expanding value.’ This is because: (1) interest-bearing capital’s ‘continual existence’ as 
the ‘independent exchange-value’ of money abstracts its process of valorisation from 
the other forms of revenue it is reliant on, so that (2) the valorisation it generated 
through interest, as more money, ‘appears as an inherent part of it.’ The means that 
‘as the growing process is to trees, so generating money, appears innate in capital in its 
form of money-capital.’  Consequently, ‘While interest is only a portion of the profit, 
i.e., of the surplus-value, which the functioning capitalist squeezes out of the labourer, 
it appears now, on the contrary, as though interest were the typical product of capital, 
the primary matter, and profit, in the shape of profit of enterprise, were a mere 
accessory and by-product of the process of reproduction.’ For a more in- depth 
discussion of the fetish-character of interest-bearing capital (see Schultz 2013). 
227 (Marx 1993, 969) 
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fetish-characteristic properties (‘the assertion of their autonomy vis-à-vis each 
other.’)228  As a result:  
 
In capital-profit (or better still capital-interest), land-ground-rent, labour-wages, this 
economic trinity as the connection between the components of value and wealth in 
general and its sources, the mystification of the capitalist mode of production is 
completed, the reification of social relations, and the immediate coalescence of the 
material relations of production with their historical and social specificity: the 
bewitched, back-to-front and upside-down world haunted by Monsieur Le Capital and 
Madame La Terre, who are at the same time social characters and mere things.229 
 
These elements of the Trinity Formula as ‘the configurations of appearance in 
which [...] the actual agents of production move and in which they are daily involved’230 
also marks the point at which Marx’s analysis has reached its most concrete level. This 
is what Marx terms ‘the religion of everyday life.’ Unfortunately, the manuscript cuts 
off where Marx is preparing to go into more detail about how the ‘autonomisation and 
ossification of the different social elements of wealth vis-à-vis one another, this 
personification of things and reification of the relations of production,’231 are further 
embodied in the religion of everyday life. 
From what is left of the section on the Trinity Formula we can see that it 
represents the culmination of Marx’s analysis of the fetish-characteristics forms of 
value. Despite its fragmentary nature and problematic usage, the Trinity Formula also 
consists in Marx’s most concrete analysis of the fetish-character in the perverted and 
upside down world of capital. Marx bases his analysis of the Trinity Formula on his 
argument from the first three volumes of Capital. This analysis thus brings together 
Marx’s previous analysis of the different types of fetish-characteristic forms of value, 
and links the latter to the class relation and to the social allocation of labour. Finally, 
these elements add up to demonstrate how Marx’s theory of fetishism is different 
from his theory of alienation.  Marx’s analysis in the Trinity Formula thus discloses 
                                                
228 (Marx 1993, 969)  
229 (Marx 1993, 970) 
230 ‘This is reflected in the fetishism of vulgar economists: It is equally natural, 
therefore, that vulgar economics, which is nothing more than a didactic and more or 
less doctrinaire translation of the everyday notions of the actual agents of production, 
giving them a certain comprehensible arrangement, finds the natural basis of its fatuous 
self-importance established beyond all doubt precisely in this trinity, in which the 
entire inner connection is obliterated.’ (Marx 1993, 970, translated amended)   
231 (Marx 1993, 970)  
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how the fetish-characteristic forms of the concrete entities of rent, wages and capital 
are constituted by the socially specific form of capitalist production, and how these 
fetish-characteristic forms become the receptacles of labour allocation.  It also shows 
how these forms are constitutive of social domination, which compels capitalists and 
landowners as personifications, and dominates proletarians who constitute and 
reproduce this perverted topsy-turvy world in order to survive.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
            5.1 Summary 
 
 In this chapter I focused on Marx’s conception of fetishism and the role that it 
plays in his theory of the constitution and the constituents of social domination.  
I also (a) differentiated my focus on fetishism from the interpretations of fetishism as 
‘alienation’ and fetishism as ‘reification’ that I covered in my literature review, and (b) 
presaged my subsequent comparative study of Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre through a 
detailed reading of Marx’s work. 
 I begin by placing Marx’s early writings in relation to his late work. In doing so I 
distinguished my interpretation of fetishism from Althusserian and classic Marxist 
Humanist interpretations of Marx. In contrast to: (1) the Althusserian interpretation I 
showed the continuity in Marx’s conceptual structure of social domination;  in contrast 
to (2) the classical Marxist humanist interpretation of fetishism as alienation I showed 
that Marx’s theory of alienation differed with his theory of fetishism, because it (a) 
lacks the explanatory conceptions of abstract labour, capital, surplus value and Marx’s 
monetary theory, and (b) because his constituent account of the social domination of 
alienated labour was premised on conceiving labour as an external alien thing, coupled 
to his account of the estrangement of human essence.   
 I then moved to demonstrate how Marx conceived of fetishism in his theory of 
the composition and properties of social domination. I began by defining how Marx 
conceived of the object and method of Capital and his theory of value. I then outlined 
how Marx’s monetary theory of value conceived of capitalism as a socially specific: (a) 
class based form of labour distribution, and (b) as a collectively constituted form of 
social domination. I demonstrated the former with an overview of his form-analysis of 
money, commodities, the class relation and general formula of capital. I then 
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demonstrated that: (1) Marx’s theory of fetishism provides an account of the social 
constitution of forms of value that integrates his form-analytic critique of political 
economy with the reification of persons and the personification of things; and that (2) 
What I have termed fetish-characteristic forms describe the autonomous and 
personified constituent properties of these forms of value that invert, dominate and 
compel individuals’ action. In addition, I also showed (3) that Marx’s account of these 
fetish-characteristic forms and their constituent domination proceeds from the 
commodity through money and capital (during the course of which these forms 
become more autonomous at the same time as their dominating properties become 
more concrete and socially embedded) and culminates in his presentation of the 
Trinity Formula, which provides an account of the constitution, the constituents and 
reproduction of the enchanted, perverted topsy-turvy world of capital.  
 This shows that Capital possesses the elements of Marx’s conceptual structure 
of domination, in which Marx: (a) uses his critical-genetic method to account for the 
social constitution of capital by deriving it from the dynamic and contradictory process 
in which social labour appears and hides itself in the socially specific forms of value; (b) 
conceives of capital as constitutive of sensible-supersensible, alienated and inverted 
forms of abstract domination that are collectively constituted and reproduced by the 
socially specific type of social labour that appears in these forms of value. It also shows 
that the manner in which this is explicated differs from his account in The Manuscripts. 
In the first place, Marx provides a more sophisticated account in Capital, describing a 
form of social domination that includes abstract labour, surplus -value and his 
monetary theory of value. In the second place, rather than simply presenting a critique 
of the external alien thing, Marx’s account of the constitutive properties of this mode 
of social domination is premised on his more sophisticated account of the necessarily 
reified social relations and fetish-characteristic personification of things that are 
collectively constituted by atomised production for exchange, and which invert and 
thereby coerce and govern the action of individuals on both sides of the class relation.  
This demonstrates that Marx’s conception of fetishism forms an inherent part 
of his theory of the constitution and constituents of this theory of capitalist social 
domination. It also points out that this theory of fetishism is more complex than the 
accounts of fetishism as alienation and reification. For rather than: (a) simply pointing 
out that capitalist production consists in workers being alienated from the things that 
they produce, or (b) that fetishism simply consists in social relations being transformed 
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into things, Marx’s theory of fetish-characteristic forms explains how reified social 
relations constitute personified things that function autonomously to invert and govern 
individual behaviour. Finally, in contrast, to the accounts of fetishism and social 
domination that follow in this thesis, Marx’s conception of fetishism and of its role in 
the constitution and constituents of his theory of social domination is more complex 
than a generalisation of the properties of commodity fetishism. Instead, his theory of 
fetishism articulates the constitution and constituent fetish-characteristic properties of 
more autonomous forms of value, alongside more complex and concrete accounts of 
their dominating properties. This concludes with Marx’s most concrete analysis of 
reality in the perverted topsy-turvy world of the Trinity Formula, in which the 
fetishistic aspects of the Trinity Formula were derived from the socially specific 
character of capitalist social production. These fetishistic aspects were shown to form 
integral aspects of the constitution and reproduction of this mode of production, and 
to pertain to the distribution of surplus value and to the constitution of the 
autonomous and personified properties that these streams of value possess in their 
reliance upon the proletariat’s reproduction of its own misery. 
    
5.2 Evaluation 
 
 However, there are also important limitations and criticisms of Marx’s theory 
of fetishism and its role in the construction and properties of his theory of social 
domination.  
Firstly, it is important to stress the fragmentary and unfinished status of Capital. 
This is because Marx’s mature critique of political economy does not consist in an 
unimpeachable science, nor does it consist in a magnum opus that demonstrates the 
iron laws of history. On contrary, his mature critique of political economy is an 
unfinished project: Capital consists of one volume with several different editions, and 
two volumes of assembled material, all of which were written at different points. 
These volumes are consequently fragmentary, and they also contain errors of 
assemblage that further this ambiguity (as we have seen in connection to the Trinity 
Formula). 
This is also reflected in the ambiguities in Marx’s theory, which vacillates 
between his monetary theory of value and the neo-Ricardian residues that remain in 
his writings. This can be seen in the ambiguous status of abstract labour, which is 
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presented with both physiological and social characteristics. It can also be seen in 
some of the shoddy scientific and religious metaphors that he uses to describe 
fetishism, as well as his choice of the words, which reflect and appear to describe 
practical abstraction. Finally, ambiguities are also noticeable in his presentation of 
money and the fetish-characteristic form of money, which depart from the coherent 
presentation of the form-analysis that he presented in the first edition of Capital. As a 
result, one cannot simply separate the complete and coherent theory of the ‘esoteric 
Marx’ from the ‘exoteric Marx.’232 
In the second case it is important to consider how Marx’s conception of his 
object of study in Capital, as a model of capital at its ideal average, hinders an account 
of social domination in empirical reality. It is simply not the case that this ideal average 
analysed in Capital could be applied to the empirical reality of Marx’s day or to the 
empirical reality of today.  One reason for this is that the empirical reality of how 
capital functions in capitalist society is bound to be messy and more complex than an 
ideal average.233 Another reason is that Marx’s account of capital at its ideal average 
does not provide an account of how capital interacts with other elements of capitalist 
society, such as the state, and indeed refrains from describing how the following 
characteristics of capitalism are characteristic of capital’s function: 
 
In presenting the reification of the relations of production and the autonomy they 
acquire vis-à-vis the agents of production, we shall not go into the form and manner in 
which these connections appear to them as overwhelming natural laws, governing 
them irrespective of their will, in the form that the world market and its conjunctures, 
the movement of market prices, the cycles of industry and trade and the alternation of 
prosperity and crisis prevails on them as blind necessity. This is because the actual 
movement of competition lies outside our plan, and we are only out to present the 
                                                
232 The distinction between the ‘esoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ Marx was popularised by 
Backhaus and Reichelt to distinguish between the neo-Ricardian and monetary strands 
of Marx’s theory of value. This distinction has some overlap with the distinction 
between ‘traditional Marxism’ and the new reading of Marx. Whilst Backhaus and 
Reichelt originally claimed that the ‘esoteric’ Marx could be reconstructed and 
distinguished from the ‘exoteric’ Marx they later modified their view. Along with 
figures such as Heinrich and Arthur they now hold that there are ambivalences 
between the neo-Ricardian and monetary strands in Marx’s thought and that the latter 
need to be completed rather than simply be reconstructed. However, some 
commentators, like Postone, still hold to a similar distinction.  
233 Indeed as the school of self-identified ‘Political Marxism’ stresses, empirically real 
capitalist societies are complex entities that include non-capitalist elements, social 
complexity and variation. See (Banaji 2011; Gerstenberger 2011; Teschke 2009; E. M. 
Wood 2002)  
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internal organization of the capitalist mode of production, its ideal average, as it 
were.234  
 
 Thus, one cannot simply apply Marx’s analysis directly to contemporary reality. 
As a result, these ambiguities, orientations and omissions undermine the 
coherence of Marx’s theory of fetishism and his theory of the social constitution and 
the constituents of social domination. They thus weaken the coherence and relevance 
of his critique of political economy. 
Finally, in contrast to the accounts of Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre that we will 
go on to examine, Marx’s ideal model does little to consider three areas; how the 
fetish-characteristic forms of capital are embedded in social and cultural forms; how 
these fetish-characteristic forms affect individuals and subjectivity and the 
epistemological repercussions of fetish-characteristic forms. It is these gaps that 
Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre will try to fill with the role that their respective 
interpretations of fetishism play in their theories of social domination. However, as I 
will also show, the manner in which each thinker constructs his theory differs from 
Marx’s and this will be shown by extrapolating their theories of social domination from 
their respective interpretations of the fetish-character of commodities.   
                                                
234 (Marx 1993, 960)  
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2. Lukács, Fetishism as Reification and his 
Social Theory of Dominating 
Mystification 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I turn to the work of Georg Lukács, and I look at the role 
played by the concept of fetishism within his theory of social domination. I then 
evaluate the coherence of the elements that compose the latter and discuss the way in 
which they inform it. In order to do so, I examine Lukács’ theory of reification and 
treat it as being constitutive of an attempt, on Lukács own part, to extend Marxian 
theory, so as to enable it to account for important facets of contemporary socio-
cultural reality that were not included within Marx’s critique of political economy. 
These facets include institutions such as the state and bureaucracy, and particular 
modes of consciousness. In order to make his social theory pertain to these 
phenomena, Lukács, I will argue, based his theory of the constitution and constituent 
properties of reification on a distinctive double-faceted conception of commodity 
fetishism. This notion of fetishism fuses his Hegelian-Marxian and Simmelian-Weberian 
positions, and allows him to articulate a theory of fetishism and social domination 
which I will refer to here as the dominating mystification of his theory of reification.235 
 
1. Literature on Lukács’ accounts of Fetishism as Reification 
 
 Following the typology outlined in the introduction to this thesis, much of the 
commentary on Lukács’ conception of reification can be seen to fall into two principal 
                                                
235  As I hope to show during the course of this chapter, because this double-faceted 
interpretation of fetishism informs Lukács theory of reification, there is no separation 
between the domination and mystification described in his theory nor is there a 
separation between Lukács’ definition of fetishism and reification.   
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strands, insofar as the commentators concerned tend to either argue for or against 
continuity accounts of fetishism as ‘reification.’ 
 
1.2 Continuity 
  
 The continuity account of fetishism as ‘reification’ conceives of a conceptual 
continuity between Marx’s account of fetishism and that of Lukács. On this view, 
fetishism and reification are treated interchangeably.236 This account does not 
distinguish between what I have identified as Marx’s account of reified social relations 
and the fetish characterisation of things. Nor does this account interpret a conceptual 
distinction between Marx’s conception of fetishism and Lukács’ conception of 
reification. On the contrary, this account either: (a) stresses conceptual continuity 
between Marx and Lukács, on the grounds that fetishism is interpreted as reification;237 
(b) conceives Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism as the Marxian aspect of Lukács’ 
Weberian-Marxist theory of reification;238 or (c) interprets fetishism and reification 
through the broad thematic lens of alienation.239  
 These interpretations are based on two key assumptions: firstly, that of 
conceiving Marx’s theory of fetishism as the transformation of social relations into a 
thing, and secondly that of viewing this conception of fetishism as the basis for Lukács’ 
theory of reification.240 In some accounts these two points of continuity are added to a 
third: namely, that of conceiving Lukács’ account of reification as continuous with 
Marx’s theory of alienation.241  
                                                
236 See (Vandenberghe 2009) 
237 See (Deborah Cook 1996) 
238 See (Lowy 1979; Honneth 2008; Wiggershaus 1995; Martin Jay 1986; Deborah 
Cook 2004)  
239 One prominent example of this can be found in Arato and Breines: ‘in Marx’s work 
it was in fact the notion of commodity fetishism, not a developed concept of alienation 
that enabled Lukács to see that the problematic of reification lies at the centre of 
Marxian critique.’  (Arato and Breines 1979, 115) 
240 See (Vandenberghe 2009) 
241Arato and Breines provide an example that combines this conception of fetishism as 
reification with a conception of fetishism and reification as types of alienation: ‘From 
commodity fetishism, Lukács deduced a concept that, as a student of Simmel, he had 
been utilizing at least since 1910: the concept of the alienation of labour […] Thus, 
Lukács deduces from ‘reification’ the notion of alienation.’ Arato and Breines 
1979,115) For examples of fetishism as the basis for reification see (Honneth 2008, 
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1.3 Discontinuity 
 
 The readings that argue for discontinuity conceive some type of conceptual 
divergence between Marx’s conception of fetishism and Lukács’ conception of 
reification. This reading is prominent in what I designated as the Althusserian242 and 
Value-Form interpretations of fetishism. In addition, Lucio Colletti published several 
articles emphasising how Lukács’ Hegelian conception of reification differs from that of 
Marx’s;243 Gillian Rose offers Neo-Kantian grounds for discontinuity;244  Moishe 
Postone argues that Lukács’s theory of reification is grounded on traditional Marxist 
preconceptions; finally, Lukács himself stresses elements of discontinuity between 
Marx and History and Class Consciousness in the 1967 preface to the latter text. 
 In these accounts, discontinuity is stressed between both Marx’s and Lukács’ 
conceptions of fetishism and their respective methodologies. The most prominent 
criticism in accounts of conceptual discontinuity identifies what Lukács himself 
described as a ‘fundamental and crude error: confusing the Hegelian conception of 
objectification with Marx’s conception of alienation.’245 Althusser also criticises Lukács’ 
conception of reification for: (a) focusing on thingness246 and (b) its scope.247 
                                                                                                                                          
97), (Wiggershaus 1995, 80), (Jay 1986; Jay 1996, 189-190), (Deborah Cook 2004), 
(Dupree 1988) and (Grondin 1988)   
242(Althusser 2005; Althusser and Balibar 2009; Balibar 2007) 
243 (Colletti 1973; Colletti 1989) 
244 (Rose 1979; Rose 1981) 
245 See (Lukács 1972, Xxiii-Xxiv) Curiously, Lukács’s identification of this error seems 
to make its own case for a continuity account insofar as he does not distinguish 
reification, alienation or fetishism from each other. 
246 ‘The whole, fashionable, theory of ‘reification’ depends on a projection of the 
theory of alienation found in the early texts, particularly the 1844 Manuscripts, on to 
the theory of ‘fetishism’ in Capital. In the 1844 Manuscripts, the objectification of the 
human essence is claimed as the indispensable preliminary to the re-appropriation of 
the human essence by man. Throughout the process of objectification, man only exists 
in the form of an objectivity in which he meets his own essence in the appearance of a 
foreign, non-human, essence. This 'objectification' is not called 'reification' even though 
it is called inhuman. Inhumanity is not represented par excellence by the model of a 
'thing': but sometimes by the model of animality (or even of pre-animality - the man 
who no longer even has simple animal relations with nature), sometimes by the model 
of the omnipotence and fascination of transcendence (God, the State) and of money, 
which is, of course, a ‘thing’. In Capital the only social relation that is presented in the 
form of a thing (this piece of metal) is money. But the conception of money as a thing 
(that is, the confusion of value with use-value in money) does not correspond to the 
reality of this ‘thing’: it is not the brutality of a simple 'thing' that man is faced with 
when he is in direct relation with money; it is a power (or a lack of it) over things and 
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  Accounts of methodological discontinuity by authors such as Elbe and Postone 
stress the means by which Lukács’s conception of reification is derived from and 
applied to a myriad of social and cultural phenomena and in a manner that differs from 
that of Marx.248 
 My criticisms of Lukács mirror some of these accounts. Prior to this, I will 
provide my own interpretation of Lukács’s position. In doing so I distinguish myself 
from the literature outlined above by focusing on the way in which his distinct 
understanding of fetishism informs his theory of the composition and characteristic 
properties of his theory of reification. I argue that Lukács utilises a double-faceted 
interpretation of fetishism to articulate these aspects of his theory of reification. As 
this interpretation of fetishism is premised on replacing Marx’s account of the abstract 
and autonomous properties of capitalist labour with the idea of social objectification as 
such, I argue that the first component of this interpretation is a view according to 
which fetishism arises through a process of objectification that separates subject from 
object. This process is reflected in the second component of Lukács’ interpretation, 
which is the contention that these objects are transformed into things that possess the 
                                                                                                                                          
men. An ideology of reification that sees 'things' everywhere in human relations 
confuses in this category ‘thing’ (a category more foreign to Marx cannot be imagined) 
every social relation, conceived according to the model of a money-thing ideology.’ 
(Althusser 2005, 230) For similar accounts of conceptual discontinuity between 
fetishism and reification see McBride in (Rockmore 1988) and (Markus 1982): 
‘Alienation and Reification in Marx and Lukács’, Thesis Eleven, 5–6.  
247 ‘In the capitalist mode of production it [fetishism] takes the form of the fetishism of 
commodities, i.e., the personification of certain things (money-capital) and the 
‘reification’ of a certain relationship (labour). It does not consist of a general 
‘reification’ of all relationships, as some humanist interpretations of Marx argue, but 
only of this particular relationship.’ From Ben Brewster’s Glossary in (Althusser and 
Balibar 2009, 313)   
248 ‘In the ‘founding document’ of Western Marxism, Lukács’s History and Class 
Consciousness – which at least for the first time refers to the character of capitalist rule 
as understood by Marx: anonymous, objectively mediated, and having a life of its own – 
a reconstruction of Marx’s theory of capitalism is avoided. Instead of an analysis of 
Marx’s dialectic of the form of value up to the form of capital, which in the theory of 
real subsumption offers an explanation of the connection – so decisive for Lukács – 
between commodification and the alienated structure of the labour process, one finds 
merely an analogizing combination of a value theory reduced to the ‘quantifying’ value-
form (due to an orientation towards Simmel’s cultural critique of money) and a 
diagnosis, oriented towards Max Weber, of the formal-rational tendency of the 
objectification of the labour process and modern law.’ (Elbe 2011) See also Lukács 
1972)  
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fetishistic properties of false objectivity. I also argue that this interpretation provides a 
basis for Lukács’ fusion of Hegel, Marx, Simmel and Weber in his account of the social 
constitution and constituent dominating and mystificatory properties of reified 
totality.249  
 I begin here by discussing the important role that History and Class Consciousness 
played in breaking with the Second International’s interpretations of Marx. I then place 
that work in the context of Lukács’ intellectual biography. I do so by focusing on how 
the early conception of dominating mystification that he formulated in his works of 
Kultur Kritique drew on Simmel and Weber. This will then lead me to demonstrate that 
Lukács’ theorisations of fetishism as reification in History and Class Consciousness ground 
these Simmelian-Weberian concerns in his Hegelian Marxist framework.  
 In the next part of the chapter I then turn to this Hegelian Marxist framework. 
I use the essay ‘What is Orthodox Marxism?’ from History and Class Consciousness as a 
means of formulating his account of the social constitution and constituent properties 
of capitalist social reality. I argue that Lukács’ interpretation consists in conceiving of 
capitalism through a Hegelian prism as an objectified dialectical social totality in which 
the subject is separated from the object on a practical and a theoretical level. To 
demonstrate this, I turn to Lukács’s interpretation of fetishism. I show how Lukács’s 
double-faceted interpretation of fetishism accounts for the practical and theoretical 
separation that occurs in this process of objectification.  On his view, fetishism consists 
in the transformation of social processes into things. As fetishes, these things possess a 
false objectivity that dominates individuals by mystifying their content as objectified 
social entities. This conception of fetishism as ‘thingification’ leads Lukács to interpret 
fetishism as a pervasive theoretical phenomenon that is constitutive of non-Hegelian-
Marxist methodologies and of everyday consciousness. 
 I then show how this conception of Hegelian Marxism allows Lukács to adapt 
his Simmelian and Weberian conception of mystified domination to his Hegelian 
Marxist framework, and to formulate his theory of reification. I argue that Lukács does 
this through his peculiar interpretation of commodity fetishism, which fuses the 
Hegelian-Marxist and Simmelian-Weberian strands of his thought. I then demonstrate 
                                                
249 My use of the terms Hegelian-Marxian and Weberian-Simmelian is not intended as 
an assertion on my part of elective affinities or incompatibilities between these two 
thinkers. I simply intend this coupling to provide an indication of how two strands of 
Lukács’ thought relied on fusing these thinkers in spite of theoretical incompatibilities.  
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how this interpretation of fetishism provides Lukács with a basis from which he is able 
to present the characteristic properties and composition of his theory of reification as 
a theory of dominating mystification that pertains to a multitude of objective and 
subjective, practical and theoretical social phenomena.  
 I will conclude this chapter by evaluating Lukács’ theory of social domination in 
terms of some criticisms of how he interprets fetishism, the role it plays in his account 
of the constitution and constituent properties of reification and the general coherence 
of this theory.  
 
2. Historical Context 
 
2.1 The Marxism of the 2nd international 
 
  History and Class Consciousness is one of the most important works in 
twentieth-century Marxism. Much of this has to do with the historical context within 
which it appeared. Prior to its publication, Marx’s writings had been codified into the 
variant of Marxism that grew out of the 2nd International. This strand of Marxism fused 
the later writings of Engels and those of Marx into the scientific doctrine of dialectical 
materialism. In these interpretations, Marx and Engels provided a scientific insight into 
the ‘iron laws’ of history and nature. They also provided an alternative model of 
political economy that was based on a rigid conception of historical development and 
an economism based on a schematic dualism, according to which the ‘base’ determines 
the ‘superstructure’.250 The critical bent of Marx’s critique of political economy was 
ignored and the categories that were central to Marx’s critique of political economy – 
such as fetishism, abstract labour and the value form – received virtually no attention. 
History and Class Consciousness broke with this interpretation by offering a critical 
Hegelian conception of Marx’s thought that drew on Capital’s discussion of the 
fetishism of commodities, and which eschewed economism for a critique of the socio-
cultural totality. Because of this, History and Class Consciousness was one of the first 
notable attempts to draw on Marxist categories in an attempt to extend Marx’s 
analysis to the increasingly bureaucratised and rationalised capitalist society of the 
1920s. Despite the specific purpose it was written for, and despite Lukács’ later 
                                                
250 For an extended discussion see ‘Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second 
International’ in (Colletti 1989), (Kolakowski 1981)  
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misgivings about the work, its status as one of the founding documents of Western 
Marxism and its influence on several generations of thinkers thus stems from the 
context within which this innovative interpretation was received. 
 
2.2. The early Lukács’ theory of domination 
  
 However, the theory of reification presented in History and Class Consciousness 
did not simply emerge out of the blue following Lukács abrupt conversion to Marxism. 
As noted above, many accounts argue for continuity between the conceptions of 
fetishism advanced by Marx and Lukács, and indeed between their notions of 
reification and alienation.251 In contrast to such readings, it is important to outline the 
early Lukács’s conception of domination, as it contains parallels with aspects of Marx’s 
theory of alienation whilst remaining conceptually distinct from the latter. This 
demonstration will also show that Lukács’s early theory of domination finds its way 
into History and Class Consciousness via the Simmelian and Weberian aspect of his 
theory of reification. 
 Lukács’ early conception of domination can be seen in his pre-Marxist works of 
Kultur Kritique. In these works, Lukács offers a variant of the latter, levelled at 
intertwined conceptions of society and culture. Like other variants of Kultur Kritique, 
Lukács’ early work is based on an opposition between a neo-romantic conception of 
organic wholeness and its antithesis in contemporary socio-cultural forms.  
 Lukács’s conception of social-cultural forms in these works was influenced by 
Georg Simmel’s understanding of reification.252 Simmel treated Marx’s theory of 
fetishism as a ‘special case’ of the general ‘tragedy of culture.’253 In Colletti’s words, the 
tragedy of culture was conceived: ‘in the fact that the “forms” engendered by “life” are 
solidified into objective institutions separated from it’, where ‘these objective institutions 
                                                
251 See (Vandenberghe 2009) 
252 Simmel uses the term Verdinglichung in Philosophy of Money several times. He does so 
more times than Marx does in Capital. For contrasting viewpoints on the etymology of 
Verdinglichung see (Frisby 1992 and Rose 1979) 
253 ‘The ‘fetishism’ which Marx assigned to economic commodities represents only a 
special case of this general fate of contents of culture. With the increase in culture 
these contents more and more stand under a paradox: they were originally created by 
subjects and for subjects: but their intermediate form of objectivity, which they take 
on in addition to the two extreme instances, they follow an immanent logic of 
development. In so doing they estrange themselves from their origin as well as from 
their purpose.’ (Simmel 2011)  
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acquire an autonomy of their own and set themselves over against the becoming that 
generated them originally.’254 Simmel’s conception of reification thus shares two 
important characteristics with Lukács’s early conception of domination: the conflation 
of alienated sociality with objectification,255 and the subsequent conception of these 
reified forms as problems of the understanding,256 thus rendering this conception of 
domination, as being dominated by mystifications of false objectivity, or rather by what 
I have termed dominating mystification.   
 Lukács’s early conception of domination also features other aspects that will 
resurface in History and Class Consciousness. These include theorisations of: (1) society 
as second nature; (2) Weberian rationalisation;257 (3) bourgeois subjectivity; (4) 
depersonalisation.  All of these aspects of Lukács’ early theory of dominating 
mystification can be seen in the following, which treats the rationalised, fragmented 
division of labour as analogous to the objectification of capitalist production; an 
objectification that is constitutive of an autonomous and rationalised form of 
domination that is external to the personality of individuals: 
 
From the standpoint of the modern individual, the essence of the modern division of 
labour is perhaps that it makes work independent of the always irrational, thus only 
qualitatively determinable, capacities of the workers and places it under objective, goal-
oriented criteria that lie outside of his personality and have no relationship to it. The 
major economic tendency of capitalism is this same objectification of production, its 
separation from the personality of the producers.258  
  
As I will show, these aspects of Lukács’ early theory of mystified social 
domination persist in what I will define as the Simmelian and Weberian strand of 
reification that can be discerned in History and Class Consciousness.259 I will now turn to 
the conception of Hegelian Marxism that I will use as a framework for demonstrating 
how the Hegelian Marxist strand of his thought fits into his theory of reification.   
 
 
                                                
254 (Colletti 1973, 169) 
255 (Frisby 1992, 95) 
256 (Frisby 1992,169) 
257See (Martin Jay 1986; Colletti 1989; Frisby 1992, Lowy 1979) 
258 Lukács, ‘zur soziologie des modernen dramas’, 665 cited in (Frisby 1992) 
259 This is not to refute History and Class Consciousness for being insufficiently Marxist. 
Rather it is to situate where certain elements Lukács introduces into Marxist theory 
stem from. 
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3. Lukács’ Hegelian Marxism 
 
 Lukács’ most extensive explication of his conception of Marxist theory in  
History and Class Consciousness can be found in the essay titled ‘What is Orthodox 
Marxism?’ This essay shows that Lukács understands Marxism as the method that 
deciphers capitalist social reality. It also demonstrates how he conceives of social 
constitution and constituent properties of capitalist reality in conjunction with 
fetishism. As I will now show, these facets of Lukács’s theory rely on the way in which 
he interprets Marx’s social theory through the Hegelian categories of dialectics and 
totality. I will then show how these categories form the basis for his account of the 
composition and characteristic properties of his double faceted interpretation of 
fetishism.  
 These elements of Lukács’s conception of Marxist theory as the means for 
deciphering capitalist society can first be seen in his statement that ‘Orthodox 
Marxism’ refers ‘exclusively to method’ and in his support for ‘the scientific conviction 
that dialectical materialism is the road to truth.’260 As these statements indicate, 
Lukács’s fusion of Marx and Hegel is central to this conception of Marxism. At the 
heart of this fusion lies the use of the Hegelian categories of dialectics and totality to 
conceive of capitalism as a dialectical socio-cultural totality. This is apparent in Lukács’s 
interpretation of Marxist theory as the method that provides knowledge of the 
historical evolution of society and of the functioning of the capitalist totality. Marxist 
theory does this through the dialectical method: ‘the function of theory is also to 
understand its own basis, i.e. dialectical method.’261 For Lukács, ‘This point is absolutely 
crucial.’262 
 The reason that this point is crucial is because Lukács conceives of the 
dialectical method as being constructive of history and capitalist social totality. He 
refers to this in Hegelian terminology as the ‘dialectical relation between subject and 
object in the historical process.’263 This means that the dialectical method grasps 
historical development. As a consequence, Lukács grasps capitalism’s operation 
                                                
260 (Lukács 1972, 1)  
261 (Lukács 1972, 3)  
262 (Lukács 1972, 3) 
263 (Lukács 1972, 3) 
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through a Hegelian prism as a dialectical totality that consists in the objectified 
separation between subject and object.  
 The interplay between the dialectical method and the category of totality is the 
means, according to Lukács, through which reality can be grasped. Like dialectics, 
totality serves a dual purpose in Lukács’s thought. Since he asserts that the social-
cultural-economic entity of capitalism functions as a totality, the methodological 
category of totality provides knowledge of capitalism. Totality and the dialectical 
method thus combine to provide a true knowledge of historical evolution and the 
dialectical function of capitalist totality.264  For Lukács, totality is thus ‘the only method 
capable of understanding and reproducing reality. Concrete totality is, therefore, the 
category that governs reality.’265  
 
3.1 Lukács’ Interpretation of Fetishism 
 
 These Hegelian aspects of Lukács’s conception of Marxist theory can be seen in 
more detail in the conception of fetishism advanced in ‘What is Orthodox Marxism?’. 
There Lukács presents fetishism in relation to dialectics and totality, whilst contending 
that fetishism should be understood in terms of thingification in which parts of the 
objectified dialectical ‘social process’ of capitalist totality appear as things divorced 
from totality. As fetishes, these things possess a false objectivity that ‘cloaks’ the ‘social 
processes’ that constitute them. This means that fetishism is utilised as a double-
faceted theory to articulate the social constitution of the thingified appearance of 
capitalist totality, in which practical activity is objectified, and in which it appears as a 
thing that possesses a false objectivity. By virtue of this conception, fetishism also 
becomes a general theoretical phenomenon, indicative of theoretical methods that try 
to understand capitalism and indeed the everyday consciousness of human agents; for 
both pertain to Lukács’s attempts to understand capitalism on the basis of thingified 
appearance. These fetishes are dispersed by the orthodox Marxist method, which 
                                                
264 ‘All the isolated partial categories can be thought of and treated-in isolation-as 
something that is always present in every society. (If it cannot be found in a given 
society this is put down to “chance”- as the exception that proves the rule.) But the 
changes to which these individual aspects are subject give no clear and unambiguous 
picture of the real differences in the various stages of the evolution of society. These 
can really only be discerned in the context of the total historical process of their 
relation to society as a whole’. (Lukács 1972, 9-10)   
265 (Lukács 1972, 10) 
  
93 
provides a transparent grasp of capitalism as a social totality. In this we can see 
Lukács’s account of the constitution and properties of these types of fetishism.  
 
A) Methodological fetishism 
 
 This first type of fetishism, which can be termed methodological fetishism, is 
evident in Lukács’s critique of science. In this account, the scientific method is 
engendered by the fetishistic and fragmented outward appearance of capitalism 
constituted by the objectification – ‘the reification of all human relations’ – and 
fragmentation of totality: ‘the constant expansion and extension of the division of 
labour.’266 This appearance harmonises with specialisation and becomes the basis of 
scientific methodology. As a result, the objectified aspects of totality are conceived as 
‘things’ that are independent of totality.267   
 Lukács’ Hegelian conception of Marxist theory disperses these forms of 
methodological fetishism by theoretically relating subject to object, and can be seen to 
reveal the properties of these types of fetishes. This is because, in contrast to scientific 
methods of understanding, ‘dialectics insists on the concrete unity of the whole.’268 By 
doing so, dialectics ‘exposes these appearances for the illusions they are – albeit 
illusions necessarily engendered by capitalism.’269 For this to happen, it is first necessary 
that dialectics recognises these ‘things’ as forms of appearance ‘in which the inner core 
necessarily appears.’ For, (a) ‘the simultaneous recognition and transcendence of 
immediate appearances is precisely the dialectical nexus’, and (b) ‘Only in this context 
                                                
266 (Lukács 1972, 6)  
267  ‘The fetishistic character of economic forms (fetischistische character), the 
reification of all human relations, the constant expansion and extension of the division 
of labour which subjects the process of production to an abstract, rational analysis, 
without regard to the human potentialities and abilities of the immediate producers, all 
these things transform the phenomena of society and with them the way in which they 
are perceived. In this way arise the 'isolated' facts, 'isolated' complexes of facts, 
separate, specialist disciplines (economics, law, etc.) whose very appearance seems to 
have done much to pave the way for such scientific methods. It thus appears 
extraordinarily 'scientific' to think out the tendencies implicit in the facts themselves 
and to promote this activity to the status of science.’ (Lukács 1972, 6)  
268 (Lukács 1972, 5) 
269 (Lukács 1972, 6) 
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which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and 
integrates them in a totality, can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge.’270  
 Methodological fetishism therefore consists in methodological presuppositions 
of specialisation and formal rationality, which, as premised on the thingified appearance 
generated by the reification of all human relations and the division of labour that 
transforms these social processes into a thing-like appearance, provides a fragmented 
orientation towards totality. From this perspective, the dialectical ‘social processes’ of 
totality cannot be grasped, and objects are conceived as things detached from the 
processes that objectify them. This orientation fetishises disciplines and 
methodological approaches as isolated things, and provides them with a false 
objectivity that cloaks their place as aspects of totality. Such a juxtaposition can also be 
seen in Lukács’s deployment of the conception of fetishism which he associates with 
everyday human agents within capitalism. 
 
B) Everyday Fetishism 
 
 Lukács’s reliance on a conception of what might be termed ‘everyday 
fetishism’271 demonstrates the importance of his interpretation of Marxism as a 
method that discloses the constitution, domination and reproduction of the capitalist 
totality. This is because the ultimate validity of this method ‘only emerges with 
complete clarity’ when ‘we direct our attention to the real, material substratum of our 
method, viz. capitalist society with its internal antagonism between the forces and the 
relations of production.’272 In Lukács’s Hegelian interpretation of Marx’s theory of 
fetishism, everyday conceptions of capitalism rest on the latter’s immediate 
appearances, and fail to grasp the material substratum of the class relation that 
constitutes this objectified, thingified appearance. The Marxist method, however, for 
Lukács, by virtue of its dialectical apprehension of totality, can grasp this substratum.273 
This knowledge of totality dissolves the fetishistic conceptions held by everyday agents 
in capitalism in a two-fold manner: firstly by dissolving the assumption that capitalism is 
a natural, and not an historical entity; and secondly, by dissolving the fetishised 
                                                
270 (Lukács 1972, 8) 
271 As I indicate below, this is because everyday fetishism is indicative of ‘the objective 
forms of all social phenomena.’ (Lukács 1972,10)  
272 (Lukács 1972,10) 
273 See (Lukács 1972, 4) 
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appearance of capitalism.274 As a result, it also discloses how Lukács conceives the 
composition and characteristic properties of these types of fetishism. 
 In a further instance of Lukács’s Hegelian interpretation of Marx’s theory of 
fetishism, the naturalisation of capitalism is shown to occur because people’s everyday 
perceptions do not grasp how or why capitalism functions as a dialectical social 
totality. As a result, the thingified appearance of capitalist society generates the 
conception that it is natural: ‘With the totality out of the way, the fetishistic relations 
[Erscheinen] of the isolated parts appear as a timeless law valid for every human 
society.’275 The Marxist theoretical method de-naturalises these trans-historical 
assumptions. Capital’s fetishistic forms of objectivity are derived from its immediate 
appearances and they generate the assumption that capitalism is in some sense 
‘natural’; yet the dialectical method links these immediate forms of appearance 
together, and reveals their basis within the historically rooted substratum that they 
serve to veil. This reflects the degree to which Lukács conceives capitalist totality as a 
social process: 
 
[…] the objective forms of all social phenomena change constantly in the course of 
their ceaseless dialectical interactions with each other. The intelligibility of objects 
develops in proportion as we grasp their function in the totality to which they belong. 
This is why only the dialectical conception of totality can enable us to understand 
reality as a social process. For only here the fetishistic forms of objectivity that capitalist 
production necessarily produces dissolve themselves into a necessarily recognized 
[understood, perceived, grasped] appearance – an appearance that nevertheless 
remains an illusion [translation of this sentence amended]. These unmediated 
concepts, these 'laws' sprout just as inevitably from the soil of capitalism and veil the 
real relations between objects. They can all be seen as ideas necessarily held by the 
agents of the capitalist system of production […] Only when this veil is torn aside 
does historical knowledge become possible. For the function of these unmediated 
concepts that have been derived from the fetishistic [fetischistischen] forms of 
objectivity is to make the phenomena of capitalist society appear as supra- historical 
essences. The knowledge of the real, objective nature of a phenomenon, the 
knowledge of its historical character and the knowledge of its actual function in the 
totality of society form, therefore, a single, undivided act of cognition. 276 
                                                
274 By doing so, this conception of everyday fetishism fuses Marx’s conceptions of the 
political economists’ fetishistic naturalisation of capitalism with Marx's contention that 
the fetish character of commodities is indicative of the social character of capitalist 
production.  
275 (Lukács 1972,14) 
276 Lukács 1972, 14) As noted, I amended the translation of a crucial sentence in this 
paragraph. Livingstone translates it as ‘For only this conception dissolves the fetishistic 
forms [fetischistischen] necessarily produced by the capitalist mode of production and 
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Lukács’ discussion of necessary forms of illusion in this passage can be taken to 
indicate that he would interpret the fetish forms of objectivity as an objective or 
necessary illusion; as an illusion that cannot be dissolved merely through the 
generation of knowledge about totality, but only through the practical overthrow of 
the capitalist totality itself. Yet directly after this passage, Lukács treats the fetish 
character of commodities as a form of thingified objectivity that veils the class relation 
that constitutes capitalist production and as something that can be dispersed by 
criticism. As was the case with the other types of fetishism, i.e., that of the fetishism of 
economic categories and of the human environment, this immediacy is conceived in 
terms of things that possess a false objectivity which conceals the social relations 
embedded in them:  
  
The fetishistic illusions [fetischistischen] enveloping all phenomena in capitalist society 
succeed in concealing reality, but more is concealed than the historical, i.e. transitory, 
ephemeral nature of phenomena. This concealment is made possible by the fact that in 
capitalist society man's environment and especially the categories of economics appear 
to him immediately and necessarily in forms of objectivity which conceal the fact that 
they are the categories of the relations of men with each other. Instead they appear as 
things and the relations of things with each other. Therefore, when the dialectical 
method destroys the fiction of the immortality of the categories it also destroys their 
reified character and clears the way to a knowledge of reality. 277 
 
These fetishistic categories are consequently ‘destroyed’ by dialectical 
knowledge of the social relations that mediate the relation between things, as this 
provides transparent insight into the capitalist totality: ‘It is by virtue of this insight that 
the dialectical method and its concept of totality can be seen to provide real 
knowledge of what goes on in society.’278 As a consequence, this dialectical knowledge 
of totality provides a description of how Lukács construes the social relations that 
underlie it. Lukács’ description of these social relations provides an account of social 
                                                                                                                                          
enables us to see them as mere illusions [erkannten Schein] which are not less illusory 
[Schein] for being seen to be necessary.’ In my view, Livingstone’s translation (1) 
neglects Lukács’s designation of this type of fetishism as fetish forms of false objectivity, 
and this leads to (2) neglecting the importance of Lukács’s designation of the illusory 
properties of these fetish forms of false objectivity as erkannten Schein, thereby (3) 
introducing an unwarranted distinction between illusion and mere illusion.  
 
277 (Lukács 1972, 15)  
278 (Lukács 1972, 15) 
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domination and the social constitution of capitalism that is premised upon his Hegelian, 
Orthodox Marxist method. The first point can be seen in his description of the 
practical constitution of these objectified forms of false objectivity in which ‘the inner 
logic of the movement of human society can be understood at once as the product of 
men themselves and of forces that arise from their relations with each other and 
which have escaped their control.’279 The second point is evident in his account of the 
dialectical function of capitalism as a totality that is constituted by human social 
relations: 
 
As ‘pure’ economic categories they are involved in constant interaction with each 
other, and that enables us to understand any given historical cross-section through the 
evolution of society. But since they have arisen out of human relations and since they 
function in the process of the transformation of human relations, the actual process of 
social evolution becomes visible in their reciprocal relationship with the reality 
underlying their activity. That is to say, it is the production and reproduction of a 
particular economic totality.280 
 
  We can now see the distinct configuration of Lukács’s Hegelian Marxism. 
Marxism is seen as constitutive of a critical-dialectical method that grasps the 
movement of history and the function of capitalist society as a dialectical social totality. 
Rather than providing a fully explicated theory of social constitution, this ‘method’ 
tends to: (a) presuppose that capitalism functions as a dialectical social totality without 
offering a detailed explication of how it actually functions in that regard; (b) defines the 
basis of the constitution of this totality by resorting to the Marxian terminology of 
relations between people and class relations, but without a detailed explanation of 
what these relations are, or indeed of how they constitute totality; (c) tends to fall 
back on a ‘Hegelian’ conception of the historical evolution of society as the interaction 
between subject and object, and on an account of objectification as the ground for a 
conception of social dynamics.  
 We can also see how this distinct configuration conceives of fetishism in the 
dual capacity of a theory that articulates how the dialectical social relations of capitalist 
totality (a) constitute objectified thing-like appearances, and (b) are constitutive of 
types of understanding that rest on these immediate appearances, and which thus 
engender a failure to grasp capitalism as a dialectical totality. Fetishism is thus 
                                                
279 (Lukács 1972, 15) 
280 (Lukács 1972, 14) 
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interpreted as problem of ‘thingification’ that generates a false objectivity that cloaks 
the real ‘social processes’ that are objectified in them. Instead of consisting in an aspect 
of a theory of the constitution of abstract social domination that explains the role that 
personified things play in the social constitution and reproduction of capitalist social 
production, Lukács’s conception of fetishism in his theory of social domination is thus 
concerned with objectification per se.281 In the above examples, theoretical instances of 
fetishism are consequently conceived as forms of thingified false objectivity that is 
characteristic of scientific and everyday forms of understanding.  
 As a result, Methodological Fetishism consists of types of understanding, such 
as science, that are methodologically deficient. Lukács’s interpretation of commodity 
fetishism, on the other hand, bases itself on the confusion of objectification and the 
abstract and autonomous social character of capitalist labour, and thereby conceives 
fetishism as a naturalisation fallacy, and thus as an epistemological illusion of 
thingification that serves to veil the underlying class relations of capitalist totality. Yet 
where ‘What is Orthodox Marxism?’ deploys these concepts in connection to a 
theoretical account of the constitution and constituent, thingified appearance of social 
reality, something rather different can be found in his ‘Reification and the Class 
Consciousness of the Proletariat’. In the latter essay, these concepts are used as means 
of describing the constitution and the constituent dominating and mystificatory 
elements of capitalist dialectical social totality. In the latter essay, as I will now show, 
Lukács utilises his interpretation of commodity fetishism to fuse the Simmelian-
Weberian and Hegelian-Marxian strands of his thought, employing it as a basis upon 
which he formulates his theory of the dominating mystification of reification. 
 
4. Reification 
 
 Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat is a dense essay. Whilst many 
commentators have provided an exposition of the work and traced its disparate 
influences,282 I will focus on how Lukács’s Hegelian interpretation of Marx and his 
distinct interpretation of commodity fetishism grounds the theory of reification. I then 
                                                
281 In this sense it is Lukács’s conflation of alienation with objectification that fuses his 
Hegelian-Marxian conception of domination with the Simmelian-Weberian strand of 
his thought. 
282 See (Andrew Arato 1979; Vandenberghe 2009) 
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examine how the Hegelian-Marxist and Simmelian, Weberian aspects of his conception 
of social domination and mystification are constitutive of this interpretation of 
commodity fetishism as a theory of the dominating mystification of objectified capitalist 
totality. I will then turn to Lukács’ notion of the destruction of reification, as the 
crucial conception of de-reification that he presents there can be seen to reveal his 
views on the constitution of reification. 
 The extent to which Lukács’s Hegelian Marxism informs his conception of 
reification can be seen in the introductory paragraph of the ‘Reification’ essay. In this 
paragraph, Lukács lays out his conception of Marx’s analysis of capitalist society. This 
reflects the elements of Lukács’s Hegelian Marxism discussed above, and it also 
demonstrates that Lukács is utilising his conception of Marxism as the basis for his 
social analysis of reification. This can be seen in his statement that Marx used the 
category of totality critically, and as a means to ‘portray capitalist society in its totality 
[by] lay[ing] bare its fundamental nature.’283  
 The central importance that Lukács’s interpretation of commodity fetishism 
holds in the ‘Reification’ essay is also signalled in his statement that Marx’s critical 
analysis of totality is primarily based on his analysis of commodities, for ‘there is no 
problem’, in Lukács’s view, ‘that does not ultimately lead back to that question and 
there is no solution that could not be found in the solution of the riddle of the 
commodity form.’284 This is mirrored later in the essay when Lukács states that ‘it 
might be claimed […] that the chapter dealing with the fetish character of the 
commodity contains within itself the whole of historical materialism and the whole 
self-knowledge of the proletariat seen as the self-knowledge of capitalist society.’285 As 
a result, the commodity form is defined as ‘the central, structural problem of capitalist 
society in all its aspects’ and thus as the basis of Lukács’s dialectical social analysis of 
capitalist totality; it is presented as ‘yield[ing] a model of all the objective forms of 
bourgeois society together with all the subjective forms corresponding to them.’286  
 These two elements are drawn on in the beginning of the essay, where Lukács 
provides a basis for his analysis of the constitution and constituent properties of reified 
totality in his definition of the commodity form.  It is important to note that the 
                                                
283 (Lukács 1972, 83) 
284 (Lukács 1972, 15) 
285 (Lukács 1972, 170)   
286 (Lukács 1972, 15) 
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definition that Lukács provides of the commodity form is equivalent to his conception 
of fetishism and to his later definition of the basic phenomena of reification.287 This 
definition can also be seen to link his Hegelian-Marxian and Simmelian-Weberian 
strands of thought with the dual conception of fetishism that articulates his views on 
the composition and characteristic properties of capitalist totality. This is done in 
Lukács’s definition of the commodity form, in which we can see (1) his Hegelian-
Marxian conception of fetishism as the autonomous thingified false objectivity of 
‘phantom objectivity’; (2) his Simmelian and Weberian conception of reification as 
autonomy, which is premised on a formal rationality that cannot grasp its own content; 
(3) that he bases the constitution and the constituent properties of these two facets 
on the mode of objectification that takes place within a social relation between people 
that takes on the character of a thing, and which thereby veils the social relations that 
constitute it. Thus: 
 
The essence of commodity-form [translation amended] has often been pointed out. Its 
basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus 
acquires a 'phantom objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-
embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between 
people.288  
 
 This distinctive interpretation of the commodity becomes a basis for Lukács’ 
analysis of the constituent properties of reified social totality in three ways. In the first 
place, Lukács provides several historical arguments for the pervasiveness of 
commodification. In the second place, his ensuing definition of reification is equivalent 
to this definition. In the third place, his subsequent analysis draws on these elements to 
catalogue the pervasive reification of capitalist totality.  
 This first element of this connection between Lukács’s views on the commodity 
and his account of totality provides a historical basis for the pervasiveness of 
commodification that he presents in a number of statements, which periodise the 
                                                
287 Lukács uses the terms commodity form, fetishism and reification interchangeably. 
This is particularly noticeable in the use of Marx quotations in which Lukács: (a) omits 
Marx’s only use of the term reification (verdinglichung) from the passage of the Trinity 
Formula that he quotes; (b) uses several of Marx’s discussions of different types of 
fetishism including the passage where Marx defines the fetish-character of commodities 
to define reification. Rose (1979) also points out that Lukács uses Marx’s definition of 
the fetish-character of commodities for the basis of his definition of reification. Frisby 
(1992) also points out that Lukács omits Marx’s one use of the term verdinglichung.   
288 (Lukács 1972, 83)  
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historically specific and all-encompassing extent of commodification. In these remarks, 
Lukács draws on his initial comments about the commodity as the central, structural 
problem of capitalist society by distinguishing the capitalist society he is analysing from 
earlier forms of capitalism, and from other modes of production. Consequently, he 
asserts that ‘commodity fetishism is a specific problem of […] the age of modern 
capitalism’.289 This is because, in contrast to previous forms of capitalism, commodities 
are only ‘constitutive’ of society when ‘the commodity structure’ has ‘penetrate[d] 
society in all its aspects and […] remould[ed] it in its own image.’ As a result, the 
‘universal structuring principle’ of commodification possesses pervasive dialectical 
properties:  
 
The commodity can only be understood in its undistorted essence when it becomes 
the universal category of society as a whole. Only in this context does the reification 
produced by commodity relations assume decisive importance both for the objective 
evolution of society and for the stance adopted by men towards it.290 
  
The second element listed above pertains to Lukács’s definition of the basic 
phenomena of reification. The definition that Lukács provides consists of a citation of 
the passage where Marx defines the fetish character of commodities291 – not, it might 
be added, the passage in which Marx discusses the phenomena of the objectification of 
persons and reified social relations – and omits Marx’s use of the term fetishism. This 
definition thus treats fetishism as reification. As I will show, this is equivalent to 
Lukács’s earlier definition of the commodity form.  
 I will make this case by turning now to the third element of the connection 
between Lukács’s view of the commodity and his conception of social totality. This 
third element is the analysis of reified totality that proceeds from this definition of 
fetishism as reification. The problematic equivalence between fetishism, reification and 
                                                
289 (Lukács 1972, 84) 
290 (Lukács 1972, 83) 
291 ‘A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social 
character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the 
product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their 
own labour is presented to them as a social relation existing not between themselves, 
but between the products of their labour. This is the reason the products of labour 
become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible 
and imperceptible by the senses […] It is only a definite social relation between men 
that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.’ (Lukács 
1972, 85) 
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Lukács’s initial definition of the commodity form already signalled in Lukács statement 
that his ‘intention’ is to ‘base’ his analysis of reification on ‘Marx’s economic analyses 
and to proceed from there to a discussion of the problems growing out of the fetish 
character of commodities, both as an objective form and also as a subjective stance 
corresponding to it.’292 As I will show, the ensuing account of reification generalises the 
properties of his unique analysis of the commodity form qua fetishism as reification to: 
(a) the practical forms of reification constitutive of the objectified separation between 
subject and object that occur in the process of thingification; and (b) the theoretical 
elements of reified consciousness which are reflective of the objectified separation 
between subject and object in their correspondence to thingified appearance. 
 
4.1 Practical Reification 
 
 This can first be seen in the Hegelian-Marxist strand of the practical forms of 
reification. This aspect of reification draws on the conceptions of ‘autonomy’ and 
‘phantom objectivity’ signalled in his definition of the commodity form. In these 
passages Lukács can also be seen to draw out the repercussions that this autonomy 
has on human individuals.  
  The constituent properties of this Hegelian-Marxian conception of reification 
are first drawn out in Lukács’s characterisation of the basic phenomena of reification, 
which is indicative of his equivalent treatment of: his initial definition of the commodity 
form; his definition of fetishism as reification; and his interpretation of fetishism qua 
objectification. This is evident in Lukács’s statement that ‘what is of central 
importance’ to Marx’s definition of commodity fetishism ‘is that because of this 
situation a man's own activity, his own labour becomes something objective and 
independent of him, something that controls him by virtue of an autonomy alien to 
man.’293 
  The characteristic properties of this ‘basic phenomenon’ of reification are 
illustrated by Lukács in a dialectical manner that also highlights this aspect of Lukács’ 
interpretation of fetishism. This is apparent when Lukács stresses that it is a world of 
objects as such that is indicative of this practical form of reification: ‘a world of objects 
and relations between things springs into being.’  It is further evident in his description 
                                                
292 (Lukács 1972, 85) 
293 (Lukács 1972, 86) 
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of how the ‘phantom objectivity’ of these objects ‘confront’ individuals as ‘invisible 
forces that generate their own power’294, estranging individuals from their own activity 
and compelling them to act in an instrumental manner. 
 Finally, these Hegelian-Marxist aspects of the constituent properties of the 
practical forms of reification can be seen in Lukács’s further elucidation of the 
dialectical repercussions of abstract labour. Objectively, abstract labour grants 
different objects their commodity nature by ‘facilitating the equal exchange of 
qualitatively different objects.’295 Subjectively, what Lukács terms the ‘formal equality’ 
of abstract labour ‘becomes the real principle governing the actual production of 
commodities.’296As a result, the Hegelian-Marxian elements of Lukács’s definition of the 
commodity form as the autonomous fetishism of thingified false objectivity are 
reflected in the constituent properties of ‘abstract labour’ which ‘becomes a category 
of society that decisively influences the objective form of things, including the 
movements of people within society, their relation to nature, and their possible 
relations of men with each other.’297 
 In order to demonstrate how abstract labour attains and exerts this influence, 
Lukács moves to production in the factory. Here, Lukács can be seen to draw on the 
Simmelian and Weberian aspects of his definition of the commodity form in his ‘strictly 
rational and all-embracing’ analysis of the objectified forms of reification that are 
constitutive of the pervasive rationalisation of human activity in reified totality. As was 
the case in his earlier work, this Simmelian and Weberian conception of reification is 
premised on: (a) his conflation of alienation and objectification and (b) an opposition 
between the pernicious effects of the quantified and fragmented rationalisation of the 
division of labour and a qualitative notion of wholeness. 
 From this it follows that Lukács’s initial discussion of production in the factory 
is constitutive of practical properties of reification that derive from the fact that such 
production is rationalised in fragmented, quantified and calculated activities. This 
transforms the products of the process of production into autonomous objects – ‘the 
finished article ceases to be the object of the work-process’298 – because it is 
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generated by the fragmented division of labour in the act of production and based on 
an opposition to a neo-romantic conception of organic production.299  
 These Simmelian and Weberian aspects are also reflected in Lukács’s account 
of the subjective aspect of rationalisation which fragments the subject who takes on a 
contemplative stance towards its own activity. This entails the ‘mechanically objectified 
performance of the worker, wholly separated from his total human personality’,300 so 
that this ‘rational mechanisation extends right into the workers soul’, where ‘even his 
psychological attributes are separated from his total personality because ‘they are 
placed in opposition to it so as to facilitate their integration into specialised rational 
systems and their reduction to statistically viable concepts.’301 This causes the 
transformation of the ‘basic categories of man’s immediate attitude to the world’,302 
which Lukács also accounts for in terms of an opposition between quantity and quality. 
Time is transformed into quantitative space; human labour power is objectified ‘into 
something opposed to their total personality’, and holistic community is replaced by 
mechanisation. 
  This analysis of the rationalisation of the factory forms the basis for the 
generalisation of this Simmelian and Weberian account of reification to other socio-
cultural forms. This can be seen in the analogies that Lukács draws between the 
characteristics of reification that he has developed in his preceding analysis of the 
factory, and other social institutions. This generalisation is based on the contention 
                                                
299 ‘The latter turns into the objective synthesis of rationalised special systems whose 
unity is determined by pure calculation and which must therefore seem to be 
arbitrarily connected with each other. This destroys the organic necessity with which 
inter-related special operations are unified in the end-product. The unity of a product 
as a commodity no longer coincides with its unity as a use-value: as society becomes 
more radically capitalistic the increasing technical autonomy of the special operations 
involved in production is expressed also, as an economic autonomy, as the growing 
relativisation of the commodity character of a product at the various stages of 
production’. (Lukács 1972, 89)  
300 (Lukács 1972, 90)  
301 (Lukács 1972, 8)  
302 (Lukács 1972, 90)  
Thus despite Lukács’s contention that there is continuity between his earlier 
discussion of the autonomisation of commodities and abstract labour on the one hand, 
and his discussion of autonomisation and rationalisation on the other, there is 
nonetheless incommensurability. This is because while in Marx’s account the 
autonomisation of objects is premised on the social division of labour, in Weber’s it is 
premised on the division of labour within specific factories. One does not necessarily 
relate to the other.  
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that since ‘the laws of capitalist production have been extended to cover every 
manifestation of life’, the ‘factory contains the concentrated structure of society.’  
From this it follows that ‘the fate of the worker is typical of society as a whole’, in that 
‘self-objectification’, and the ‘transformation of a human function into a commodity’ 
reveals in all its starkness the dehumanised and dehumanising function of the 
commodity relation.’303 Therefore because the commodity is the universal structuring 
principle of totality in Lukács’s account, ‘[c]apitalism has created a form for the state 
and a system of law corresponding to the needs and harmonising with its own 
structure.’304  
 Such a ‘harmony’ is demonstrated by recourse to the Simmelian and Weberian 
strand of reification. The institutions of the state and bureaucracy are said to possess a 
‘rational systemisation’305 that is analogous to the organisation of the factory. This 
rational systemisation eschews qualitative factors to consist in formal, quantitative, 
fragmented and standardised organisation.306 These forms of ‘rational systemisation’ 
‘confront’ individuals, instilling a contemplative attitude within them, and also engender 
their estrangement from their own activity and from their own instrumental 
behaviour. Thus, not only are people’s actions objectified and rationalised; so too is 
their consciousness. Examples of this include bureaucracy and law, the properties of 
which are analogous to the factory in that they imply’ the adjustment of one’s way of 
life, mode of work and hence of consciousness, to the general socio-economic 
premises of the capitalist economy.’307 This is seen as being so pervasive throughout 
capitalist totality that it also extends to other occupations and social customs, 
including journalists, marriage, and specialists who are ‘the living embodiment of such 
tendencies’.308 As a result: ‘the formal standardisation of justice, the state, the civil 
service, etc. signifies objectively and factually, a comparable search for the rational 
formal laws of these carefully segregated partial systems’, while, subjectively, the 
‘divorce between work and the individual capacities and needs of the worker 
                                                
303 (Lukács 1972, 92) 
304 (Lukács 1972, 95) 
305 (Lukács 1972, 96) 
306 (Lukács 1972, 92) 
307 (Lukács 1972, 98) 
308 (Lukács 1972, 103) 
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produces’ the ‘comparable effects upon the consciousness’ of an ‘inhuman, 
standardised division of labour.’309 
 These Hegelian-Marxian and Weberian-Simmelian strands of practical 
reification are brought together in Lukács’ comments on the ‘natural laws’ and crisis-
prone tendencies of reified totality. The former and the later are accounted for in 
terms of the relationship between the rationalised parts and the irrational whole.310 
This relationship is indicative of the ‘true structure of society’, where ‘independent, 
rationalised and formal partial laws whose links with each other are of necessity purely 
formal (i.e. their formal interdependence can be formally systematised),’ can ‘only 
establish fortuitous connections.’311 Therefore, ‘It is evident that the whole structure 
of capitalist production rests on the interaction between a necessity subject to strict 
laws in all isolated phenomena and the relative irrationality of the total process.’312 
Thus, on one hand the Weberian-Simmelian strand of Lukács’s theory consists in the 
rationalised parts of capitalist totality in which the practical activity of society is carried 
out in accordance with partial laws that ultimately help to reproduce this society.  
 
The capitalist process of rationalisation based on private economic calculation requires 
that every manifestation of life shall exhibit this very interaction between details which 
are subject to laws and a totality ruled by chance. It presupposes a society so 
structured. It produces and reproduces this structure in so far as it takes possession of 
society.313  
 
It also means, on the other hand, that the Hegel-Marxian strand of Lukács’s 
theory reflects the function of the irrational whole which is exemplary of a ‘law’ that is 
collectively constituted by the 'unconscious product of the activity of the different 
commodity owners acting independently of one another’314 As a result,  
 
This irrationality, this-highly problematic-'systematisation' of the whole which diverges 
qualitatively and in principle from the laws regulating the parts, is more than just a 
                                                
309 (Lukács 1972, 99) 
310 This rationalisation of the world appears to be complete. It seems to penetrate the 
very depths of man's physical and psychic nature. It is limited, however, by its own 
formalism. That is to say, the rationalisation of isolated aspects of life results in the 
creation of formal Iaws. (Lukács 1972, 102) 
311 (Lukács 1972, 102) 
312 (Lukács 1972, 101) 
313 (Lukács 1972, 102) 
314 (Lukács 1972, 102) 
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postulate, a pre-supposition essential to the workings of a capitalist economy. It is at 
the same time the product of the capitalist division of labour.315  
 
As such, Lukács’s account of the constituent properties of the practical forms 
of his theory of reification can be seen to draw on his Hegelian-Marxian account of the 
autonomous thingified properties of social activity and his Simmelian and Weberian 
conception of the rational and all-embracing autonomy of the rationalised production 
process. Both rest on his conception of objectified separation and are premised on his 
definition of the commodity fetish. These two aspects of Lukács thought are 
synthesised in the rationalised, autonomous function of totality. As I will now show, 
Lukács account of the theoretical stances that correspond to these practical forms of 
reification also draws on this definition. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Reification 
  
 This is because the theoretical elements of the constitutive properties of 
reification are premised on the objectified separation of subject and object.  These 
theoretical stances consequently rest on the thingified appearance of a fetishised social 
totality that conceals the social relations that constitute it. This theoretical aspect of 
reified consciousness is so pervasive that ‘even the individual object which man 
confronts directly, either as a producer or consumer, is distorted in its objectivity by 
its commodity character.’316 As a consequence it can be seen in the several types of 
theoretical subjectivity that Lukács outlines. These types can also be seen to reflect the 
theoretical accounts of fetishism in ‘What is Orthodox Marxism?’.  
 What Lukács calls the ‘reified mind’ is indicative of this theoretical element of 
reification. This ‘reified mind’ sees ‘the commodity character of the commodity, the 
abstract, quantitative mode of calculability’ as the form in which its own authentic 
immediacy becomes manifest, and, as reified consciousness, it does not even attempt 
to transcend it. Instead, the reified mind tries to perpetuate and ‘scientifically deepen 
it.’ For Lukács, ‘the reified mind’ is indicative of ‘bourgeois attempts to comprehend 
the ideological phenomenon of reification.’317 
                                                
315 (Lukács 1972, 103 
316 (Lukács 1972, 93) 
317  (Lukács 1972, 95) 
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 This theoretical element of reification is also characteristic of Lukács’s criticism 
of the scientific method. This criticism fuses his discussion of Weberian rationalisation 
with his conception of methodological fetishism in ‘What is Orthodox Marxism?’. In 
this respect, the rationalised specialisation of skills ‘leads to the destruction of every 
image of the whole.’318 While Lukács’s criticism of the scientific method in which ‘its 
own concrete underlying reality lies, methodologically and in principle, beyond its 
grasp’319 repeats his earlier criticism of methodological fetishism in ‘What is Orthodox 
Marxism?’. There he claimed that the scientific method cannot grasp totality. Finally, 
bureaucracy and jurisprudence are seen to involve this theoretical element of 
reification because they are based on analogous types of formal rationality that fail to 
grasp their own content. 
 These elements of the theoretical component of reification are also present in 
Lukács’s longer discussion of the antinomies of bourgeois thought, which he presents 
in the second section of the ‘Reification’ essay. In this section Lukács identifies several 
antinomies in German idealism that he views as symptomatic of bourgeois thought. 
These antinomies include the opposition of subject and object, freedom and necessity, 
individual and society, form and content. Like the other forms of reified consciousness, 
these antinomies proceed from a contemplative stance and a deficient methodology 
that is based on the thingified appearance, and thus fail to grasp the underlying social 
relations that constitute capitalist totality.320  
 Finally, the initial discussion in the section on ‘The Standpoint of the Proletariat’ 
reflects the analysis of everyday fetishism in ‘What Is Orthodox Marxism?’. There 
Lukács deploys his conception of fetishism in terms of the consciousness of all agents 
in capitalism.  
  The constituent elements of the theoretical element of reification can thus be 
seen as instances of Lukács’ generalisation of the thing-like appearance of the 
                                                
318 (Lukács 1972, 104) 
319 (Lukács 1972,104) 
320 ‘In Section II we were able to point out as emphatically as possible the various 
intellectual implications flowing from the character of bourgeois society and the 
systematic limitations of its thought. We drew attention there to the antinomies 
(between subject and object, freedom and necessity, individual and society, form and 
content, etc.) to which such thought necessarily led. It is important to realise at this 
point that although bourgeois thought only landed in these antinomies after the very 
greatest mental exertions, it yet accepted their existential basis as self,-evident, as a 
simply unquestionable reality. Which is to say: bourgeois thought entered into an 
unmediated relationship with reality as it was given’ (Lukács 1972, 156) 
  
109 
commodity form. As such, his account of the reified mind and of the bourgeois 
methodologies in which consciousness is separated from its object rest on his 
conception of the fetish as an objectified, thing-like appearance that veils the 
underlying social relations that are objectified within it.  
 
4.3 Reification as Dominating Mystification 
 
 These aspects of Lukács’ theory of reification combine to form a theory of 
what can be termed dominating mystification, in which these inter-related strands of 
reification, which are reflective of Lukács’ unique interpretation of commodity 
fetishism, are drawn together. Lukács thus brings out the repercussions exerted by the 
objectified, thing-like appearance of social totality upon the individuals who are 
embedded within it.  
 This can be seen by addressing Lukács’s characterisation of the way in which 
humans are dominated by reification. Lukács’s conceptions of these facets of reification 
stem from the Hegelian-Marxian and Simmelian and Weberian premises that he initially 
lays out and are added to in the rest of the ‘Reification’ essay. As a whole, Lukács’s 
conception of dominating mystification can be seen in his influential use of the term 
‘second nature.’ Second nature conveys the autonomous function of the  ‘natural laws’ 
of totality and the manner in which it dominates and compels individual action in the 
form of the objectified false objectivity of things ‘in which reification finds its practical 
expression.’ It also conveys the manner in which consciousness is likewise maimed by 
this separation, in which the transformation of the commodity relation into a thing of 
‘ghostly objectivity’ also ‘stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man; his 
qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are things.’321 
Finally, second nature conveys the naturalised thing-like appearance of these social 
conditions that provide the basis for theoretical reification.322 Appropriately, the 
conception of second nature does this without providing much of an explication for 
                                                
321 (Lukács 1972, 100) 
322 ‘However, if this atomisation is only an illusion it is a necessary one. That is to say, 
the immediate, practical as well as intellectual confrontation of the individual with 
society, the immediate production and reproduction of life - in which for the individual 
the commodity structure of all 'things' and their obedience to 'natural laws' is found to 
exist already in a finished form, as something immutably given-could only take place in 
the form of rational and isolated acts of exchange between isolated commodity 
owners.’ (Lukács 1972, 92) 
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the genesis of second nature, or of how it promulgates these autonomous properties 
of domination. Instead, these properties are grounded on the extensive dominating 
mystificatory properties of the objectified thing-like appearance of the commodity 
form.  
 
The commodity become crucial for the subjugation of men’s consciousness to the 
forms in which this reification finds expression and for their attempts to comprehend 
the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate them, from servitude 
to the ‘second nature’ so created.323   
 
As a result there is ‘no natural form in which human relations can be cast, no 
way in which man can bring his physical and psychic ‘qualities’ into play without their 
being subjected increasingly to this reified process.’324 Lukács’s theory of reification can 
therefore be said to be a theory of dominating mystification.  
This conception of dominating mystification can also be seen in passages that 
outline the repercussions that second nature has on individuals on either side of the 
class divide. As regards the whole, Lukács accounts for its effects on the class relation 
in terms of his periodisation of the pervasiveness of commodification. Thus it was ‘not 
until the rise of capitalism’ that a ‘unified economic structure, and hence a formally 
unified structure of consciousness that embraced the whole of society came into 
being.’325 Consequently, a ‘unity is expressed in the fact that the problems of 
consciousness arising from wage labour were repeated in the ruling class in refined and 
spiritualised, but, for that reason, more intensified form.’326  
As result, these characteristics of the dominating mystification of individuals in 
the class relation also fuse the Hegelian-Marxian and Simmelian and Weberian strands 
of reification and the properties of domination and mystification. Thus the proletariat’s 
actions, consciousness and ‘total personality’ are compelled, fragmented and 
dehumanised due to the manner in which their labour is inverted by virtue of the 
mystified properties of capitalist totality:  
 
For the proletariat social reality […] appears in the first instance as the pure object of 
societal events. In every aspect of daily life in which the individual worker imagines 
himself to be the subject of his own life he finds this to be an illusion that is destroyed 
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324 (Lukács 1972, 100) 
325 (Lukács 1972, 100) 
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by the immediacy of his existence. This forces upon him the knowledge that the most 
elementary gratification of his needs […] [t]he quantification of objects, their 
subordination to abstract mental categories, makes its appearance in the life of the 
worker immediately as a process of abstraction of which he is the victim, and which 
cuts him off from his labour-power, forcing him to sell it on the market as a 
commodity, belonging to him. And by selling this, his only commodity, he integrates it 
(and himself: for his commodity is inseparable from his physical existence) into a 
specialized process that has been rationalized and mechanized, a process that he 
discovers already existing, complete and able to function without him and in which he 
is no more than a cipher reduced to an abstract quantity, a mechanized and 
rationalized tool […] Thus for the worker the reified character of the immediate 
manifestations of capitalist society receives the most extreme definition possible.327  
 
 The bourgeois individuals are likewise compelled, subjugated, and by virtue of 
their class standpoint prevented from grasping the reified social totality. They possess 
‘individual consciousness’ with which they confront the ‘overwhelming objective 
necessities imposed by society of which only minute fragments can be  
comprehended.’328 Furthermore their actions consist in quantified, calculating and 
instrumental activities.329 
 Descriptions such as these are also provided in accounts of the dominating 
mystification that imposes itself upon other individuals in the capitalist totality, where 
individuals are compelled by ‘the objectified forms’ and the ‘subjective stances’ 
corresponding to them. One such notable example is bureaucracy, which is such a 
‘monstrous intensification of one-sided specialisation’ that it ‘represents […] a 
violation of man’s humanity.’330 This is because bureaucracy is premised on its formal 
separation from qualitative interaction with the essence of ‘things’, which causes the 
faculties of bureaucrats to be objectified, detached and split from their personality. 
Thus in the case of bureaucrats and other vocations, such as lawyers, specialists and 
journalists, the objectified forms characteristic of their institutional activity operate 
separately from them, inverting and compelling them to think and behave in an 
instrumental manner.  
                                                
327 (Lukács 1972, 166-67)  
328 (Lukács 1972, 165) 
329 ‘For the capitalist this side of the process means an increase in the quantity of 
objects for him to deal with in his calculations and speculations. In so far as this 
process does acquire the semblance of a qualitative character, this goes no further 
than an aspiration towards the increased rationalisation, mechanisation and 
quantification of the world confronting him.’ (Lukács 1972, 165) 
330 (Lukács 1972, 99) 
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 As a whole the constitution of these objectified social forms of false objectivity 
and the instrumental existence that they cultivate, thus dominates individuals by 
estranging them from their labour and forcing them to perform fragmented activities. 
These objective forms of domination are coupled with the subjective properties of 
reification where the contemplative, passive and fragmented activity of the worker is 
reflected in dominated mystified consciousness, which is likewise a type of ‘subjugation’ 
that is separated from the object. Lukács’s theory of reification is therefore a theory of 
dominating mystification, which, as premised on his unique conception of fetishism, 
explains the subjugation and dehumanisation of individuals to the dominating and 
mystifying properties of the objectified, thingified appearance of social totality.  
 Now that I have shown how Lukács’s interpretation of fetishism is constitutive 
of the dominating mystification of this theory of reification, I will turn to how he 
accounts for its constitution in the standpoint of the proletariat. 
 
5 The Constitution of Reified Totality 
  
 Lukács’s account of the composition of reified totality can be seen in the 
context of the process of de-reification that occurs from the standpoint of the 
proletariat. These conceptions are themselves linked to the third aspect of his analysis 
of commodity fetishism: that a social relation between people takes on the character 
of a thing and generates the phenomena of reification.331  
 For Lukács, the standpoint of the proletariat thus leads it to develop a 
Hegelian-Marxist conception of capitalism as a dialectical social totality, and to view it 
as constituted in the manner that Lukács outlines. Although both classes are 
embedded in reified totality – ‘the proletariat shares with the bourgeoisie the 
reification of every aspect of life’332  – what is of crucial difference is the standpoint of 
each class vis-a-vis capitalist totality. This is because whilst the bourgeoisie is stuck in 
                                                
331 As many other commentators have noted, the synthetic structure of the standpoint 
of the proletariat is ordered around the resolution of the problems that Lukács flags 
up in his discussion of the phenomena of reification and the antinomies of bourgeois 
thought. These problems are resolved by the proletariat, by virtue of the latter’s 
privileged standpoint, which is shown to afford a dialectical grasp of totality. This leads 
to Lukács’s dialectical generation of class-consciousness, in which this class-
consciousness de-reifies totality, leading to praxis and the actualisation of its world-
historical revolutionary task. 
332(Lukács 1972, 137) 
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immediacy and cannot penetrate the cloak of reification, the proletariat is able to grasp 
totality by virtue of the role it plays in the constitution of totality.  
 This is due to the proletarian’s place in the process of production. As someone 
who is compelled to sell her labour-power, the proletarian embodies the contradiction 
of the subject-object of capitalist totality. Proletarians are commodities that produce 
the commodity character of reified totality. This integrates them into the production 
process, which fragments, rationalises and quantifies them;333 yet it also provides them 
with a unique standpoint. From the proletarian’s standpoint, the ‘reified character of 
the immediate manifestations of capitalist society receives the most extreme definition 
possible.’334 
 As a consequence, this standpoint in the production of totality leads the 
proletarian to grasp totality and it generates self-consciousness. Unlike the capitalist, 
the worker’s position as a commodity and thus his status as the subject-object of 
capitalist totality, ‘enables him to surpass the immediacy of his condition.’335 This 
supersession is premised on the self-recognition of proletarians as a commodity in 
which the ‘factors’ in this standpoint ‘create a dialectic between the social existence of 
the worker and the forms of his consciousness and force them out of their pure 
immediacy.’336 This dialectical supersession of immediacy discloses the class relation 
that constitutes totality and stands behind the veil of immediacy. As a result, the 
standpoint of the proletariat discloses the constitution of reified totality as being 
indicative of the objectified separation of subject and object and shows the constituent 
properties of reified totality as thingified appearances generated by the class relation. 
 This first aspect is evident in Lukács’s description of how the class relation 
constitutes the objectified and thingified appearance of reified totality. As in ‘What is 
Orthodox Marxism?’, this account is scattered, and often relies on Hegelian categories 
                                                
333 ‘The quantification of objects, their subordination to abstract mental categories 
makes its appearance in the life of the worker immediately as a process of abstraction 
of which he is the victim, and which cuts him off from his labour-power, forcing him to 
sell it on the market as a commodity, belonging to him. And by selling this, his only 
commodity, he integrates it (and himself: for his commodity is inseparable from his 
physical existence) into a specialized process that has been rationalized and 
mechanized, a process that he discovers already existing, complete and able to 
function without him and in which he is no more than a cipher reduced to an abstract 
quantity, a mechanized and rationalized tool.’ (Lukács 1972, 160) 
334 (Lukács 1972, 138) 
335 (Lukács 1972, 167) 
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and presuppositions rather than upon a fully-fledged exposition. Lukács’s most 
extensive account of how the class relation constitutes reified totality is exhibited in 
the following passage. It also indicates that he views this appearance in terms of 
fetishism qua objectification as thingified appearance constituted by the class relation:  
 
Man has become the measure of all (societal) things. The conceptual and historical 
foundation for this has been laid by the methodological problem of economics: by 
dissolving the fetishistic objects into processes that take place among men and are 
objectified in concrete relations between them; by deriving the inextricable 
[unauflösbar, translation amended]337 fetishistic forms from the primary forms of human 
relations. At the conceptual level the structure of the world stands revealed as a 
system of dynamically changing relations in which conflicts between man and nature, 
man and man (in the class struggle, etc.) are fought out.338 
 
 Thus, in language characteristic of Marx’s analysis of the fetish-character of the 
commodity, according to Lukács’s account of the social constitution of reified totality, 
the class relation constitutes both the separation between subject and object in the 
process of objectification that occurs in this relation and the corresponding thingified 
appearance of false objectivity. Both, as we have seen, are indicative of reified capitalist 
totality.  
 This second aspect can be seen in more detail in Lukács’s account of the de-
reifying properties of the class standpoint, which unfold from the proletarian self-
                                                
337 Livingstone translates unauflösbar into ‘indissoluble.’ I have replaced this with 
‘inextricable’ for several reasons. In the first place the use of ‘indissoluble’ makes it 
seems that Lukács is stating that this fetishism cannot be dissolved. This is confusing 
because it comes right after Lukács’s account of how class relations constitute fetish 
objects that can be dissolved. In addition, while it might be argued here that Lukács is 
making a distinction between theoretical accounts of fetishism that can be dissolved 
and the social objectivity of the forms, this still would not make them ‘indissoluble’, 
since his entire account of reification is premised on the fact the social relations that 
constitute capitalism and the thingified appearance of capitalism can be dissolved. 
Furthermore, this use of fetishistic forms goes against Lukács’s description of the 
following: ‘the fetishistic forms of the commodity system [which] begin to dissolve: in 
the commodity the worker recognizes himself and his own relations with capital.’ As I 
show below, this is reflected in the numerous occasions where Lukács distinguished 
between: (a) the thingified appearance of reified totality that can be dissolved via the 
class standpoint and (b) the class relations which constitute reification and can only be 
dissolved in the revolutionary overcoming of capitalism. For this reasons I have 
changed the term to ‘inextricable’, by which I take Lukács’s point to be that these 
fetishistic forms of false objectivity are the ‘inextricable’, necessary appearance of the 
social relations of capital. In this way the sentence accords with the previous sentence 
and with the other instances of Lukács’s account of fetishism and reification. 
338 (Lukács 1972, 185) 
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recognition outlined above. In this process, Lukács’s conception of fetishism, i.e. his 
conception of the latter as a thingified false objectivity, is quite telling. For in Lukács’s 
account, proletarian self-consciousness is a form of knowledge that becomes a social 
reality and ‘brings about an objective structural change in the object of knowledge’339 This 
form of knowledge thus de-objectifies the false objectivity of the thingified appearance 
possessed by the commodity character of capitalist totality, revealing the underlying 
relations that constitute it. Like a chain reaction, this process of de-reification begins 
with the de-reification of the production process in which the underlying class relation 
is demystified, ‘and moves to a social process of de-fetishisation in which the 
qualitative underlying nature of society as a totality constituted by the class relation is 
grasped’:  
 
The special nature of labour as a commodity which in the absence of this 
consciousness acts as an unacknowledged driving wheel in the economic process now 
objectifies itself by means of this consciousness. The specific nature of this kind of 
commodity had consisted in the fact that beneath the cloak of the thing lay a relation 
between men, that beneath the quantifying crust there was a qualitative, living core. 
Now that this core is revealed it becomes possible to recognize the fetish character of 
every commodity based on the commodity character of labour power: in every case we 
find its core, the relation between men, entering into the evolution of society.340  
 
 This process of the de-objectification of thing-like appearance can also be seen 
when Lukács lays out several further stages of the dialectic of class-consciousness and 
de-reification that he holds to be required if society is to be de-reified. These 
developments are premised on the centrality that totality holds in his Hegelian 
Marxism. In these instances the class-consciousness of the proletariat as the subject-
object of history leads to the de-reification of his Simmelian and Weberian conception 
of reification. These Simmelian and Weberian instances of de-reification consist in 
juxtapositions between rationalised things and the processes of becoming that 
proletarian consciousness can now grasp. One example is Lukács’s account of the de-
reification of science, in which proletarian consciousness possesses ‘the knowledge 
that social facts are not objects but relations between men is intensified to the point 
where facts are wholly dissolved into processes.’341 
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 It is also the case for the proletariat’s knowledge of totality. This knowledge 
fuses Lukács’s Hegelian Marxist conception of the proletarian constitution of totality 
with the Simmelian and Weberian juxtaposition between ‘rigidified’ ‘frozen’ things and 
processes: ‘This image of a frozen reality that nevertheless is caught up in an 
unremitting, ghostly movement at once becomes meaningful when this reality is 
dissolved into the process of which man is the driving force.’342 
  As a result, Lukács’s account of the standpoint of the proletariat can be seen 
to reflect the interpretation of fetishism employed in his account of the constitution of 
reified totality; an interpretation that views fetishism in terms of the process of 
objectification and generation of thing-like appearances that derive from the class 
relation.  
    
6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
 In this chapter I focused on the role of fetishism in Lukács’s theory of the 
constitution and constituents of social domination. In contrast to continuous accounts 
of fetishism as ‘reification’ I provided an analysis of how Lukács’s theory of social 
domination is based on his own peculiar account of fetishism. In order do this I began 
by outlining the Weberian-Simmelian and Hegelian-Marxian strands of his work.  
 I then turned to the ‘Reification’ essay, where I demonstrated how Lukács’s 
interpretation of fetishism fused the Hegelian-Marxian and Weberian and Simmelian 
aspects of his thought while also providing the grounds of the constitution and 
constituent properties of his theory of reification. I argued that Lukács’s account of 
reification is based on his distinctive interpretation of commodity fetishism, which 
replaces an account of the abstract alienated and personified character of things with 
an account of objectified sociality. This conception of objectification forms the basis for 
a double-faceted conception of fetishism that accounts for social constitution in terms 
of a process of objectification, and in connection to the corresponding false objectivity 
of things that veil their content, causing them to possess the rationalised autonomous 
properties that fuse the Hegelian-Marxian and Weberian-Simmelian strands of his 
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theory. I demonstrated this in my account of how this interpretation of commodity 
fetishism is constitutive of Lukács’s theory of reification through his generalisation of 
the properties of the commodity form to the practical and theoretical types of 
reification that include a wide array of social institutions and types of consciousness. 
My account culminated by synthesising these elements in my characterisation of 
reification as mystified domination. I closed by demonstrating how the standpoint of 
the proletariat accounts for the constitution of the objectified and thing-like properties 
of reified totality. As a result, rather than reification consisting in a theory that is 
continuous with Marx’s account of fetishism, reification or alienation, Lukács’s 
distinctive interpretation of the properties of fetishism is central to his account of the 
constitution and of the constitutive properties of the dominating, mystificatory 
properties of reified totality. I will now conclude with my evaluation of this theory.  
 
6.2 Evaluation 
 
 Lukács’ theory of reification is unquestionably of historical importance. Nearly 
one hundred years after it was produced, it still stands as a seminal attempt to utilise 
Marx’s theory of fetishism as the grounds for a theory of social domination. Several 
aspects of this theory are undeniably important for the formation of critically 
orientated schools of Marxism, Hegelianism Marxism and indeed Western Marxism, 
and for theories that have attempted to apply Marx’s analysis of social domination to 
aspects of society that Marx’s analysis did not cover. This is surprising, considering the 
specific context in which it was written, and given also Lukács’s own opinion of this 
work. However, there are several conceptual criticisms that can be made of Lukács’s 
theory of reification.343 They pertain to his conception of fetishism and to how this 
conception informs his account of the constitution and constitutive properties of social 
domination. As I have shown, Lukács makes several important conceptual moves that 
render fetishism the basis of his theory of reification. While these moves enable 
Lukács to extend Marxist categories to articulate and explain the genesis and function 
of social institutions and types of consciousness, they also render his interpretation 
problematic.  Lukács ‘fundamental and crude error’ of replacing alienation with 
                                                
343 I will address the problem of the relation between theory and empirical reality in 
Lukács and the other theorists I am examining in the general conclusion to this thesis.  
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objectification’344 is the most notable reason for why this is the case. While this is 
often pointed out, the ramifications for how this differentiates Lukács’s conception of 
fetishism from Marx, and the repercussions it has for Lukács’s theory of social 
domination, are seldom focused on.  
 As was shown in the previous chapter, Marx’s theory of the fetish-
characteristic forms is part of his larger theory of the means by which the particular 
social form of capitalist social production distributes labour through personifying things 
as the bearers of value. This theory of fetish-characteristic forms is therefore a central 
part of Marx’s theory of value, which attempts to explain the perverted and inverted 
social constitution, reproduction and distribution of the social character of capitalist 
labour as it occurs in terms of the relation between things. It is also a central part of 
Marx’s account of how this process of social constitution consists of a mode of social 
domination, in which the personified character of these things compels and determines 
individual actions. It is not a theory of illusory false consciousness in which things veil 
underlying relations but it rather describes how social categories are embedded in 
things, and the social characteristics that these things possess. Furthermore, it is not a 
theory of dehumanisation per se, but articulates a theory of how individual actions are 
structured and dominated by the social imperatives they collectively constitute.  
 Lukács’s conception of fetishism is discontinuous with these aspects of Marx’s 
thought.345 As I have shown, Lukács’s conception of fetishism substitutes the Simmelian 
and Hegelian notion of social objectification for Marx’s account of the social 
constitution of the autonomous and personified fetish-characteristics of things. As a 
result, this account of fetishism and the ensuing theory of social domination that he 
develops from it, rely upon perceiving fetishism as thingification (the objectification of 
human activity into things that possess false objectivity and which veil real processes) 
rather than on offering an explanation of how these things possess abstract, 
autonomous and personified properties, relate to each other as bearers of value by 
virtue of these real processes, and dominate and compel individual actions. On the one 
hand, this allows Lukács to integrate his earlier Simmelian and Weberian conception of 
domination and to generalise the problem of thingification, so as to relate it to 
institutions and modes of understanding that a theory of personified things might not 
                                                
344 (Lukács 1972, XXII) 
345 This contention contradicts the accounts that I defined above as arguing for 
continuity between the theories of reification and of fetishism. 
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encompass. Yet on the other hand, it undermines the coherence and the efficacy of 
Lukács’s theory.346 This is because it is unclear why things possess autonomous 
properties simply by virtue of the fact that they are objectified, and why or how those 
properties dominate people. 
 This can be seen in Lukács’s account of social constitution. In the first place, 
several criticisms can be made of Lukács’ understanding of Marxism as a method that 
deciphers capitalism as a dialectical social totality. The first criticism has to do with his 
use of the Hegelian categories of the dialectic and of totality in his conception of 
Marxism. Rather than using dialectics as a method to demonstrate how facets of his 
social analysis derive from each other, as Marx did, Lukács’s account of capitalism 
commits that un-Hegelian move of presupposing that capitalism and phenomena within 
the capitalist totality possess dialectical qualities. This stance is magnified by his 
conception of capitalism as a totality. Like his conception of dialectics, Lukács’ 
conception of capitalism’s function as a totality rests upon his asserted fidelity to 
Marx’s analysis. This is however problematic, because on the one hand Lukács’ 
exposition of the Marxist method does not provide much of an account of how he 
conceives of Marx’s analysis of capitalism, or how this analysis depicts capitalism as a 
dialectical totality. This problem is furthered, on the other hand, by the fact that 
Lukács accounts for phenomena within capitalist totality that Marx’s analysis did not 
account for. This means that Lukács’s conception of Marxism as a method is different 
from Marx’s method. Yet, Lukács does not address this discrepancy. Nor does he 
present his own account of how the social constitution of forms that Marx’s analysis 
did not cover derives from Marx’s own account of the process of capitalist 
valorisation. Instead, Lukács premises his analysis on fidelity to Marx, and on the claim 
that his social analysis of reification is based on ‘the problems that grow out of the 
fetishism of commodities.’ What is problematic about this is that Lukács’s conception 
                                                
346 It is symptomatic of Colletti and Rose’s respective positions that Colletti attributes 
Lukács’s conflation of alienation and objectification and his subsequent criticism of 
reification with his Hegelianism, while Rose attributes it to his neo-Kantianism. See 
(Colletti 1973; Rose 1981) As I have shown, I contend that these problems stem from 
and fuse both strands. This means that you cannot attribute the problems in Lukács’s 
theory to the pernicious influence of either Hegel or neo-Kantianism, but must instead 
view these problems as indicative of both strands, and as being integral to his theory.  
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of fetishism, and indeed the problems that grow out of it, is in fact different from that 
of Marx, and yet at the same time relies on Marx’s theory for its coherence.347 
 This is apparent in the method of social analysis evidenced in the ‘Reification’ 
essay. As was shown above, Lukács provides an analysis of the phenomena of 
reification by interpreting different phenomena as ‘dialectical’ and analogous to the 
properties of the commodity form. Consequently, Lukács’ social analysis treats society 
as a totality of disparate phenomena that function as parts of an irrational whole, and 
which possess analogous dominating and mystifying properties. However, apart from 
referencing social laws, Lukács has not attempted to show why and how these facets 
of society are implicated in the process of capitalist valorisation and reproduction, or 
indeed in the function of capitalism as a totality.348 Instead, his account of social 
constitution all too-often relies on characterisations that resemble Marx’s description 
of the constitution of the fetish-character of commodities, in which ‘social relations’ or 
‘class relations’ constitute the reified forms of dialectical capitalist totality and provide 
the basis for an account of the objectified properties that different aspects of social 
totality share. 
 All of these factors add up to a theory of social domination that is grounded in 
the pervasive process of social objectification, but which does not have a coherent or 
rigorous account of the genesis of these different reified forms, or of why these reified 
forms possess their constitutive properties. Instead, the genesis of these different 
                                                
347 Contrary to Rose’s criticism the problem is then not only that Lukács ‘omitted 
many details of Marx’s theory of value and of the analysis of capitalist economies which 
followed on in Capital from the analysis of the commodity form.’ (Rose 1981, 29)  As I 
have shown, this is certainly true, and it forms an important basis for how Lukács’ 
conception of fetishism differs from Marx. Yet one is led to question how the addition 
of the categories that Rose notes are lacking, such as surplus value, could provide a 
basis for an analysis of reified entities, such as bureaucracy. It is also unclear how 
following Marx’s method in Capital could account for them, since Capital does not. 
What is problematic is that Lukács’ conception of Marxism as a method fails to 
provide a coherent account of the constitution and interrelation of these entities at all. 
A similar point is made by (Postone 1993) and (Elbe 2011) However, Postone seems 
to assume that grounding this theory of constitution on the opposition between 
concrete and abstract labour might account for the Simmelian and Weberian strands 
of Lukács’ thought. I see no reason for such confidence. 
348 This may be why Lukács, by virtue of a further instance of his appropriation of 
Hegel, falls back on a teleological philosophy of history as the ground of his theory of 
social constitution that treats capitalism as a historical construct in its moment of 
overcoming, rather than as a socio-cultural totality the function of which should be 
explained. Lukács acknowledges this in his 1967 preface (Lukács 1972,  xxiii)  
  
121 
forms is comprised of different theories that share similarities, but which are also at 
odds with each other. The Hegelian-Marxian aspects of Lukács’s theory employ 
elements of Marx’s theory such as abstraction, autonomy and personification.349 These 
elements are treated as results of the class relation. At the same time, due to the 
insufficiencies of Lukács’ model of social constitution, there is little account of how 
these elements are constituted.  The Simmelian and Weberian strands complement 
this theory of social domination to the degree that they allow Lukács to include 
important facets of modern society that Marx’s theory did not. It is however 
problematic that the function that these strands play within the capitalist totality is 
only accounted for by Lukács’ interpretation of the commodity, or by his method of 
analogy. This means that Lukács, at best, demonstrates that these pernicious aspects of 
society harmonise with: (a) aspects of the commodity form that are already 
presupposed in its definition; (b) a number of other aspects of capitalist totality that 
possess the features of the commodity form.  
 This demonstration, however, does little to explain why or how these facets of 
totality possess these qualities nor does it explain how or why things possess 
autonomous properties. The closest that Lukács comes to giving an explanation is 
when he presents intriguing comments on the relationship between the rationalised 
part and the irrational whole, and his statement that both strands are constituted by 
the capitalist division of labour. However, this mention of the capitalist division of 
labour does not address the point that the Weberian aspects of Lukács’s theory seem 
to be conceived in a different manner than the Marxian strands; for as was indicated 
above, they are conceptualised in terms of a fragmented division of labour which is 
premised on a notion of organic holism. This is different and possibly anathema to a 
class-based account of the social division of labour. The former is based on the 
rationalised fragmentation of production within society as a whole; the other is based 
on the idea of an atomised production for exchange. In any case, the possible 
juxtaposition between the two is not addressed, because both are left hanging on 
Lukács’s underdeveloped account of the capitalist division of labour, and on his 
account of how the class relation constitutes reified totality. Consequently, it is not 
clear how the rest of totality develops from this relation. 
                                                
349 Curiously Postone does not address the similarities that these aspects of Lukács’ 
theory share with his own interpretation of Marx. 
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 As a result, these conceptual deficiencies lead Lukács to a theory of domination 
that is overly determined – as regards the all-pervasive extent of reification – and 
undermined by its lack of explication. This is particularly true for the ways in which the 
autonomous properties of the Hegelian-Marxian and Simmelian and Weberian strands 
of Lukács’s thought are constituted, and for those in which the different aspects of 
totality are linked. This means that the critical aspect of Lukács’ theory – the reduction 
of these forms to social relations – also flounders, because it is unclear, beyond the 
fact that they are all objectified, how these social relations constitute the type of social 
totality that Lukács describes. Consequently, we are left with compelling descriptions 
of the similar properties that institutions share, their ultimate irrationality and crisis-
prone nature, and some jarring descriptions of the ways in which modern societies 
dominate the behaviour of human beings through processes of rationalisation and 
dehumanisation. A coherent theory that explains how these phenomena are 
constituted and constitutive of social relations is however lacking. Nevertheless, these 
descriptions and the theory that described them proved to be enormously influential 
in the 20th century. As we shall see, Lukács’ Hegelian Marxism and his theory of 
reification would be an inspiration and a foil for both Adorno and Lefebvre. 
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3. Adorno, the Fetish Form of the 
Exchange Abstraction and the Critical 
Theory of Social Domination. 
 
 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I focus on the place of fetishism in Theodor W. Adorno’s theory 
of social domination. In contrast to accounts that equate Adorno’s theory of social 
domination with a nebulous conception of reification, by focusing on the place of 
fetishism in Adorno’s thought, I argue that Adorno’s account of the social constitution 
and constituent properties of social domination is based upon his conception of 
fetishism. I demonstrate this by focusing on how Adorno theorises social domination 
in his early and late work. I argue that in his early work, Adorno conceives fetishism 
through his Marxian interpretation of Lukács, Benjamin and Freud, as evidenced in 
texts such as The Idea of Natural History, The Actuality of Philosophy, and On The fetish 
Character of Music and the Regression of Listening. However, and in contrast, I argue that 
his later work conceives fetishism through a Hegelian-Marxian conception of the 
exchange abstraction's fetish-form.  This, I will claim, provides the latter with means to 
elucidate the social genesis and the constituent properties of social domination which 
are carried out in his dialectical analysis of the objective and subjective forms of social 
domination proper to a negative totality, thus functioning as a basis for his critical 
theory of society. I will argue that this later theory attempts to remedy the deficiencies 
of his earlier positions by providing an account of social objectivity and of a more fully-
fledged account of social constitution. However, in the conclusion to this chapter, I 
will also show that the theory is ultimately undermined by an insufficient account of 
the genesis and social pervasiveness of the fetish-form of the exchange abstraction.  
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1. Literature Review 
 
 The bulk of commentary on Adorno’s theory of social domination can be 
placed within the typology outlined at the outset of the thesis.350 Such accounts tend to 
either treat Adorno’s theory of social domination through the prism of reification, or 
in parallel to Marx’s theory of value. They consist of:  (a) accounts that identify a 
continuity between Adorno’s theory of social domination and Lukács’s theory of 
reification; (b) interpretations that equate Adorno’s theory of reification to his theory 
of social domination; or (c) the comparisons made by value-form theorists between 
Marx’s theory of value and Adorno’s theory of social domination. 
 
1.1 Adorno’s Theory of Social Domination as Equivalent to Lukács’ 
Theory of Reification  
 
 Ralf Wiggershaus’s statement that  ‘Adorno was supporting precisely the same 
Hegelian-Marxist position which Lukács had developed in History and Class 
Consciousness – but he supported it independent of class considerations and as 
unashamed speculation’351 exemplifies the commentary that interprets Adorno’s theory 
of social domination as conceptually continuous with Lukács’ theory of reification. On 
this reading, Adorno’s theory of social domination applies Lukács’s theory of reification 
– which is said to combine Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism with Weberian 
                                                
350 Two accounts fall outside the three types described in the initial chapter of this 
thesis: Mathias Benzer’s The Sociology of Adorno (Benzer 2011) and Damo Mioyasaki’s 
The Confusion of Marxian and Freudian Fetishism in Adorno (Mioyasaki 2002) Benzer’s 
work provides an excellent sociological exegesis of Adorno’s social theory. However, 
Benzer’s account is also theoretically limited. He describes Adorno’s social theory as a 
presentation of what he terms the ‘double character’ of ‘exchange society’, and holds 
that that the latter is ‘estranged’; this is however problematic, as it fails to distinguish 
between Marx’s and Adorno’s theory of estrangement. Benzer does however 
acknowledge the resultant problems to some degree, as he notes that his use of 
estrangement also prevents an account of how Adorno utilised Marx’s concepts in his 
theory of social domination. Mioyasaki argues that Adorno confuses Marx’s and 
Freud’s theory of fetishism in On the Fetish Character and the Regression of Listening; I 
however will show below that Adorno employed them in full awareness of their 
differences.  
351 (Wiggershaus 1995, 95)  
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rationality – to late capitalist mass society.352 As I will show this strand of 
interpretation is problematic for two reasons: (1) it equates the influence Lukács had 
on elements of Adorno’s theory of social domination, and (2) the similarities Lukács’ 
and Adorno’s Hegelian-Marxist and Weber-Marxist analyses shared, with Lukács’s 
theory of reification.  As a result, this type of commentary does not differentiate 
Adorno’s theory of social domination from Lukács’ theorisation of reification. It in fact 
tends to neglect Adorno’s theoretical differences from Lukács, together with the 
distinction that Adorno makes between fetishism and reification.  Consequently, this 
type of commentary does not address how Adorno’s conception of fetishism fits into 
his theory of social domination, and ultimately describes his theory of social 
domination as reification. 353  
 
1.2 Adorno’s Theory of Social Domination as His Theory of 
Reification 
 
 Commentary in this strand follows Gillian Rose’s distinction between Lukács’ 
and Adorno’s theories of reification. As was discussed in the introduction, Rose argues 
that Adorno’s theory of reification ‘is grounded in Marx’s theory of value in a highly 
selective fashion’ that ‘does not mobilise Marx’s distinction between abstract and 
concrete labour' and which does not 'lead to any theory of the extraction of surplus 
value’ either.354 In Rose’s view, Adorno’s theory of reification ‘was based on 
commodity fetishism in a way which depended not on work or the labour-process 
(alienation) but on Marx’s theory of value, especially on the distinction between 
exchange-value and use-value.’355 This unusual interpretation of Marx’s theory of 
value356 leads Rose to conclude that ‘it is the way unlike things appear to be identical 
                                                
352 An example of this can be seen in Vandenberghe’s statement that ‘Adorno’s 
theoretical description of social reification conforms to Lukács’ description except that 
in Adorno there is no more proletariat, no more identity of subject and object, and 
consequently no more hope.’ (Vandenberghe 2009, 190)   
353 Studies on Adorno that are exemplary of this include (Vandenberghe 2009) and 
(Cook 1996) 
354 (Rose 1979, 47)  
355 (Rose 1979, 47) 
356 As I noted in the introduction Rose’s interpretation is unusual because she seems 
to imply there is a distinction between the labour process and Marx’s theory of value.  
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or equal, and the mode of thinking which can only consider them as equal, which is 
reification as a social phenomenon and as a process of thinking for Adorno.’357 
 However, as I have shown, Rose’s idiosyncratic distinction between fetishism 
and reification358 means that this strand of commentary does not differentiate between 
Adorno’s theory of fetishism and his theory of reification.  This interpretation 
consequently misses the way in which Adorno’s analysis of identity-thinking is 
interrelated with his conceptualisation of the fetish-form of the exchange abstraction 
which grounds his theory of social domination. Like the other account described 
above, which blurs Adorno’s theory of social domination with Lukács’s theory of 
reification, this reading treats Adorno’s theory of social domination as if it were 
equivalent to his own theory of reification. 359 As I will show, Adorno’s theory of 
identity-thinking is reflective of a central element of his conception of fetishism and it 
plays a part in his theory of social domination.  
 
1.3 Value-Form Theory and Adorno 
 
 Several value-form theorists draw parallels between Adorno’s theory of social 
domination and Marx’s theory of value. As is the case with their accounts of Lukács, 
the value-form theorists that have treated Adorno tend to stress the methodological 
discontinuity between his work and that of Marx.360 However, they also stress 
conceptual similarity, pointing to the importance of abstraction, objective 
conceptuality, autonomisation, inversion and social compulsion within both Marx and 
                                                
357 Commentary that interprets Adorno’s theory of reification as his theory of social 
domination thus follows Rose and contends that Adorno’s conception of reification is 
based on the interrelation of Marx’s theory of use value and exchange value with 
Adorno’s concept of identity thinking. Martin Jay is one of the most notable 
commentators to follow Rose’s interpretation of reification. For Jay, like Rose, 
Adorno’s theory of reification amounts to ‘the suppression of heterogeneity in the 
name of identity.’(Jay 1986; Jay 1984) Recent authors who follow Rose include (Hall 
2011, Dahms 2011) 
358 As was shown in the literature review at the beginning of this thesis, Rose makes a 
peculiar and influential distinction between fetishism and reification. Rose exclusively 
uses the term ‘fetishism’ to describe Marx’s theory of value, and she uses the term 
‘reification’ to describe Lukács’s, Benjamin’s and Adorno’s interpretations of Marx. 
Rose does not provide a basis for why she does this, nor does she provide definitions 
that distinguish reification from fetishism. 
359 See (D. Cook 2004) 
360 See (Elbe 2011), (Reichelt 2007), (Postone 1994) Curiously, Postone’s grounds for 
methodological difference between Adorno and Marx are the same as Rose’s.  
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Adorno’s theories of social domination.361 However, the value-form theorists who 
point out these similarities have not provided a detailed exegesis of how these 
elements of Adorno’s social theory fit into his theory of social domination. I will 
demonstrate that they do so by forming part of his conception of fetishism.362  
 In order to so, I begin by outlining the development of Adorno’s theory of 
social domination. I show how Adorno’s early work fused the pre-Marxist Lukács’ 
theory of ‘second nature’ with Benjamin’s micrological method of analysis, and that this 
was conducted as a means towards interpreting the commodity as the symbolic form 
of social domination emblematic of the constitutive properties of social domination 
whilst also holding the key to deciphering its unintentional social constitution. I also 
show how Adorno’s early theory is different from that of Lukács and Benjamin. I will 
then close this section by showing how these elements are reflected in Adorno’s On 
the Fetish Character of Music.  
 I then present an account of Adorno’s late theory of social domination. I argue 
that this late theory is based on Adorno’s Hegelian Marxist interpretation of what I 
term the fetish-form of the exchange abstraction, and I show how this forms the basis 
for his dialectical theory of social domination and for his critical theory of society.  
 I close by arguing that Adorno’s theorisation of the fetish-form of the exchange 
abstraction and its social derivation is insufficient and ultimately undermines his theory 
of social domination and his critical theory of society.   
 
2. Adorno’s Marxism 
 
  Adorno’s thought is often characterised as a monolithic whole that is 
continuous with Lukács’s conception of reification.363 I distinguish myself from this view 
in this section by substantiating my interpretation of how: (1) as Stefan Breuer puts it, 
Adorno ‘became the first Marxist theorist since Lukács to make use of the possibilities 
                                                
361 This is particularly the case for Adorno’s former students such as (Backhaus 1992 
and Reichelt 2007). Breuer (1985, 1994) also points out the similarities between 
Adorno’s interpretation of fetishism and Marx’s theory of value. Finally, authors in the 
school of Open Marxism have drawn parallels between Adorno and Marx. See 
(Holloway, Matamoros and Tischler 2008) 
362 These characteristics are generally neglected in commentaries that interpret 
Adorno’s social theory of domination through the prism of Lukács’s theory of 
reification or identity thinking.  
363 (Vandenberghe 2009) 
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of commodity analysis,’ by developing ‘his own version of the critique of fetishism that 
Lukács had begun in History and Class Consciousness’364 and (2) the changing nature of 
Adorno’s interpretation of fetishism. 
 
2.1 Adorno’s Early Work: Natural History, Lukács, Benjamin and the 
Commodity Form 
 
 Adorno’s early conception of fetishism and social domination can be 
reconstructed from some of the most significant elements of his early work: ‘The Idea 
of Natural History’365, ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’366 and ‘On the Fetish Character of 
Music and the Regression of Listening.’367 In the first two works Adorno interprets 
elements of the early Lukács and Benjamin to outline his Marxian conceptions of the 
commodity-form and social domination, and he does so in a manner that is concerned, 
as Adorno himself states, with the ‘fundamental elements of the materialist dialectic.’368 
In ‘On the Fetish Character of Music’ Adorno provides a micrological analysis that 
exemplifies the theories outlined in the first two works, but does so in conjunction 
with his interpretation of Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism. 
 Adorno’s Marxian interpretation of the early Lukács and Benjamin can be seen 
in The Idea of Natural History which fuses the early Lukács’s conception of ‘second 
nature’ with Benjamin’s early methodology.  
 Adorno interprets Lukács’s conception of second nature in The Theory of the 
Novel to characterise his idea of natural history as an historical ontology of social 
domination. Adorno conceives this social ontology of domination as alienated and 
autonomous and he uses Lukács’s theory of second nature to illustrate this in a 
dialectical fashion.369 However, in this interpretation of Lukács, Adorno distinguishes 
between objectification and alienation. This means that Adorno dialectically interprets 
second nature, objectively as an ‘alienated’ ‘world’ of ‘things’; subjectively, as ‘long dead 
                                                
364 (Breuer 1985) 
365 (Adorno 1984) 
366 (Adorno 1977) 
367 (Adorno 2001) 
368 (Adorno 1977, 129) 
369 Adorno states elsewhere that he views Lukács’ and Benjamin’s pre-Marxist work as 
their most Marxist. The reasons for this will be made apparent in my discussion of 
how Adorno uses Lukács’ and Benjamin’s earlier theories to conceptualise the 
commodity-form and social domination.  
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interiority.’ Overall, Adorno describes second nature as a ‘meaningful and a 
meaningless world (an immediate world and an alienated world of commodities).’370     
 For Adorno the key question is ‘how it is possible to know and interpret this 
alienated, reified, dead world’,371 and following Benjamin he proposes to interpret ‘the 
world of estranged things as ciphers’.372 This leads Adorno to argue that Benjamin’s 
category of the symbol and his method of constellation can be used to unlock the 
second nature of the alienated world of commodities as a socially constituted entity. 
To demonstrate this, Adorno presents a short discussion of the relationship between 
semblance and second nature.  He argues here that ‘second nature’ is a form of 
semblance but he does not treat semblance as a ‘mere illusion.’ Instead, he argues that 
‘semblance expresses something that can not be described independently of its 
semblance.’373  
 Adorno’s conception of second nature as an alienated, autonomous and 
inverted form of social domination – a mode of domination that is instantiated in 
commodities, and which can deciphered as the symbolic manner in which social 
essence appears in semblance – is also indicative of Adorno’s early interpretation of 
commodity fetishism. This is implied in Adorno’s statement that the problems that he 
is addressing here pertain to the key aspects of Marxist theory. This is made explicit in 
Adorno’s discussion of the same themes in The Actuality of Philosophy. In the latter text, 
Adorno argues that philosophy cannot provide any holistic explanatory system and 
that it should, in consequence, be oriented towards interpretation. The type of 
interpretation that he proposes is based on the method of constellation and on what 
he calls here the ‘symbol’ or the ‘riddle.’ Adorno defines the ‘riddle’ as a dialectical 
figure that discloses the unintentional constitution of forms.  The ‘task’ of philosophy is 
to ‘interpret unintentional reality […] by the power of constructing figures or images 
out of isolated elements.’374 In Adorno’s view, this task aligns philosophy with Freudian 
and Marxist theory. 
                                                
370 (Adorno 1984, 117)  
371 (Adorno 1984, 118)  
372 (Adorno 1984, 118) This methodology differs with Lukács’s approach in The Theory 
of the Novel, which viewed the substance of second nature as indecipherable. See 
(Adorno 1984, 124) and (Lukács 1974) 
373 (Adorno 1984. 124) 
374 (Adorno 1984, 124) 
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               Philosophy’s link with Marxist theory is drawn out in Adorno’s discussion of 
the commodity-form which he presents as an example of one of these riddles and 
symbols. This discussion also highlights an early difference with the Lukács of History 
and Class Consciousness, and refers back to the idea of natural history.375  In contrast to 
Lukács, Adorno does not mistake objectification with the autonomous social 
properties of things. Adorno treats the commodity-form and the related problem of 
the ‘thing in-itself’ as social forms of objectivity possessed by things, rather than as 
forms of thingified false objectivity.376 This means that criticism does not destroy false 
objectivity, so as to disclose the real underlying substratum. Yet criticism does 
however disclose that these forms of objectivity are unintentionally constituted social 
phenomena. This is due to several elements that Adorno elucidates here and which he 
also presented in the Idea of Natural History; namely: (a) that the essence of this 
unintentional process of social constitution appears in the symbolic form,377 and (b) 
that disclosing this process denaturalises and historicises these forms of second nature 
and (c) that this type of criticism is indicative of Marxist theory. 
             These elements of Adorno’s early conception of the commodity and social 
domination can be seen in Adorno’s early works of socio-cultural criticism. These 
early works can be seen to follow Lukács’s concern with mapping the pernicious 
effects of the commodification of culture through the generalisation of the commodity. 
But unlike the Lukács of History and Class Consciousness, these effects are not based on 
the generalisation of the false objectivity of thingification and its imminent demise. 
Rather, this analysis reflects Adorno’s earlier theorisations in conceiving the 
commodity as (1) constituent of the dominating social properties which he had also 
aligned with second nature and objectively functioning as an alienated world that instils 
                                                
375 (Adorno 1977, 128)  
376 ‘Suppose it were possible to group the elements of a social analysis in such a 
manner that the way they came together made a figure which certainly does not lie 
before us organically, but which must first be posited: the commodity structure. This 
would hardly solve the thing-in-itself problem, not even in the sense that somehow the 
social conditions might be revealed under which the thing-in-itself problem came into 
existence, as Lukács even thought the solution to be: for the truth content of a 
problem is in principle different from the historical and psychological conditions out of 
which it grows’ (Adorno 1977, 128) 
377 As Adorno puts it, albeit enigmatically: ‘the answer was contained within the riddle, 
and the riddle portrays only its own appearance and contained the answer within itself 
as intention.’ (Adorno 1977, 130)  
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bourgeois subjectivity,378 and (2) as a symbol that unlocks an unintentional social 
constitution.  
             These theorisations can be seen in ‘On the Fetish Character of Music and the 
Regresssion Listening’. Here Marx’s theory of fetishism is deployed as emblematic of 
Adorno’s dialectical interpretation of Lukács’s theory of second nature. Objectively, 
culture functions as an alienated world of commodities that constitutes the integration, 
domination and psychic stultification of subjectivity. In order to theorise how this 
occurs, Adorno fuses Freud and Marx’s theory of fetishism by formulating a theory of 
how the fetish character of commodities conditions individuals to substitute need (use-
value) for consumption (exchange-value.)379 In this process of displacement the essence 
of how capitalism is socially constituted and appears in the fetish character of 
commodities380 is mirrored on a subjective level by Adorno’s use of the Freudian 
theory of fetishism, which he employs in order to argue that commodities are objects 
of substitution that lead to integration and regression.381 
            Adorno’s theorisation in this essay thus uses the commodity as symbol to 
disclose the unintentional constitution and constituent properties of the objective and 
subjective aspects of social domination,382 revealing the ‘connection between the fetish 
character of the commodities and the fetishised character of human beings.’383  
                                                
378 ‘Impulse, subjectivity and profanation, the old adversaries of materialistic alienation, 
now succumb to it. In capitalist times, the traditional anti-mythological ferments of 
music conspire against freedom, as whose allies they once prescribed. The 
representatives of the opposition to the authoritarian schema become witness to the 
authority of commercial success […] The listener is converted, along his line of least 
resistance, into the acquiescent purchaser.’ (Adorno 2001, 32) 
379 ‘The concept of musical fetishism cannot be psychologically derived […] if the 
commodity in general combines exchange value and use value, then the pure use value, 
whose illusion the cultural goods must preserve in a completely capitalist society, must 
be replaced by pure exchange value, which precisely in its capacity as exchange value 
deceptively takes over the function of use value. The specific fetish character of music 
lies in this quid pro quo’.  (Adorno 2001, 38-39)  
380 ‘Even in the realm of the superstructure, the appearance is not merely the 
concealment of the essence, but proceeds of necessity from the essence itself.’ 
(Adorno 2001, 40) 
381 (Adorno 2003, 8)  
382 ‘The fetish character of music produces its own camouflage through the 
identification of the listener with the fetish […] The counterpart to the fetishism of 
music is the regression of listening (Adorno 2001, 48) The regression of listening leads 
to what Adorno variously describes as childish, infantile, retarded subjectivity and 
pseudo-activity.’  
383 (Adorno 2001, 38) 
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           In doing so, Adorno’s early Marxian social analysis of domination relies on his 
interpretation of Lukács’s conception of second nature as a mode of domination, and 
on the Benjaminian methodology with which that concept was fused in The Actuality of 
Philosophy and in On the Idea of Natural History. There are however two exceptions to 
this: (1) In contrast to Lukács, Adorno does not confuse alienation with objectification. 
Thus rather than treating fetishism as a form of thingified false objectivity that veils its 
essence, Adorno treats fetishism as the form in which social constitution appears with 
the constituent properties of autonomous social objectivity. His theorisation of the 
subjectivity that corresponds to second nature is constituted by this fetish form of 
objectivity, and employs Freudian categories to describe a state of psychic regression 
and mutilation rather than a notion of long dead interiority.384 (2) In opposition to 
Benjamin, Adorno stresses the importance of accounting for the mediation of the 
micrological objects of investigation by addressing the capitalist totality in which social 
objectivity is characterised by the second nature of the alienated world of 
commodities.385 These differences with Lukács and Benjamin are drawn out in 
Adorno’s later theory of social domination,386 which also possesses a more fully 
formed account of social constitution and domination. 
 
2.2 Adorno’s Later Work: Adorno, Marx, Hegel and the Fetish-Form 
of the Exchange Abstraction. The Hegel-Marx Analogy 
 
                                                
384 Adorno also uses reification in this essay in a proto-Lukácsian manner in terms of: 
(a) the separation of parts from the whole, and (b) in relation to the Freudian 
categories of infantile regression and dehumanisation. These uses indicate that 
reification is part of Adorno’s theory of social domination, and suggest that it is used in 
terms of the aspects of fragmentation that relate to the Weberian strand of Lukács’ 
theory but also that this part of Adorno’s theory of social domination, which is 
distinguished from his theory of fetishism, has an inconsistent relationship with Lukács’ 
theory of reification. 
385 ‘In music as elsewhere, the discrepancy between essence and appearance has grown 
to a point where no appearance is any longer valid, without mediation, as verification 
of the essence.’ (Adorno 2001, 45)  
386 These important differences between Benjamin and Adorno’s conception of 
fetishism are also discussed in their correspondence (see T. W. Adorno and Mann 
2006) The discussion of fetishism in these letters highlights a major point according to 
which Rose’s peculiar interpretation of reification is undermined. This is because the 
explicit topic of conversation between Adorno and Benjamin is the fetish character of 
commodities, which Rose describes as reification.  
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 Adorno’s later formulation of fetishism and its role in his theory of 
composition and of the characteristics of social domination occurs following his return 
to Germany in the 1960s. This formulation breaks with his earlier account of fetishism 
and with his theory of social domination.387 Rather than conducting micrological 
investigations based on the commodity, Adorno becomes concerned with formulating 
macrological theories that account for the constitution and the constituent properties 
of social domination. These theories are based on his fusion of Hegel and Marx, and 
his formulation of what I will term the fetish-form of the exchange abstraction.  
 Adorno provides what can be called a ‘dialectical’ fusion of Hegel and Marx. He 
interprets the two thinkers’ theories of social constitution as interrelated with each 
other. This means that Adorno has a Hegelian interpretation of Marx, in which the 
latter is seen as a dialectical theorist who views capital as a social totality; yet he also 
contends that the late Marx followed Hegel in theorising capitalist totality through ‘the 
objectivity of the concept’ and by viewing labour as social labour.388 He consequently 
conceives Marx’s theory of fetishism in this Hegelian light.389  
  This also means that Adorno supplements what he saw as the deficient 
elements of Marx’s theory, such as epistemology (which, according to Adorno, Marx 
‘rampaged through like an elephant in a china shop’390) with Hegelian concepts. These 
Hegelian concepts remedy Marx’s neglect of the conceptual element in exchange that 
is necessary for conceptualising equivalents and non-equivalents as equivalents. Adorno 
links this to the Hegelian concept of identity thinking.391 Like exchange, identity 
                                                
387 This period also signifies Adorno’s rapprochement with Marx for an articulation of a 
macrosocial theory, following the Nietzschean and Weberian narratives of The Dialectic 
of Enlightenment. 
388 Adorno in (Backhaus 1997) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/  
389 This can be seen in Adorno’s statement that Marx’s chapter on fetishism is ‘truly a 
piece of the legacy of classic German philosophy.’ (Adorno 2001, 190) 
390 (Adorno 2001, Materialism Imageless) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt 
391 Adorno’s anthropological speculations in (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007) trace the 
development of a type of reason akin to identity thinking in the historical process of 
humanity’s separation from and domination of nature. But Adorno also treats capitalist 
exchange and identity thinking as qualitatively different to this prehistory. Thus this 
prehistoric form seems to be historically responsible for the development of 
capitalism, but also distinct from it. This can be seen in Adorno’s statement that: ‘In 
the enlightened world, mythology has entered into the profane [...] It is not merely 
that domination is paid for by the alienation of men from the objects dominated: with 
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thinking is unable to grasp the entire array of non-identical mediations in the object or 
in the relation between objects. It therefore serves as the epistemological element that 
Adorno saw as lacking in Marx,392 and makes exchange and identity thinking 
dialectically interrelated: Identification is ‘schooled in exchange’ and ‘exchange would 
not be without those involved in such transactions adopting the identification 
principle.’393  
 Through this Hegelian Marxist conception of exchange. Adorno also integrates 
the categories of Hegel and Marx’s social philosophy. Exchange thus embodies the 
objectivity of the concept central to Adorno’s interpretation of Marx and Hegel’s 
social theory, possessing a socially constituted and constituting conceptuality.  This 
makes Adorno’s interpretation of fetishism – as the exchange abstraction’s fetish form, 
which is characteristic of this conceptuality – the basis for Adorno’s fusion of Hegel 
and Marx, and for his theory of the social constitution and the constituent properties 
of social domination.394  
 
2.3 The Fetish-Form of the Exchange Abstraction 
 
 Adorno never provides a complete explication of the social constitution of the 
fetish form of the exchange abstraction. In consequence, it has to be reconstructed 
from his scattered comments on the topic, and my attempt to do so here is composed 
of three parts. Firstly, I will set out Adorno’s interpretation of Marx; I will then show 
how this interpretation is instantiated in Adorno’s discussion of the fetish form of the 
                                                                                                                                          
the objectification of spirit, the very relations of men - even those of the individual 
himself - were bewitched. [...] Animism spiritualises the object, whereas industrialism 
objectifies the spirits of men.’ (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007) 
392 ‘The exchange-principle, the reduction of human labor to an abstract general 
concept of average labor-time, is Ur-related to the identification-principle. It has its 
social model in exchange, and it would not be without the latter, through which non-
identical particular essences and achievements become commensurable, identical. The 
spread of the principle constrains the entire world to the identical, to totality.’ 
(Adorno 2001, ‘On the Dialectics of Identity’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt 
393 (Adorno 2002, 107) 
394 ‘Concept and reality are of the same contradictory essence. What tears society 
apart antagonistically, the dominating principle, is the same thing which, intellectualised, 
causes the difference between the concept and that which is subordinated under it.’ 
(Adorno 2001, ‘Substance and Method’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt  
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exchange abstraction; finally, I will demonstrate how Adorno’s conception of the 
exchange abstraction draws on elements of Hegel’s philosophy. Following this 
reconstruction I move to Adorno’s dialectical theory of social domination. 
  Adorno’s interpretation of Marx’s theory of fetishism can be most clearly 
identified in the comments that Adorno makes on the commodity, on exchange, 
fetishism and reification in a 1962 seminar.395 On the interpretation that he presents 
there, it is abstract labour which makes commodities exchangeable.396 Abstract labour 
thus ‘abstracts from living opponents’ making commodities ‘a kind of sum of something 
solid, objective [Dinglichem].’  By virtue of these attributes of abstract labour, the 
commodity also possesses its fetish form which Adorno characterises in autonomous 
and personified terms: 
 
On the face of it, these abstractions make what is exchanged a thing in itself. What is a 
social relation appears as if it was the sum of objective qualities of an object. The 
concept of commodity fetishism is nothing but this necessary process of abstraction. 
By performing the operation of abstraction, the commodity no longer appears as a 
social relation but it seems as if value was a thing in itself.397  
 
   As Adorno contends, these autonomous and personified properties are 
constituted in social production for exchange: 
It is characteristic of commodity economy (Warenwirtschaft) that what characterizes 
exchange – i.e. that it is a relation between human beings – disappears and presents 
itself as if it was a quality of the things themselves that are to be exchanged. It is not 
the exchange that is fetishized but the commodity. That which is a congealed social 
relation within commodities is regarded as if it was a natural quality, a being-in-itself of 
                                                
395 This seminar is published as the appendix to (Backhaus 1997) and available at 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/. It was kindly translated for me by Verena Erlenbusch for 
the purpose of reconstructing Adorno’s theory of fetishism. I have amended some of 
the terms Erlenbsuch translated to bring out the Marxian connotations.  
396  ‘What makes commodities exchangeable is the unity of socially necessary abstract 
working time [Arbeitszeit]. Abstract work, because through a reduction to unity one 
abstracts from use value, from needs.’ (Backhaus 1997) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/  
397 (Backhaus 2006,6) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
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things. It is not exchange which is illusory, because exchange really takes place. The 
illusion (Schein) in the process of exchange lies in the concept of surplus value.398  
 
Adorno thus interprets fetishism as the autonomous, abstract and socially objective 
properties possessed by commodities which are constituted by social labour and 
realised in exchange. This is why I term Adorno’s conception of fetishism - the fetish 
form of the exchange abstraction. 
 As in Adorno’s earlier work, the fetish-form of the exchange abstraction is 
objective, not subjective399 or psychological.400 This is because ‘[i]n a society in which 
exchange value is the dominant principle, this fetishizing is realised necessarily.’401  
 Because exchange-value is the dominant principle, fetishism realises itself 
necessarily in an autonomous form of compulsion. Both sides of the class relation are 
forced to take on the function of ‘character masks,’ which are ‘derived from objective 
conditions’ wherein ‘the role […] [is] imposed on the subject by the structure.’ 
Workers are compelled to sell their labour power in order to survive. Capitalists are 
compelled to valorise value to ‘prevent themselves from going broke.’402 
 Fetishism also determines reification, which Adorno distinguishes from the above 
accounts of compulsion, and derives from the fetish form of the exchange abstraction. 
Reification is thus established by the fetish form of the exchange abstraction. This is 
because the fetish form of the exchange abstraction is ‘not simply false consciousness 
but results from the structure of political economy.’ For Adorno ‘this is the actual 
                                                
398(Backhaus 2007, 4) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
399 ‘Concepts like the fetish character of commodities can only be understood when 
one does not just transform them into subjective categories.’ (Backhaus 2007, 7) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
400 ‘This is the actual reason why consciousness is determined by being. What is 
decisive is that the objective structure of economic form realises from within itself 
fetishization.’ (Backhaus 2007, 7) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
401 (Backhaus 2007, 9) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
402 (Backhaus 2007, 9) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
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reason why consciousness is determined by being.’403 Reification is thus defined as 
‘human beings’ becoming ‘dependent on those objectivities’ of the fetish form of the 
exchange abstraction ‘which are obscure to them.’404 However, since reification is 
established by the autonomous and personified properties of the fetish form of the 
exchange abstraction, ‘reification [Verdinglichung] is not only false consciousness but 
simultaneously also reality, insofar as commodities really are alienated from human 
beings. We really are dependent on the world of commodities [Warenwelt].’405  
 Thus Adorno’s interpretation of Marx distinguishes between the reified social 
relations of exchange, reification and fetishism. For Adorno, reification on a practical 
and theoretical level is established by reified social relations and the personification of 
things with both as central elements of social domination. As I will show, this 
distinction is reflected in Adorno’s social theory of domination with some 
differentiation. On the one hand, the pernicious effects of the fetishistic, autonomous 
objectivity of social totality on persons exceeds an account of reification, as it includes 
accounts of compulsion, psychological and ontological human maiming that are 
explicated in his account of fetishism and social domination and are not described or 
captured by the metaphor of thingification or objectification. On the other hand at this 
point in his work406 Adorno also differentiates this type of domination from practical 
reification and reified consciousness.407 This is also why he states that other types of 
                                                
403(Backhaus 2007, 3) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
404(Backhaus 2007, 9) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
405(Backhaus 2007, 9) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
406 A proper philological study of the usage of the terms ‘reification’ and ‘fetishism’ in 
the entirey of Adorno’s corups exceeds the limits of this thesis. Yet as I show in what 
follows, the distinction between ‘fetishism’ and ‘reification’ in his late work is indicative 
of the move to provide macrological social theory based on a more complex reading 
of Marx’s theory of fetishism.  
407 This corresponds to the one definition of reified consciousness given by Adorno 
that I have been able to find. In On Subject Object, reified consciousness is defined as 
the type of consciousness ‘which mistakenly takes itself for nature, is naïve: a historical 
formation and itself mediated through and through, it takes itself, to speak with 
Husserl for an ‘ontological sphere of absolute origins’ and takes the thing confronting 
it, which it itself has trussed up, for the coveted matter itself.’ (T. W. Adorno 1983, 
252) 
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reified consciousness are of secondary importance to the reified consciousness 
established by the fetish-character of commodities.408  In contrast to accounts that 
subsume all of these aspects of Adorno’s theory under reification, I focus on 
foregrounding his account of fetishism and the way it is realised in his account of the 
compulsive and maiming aspects of social domination.  
  In Adorno’s view these attributes of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction 
are ‘characteristic of commodity economies.’ These characteristics signal why ‘Marx 
does not start with consumption but with production – production understood as: 
dominance [Vorherrschaft] of the proprietors [der Verfügenden]. This approach is more 
just to reality.’  These properties also lead to the naturalisation of the exchange 
abstraction’s attributes, so that ‘congealed social relations within commodities are 
regarded as if they were a natural quality, a being-in-itself of things.’409  
 These characteristics are also the reason why Adorno states that the fetish form 
of the exchange abstraction ‘still is the key to society’ and is what ‘distinguishes’ the 
Frankfurt School from ‘all other traditions of sociology.’410 They are mirrored in 
Adorno’s Hegelian-Marxist interpretation that presents the exchange abstraction as 
constituting and constitutive of the ‘negative universality’ of social totality. This can be 
seen in Adorno’s discussions of the exchange abstraction’s place in his social theory.  
 Adorno describes the exchange abstraction as having emerged historically from 
the ‘dissolution of all products and activities into exchange-values.’411 This dissolution 
was ‘presupposed’ by the social form of production, which consisted of ‘the dissolution 
of all solidified personal (historical) relationships of dependency in production, as much 
as the all-round dependency of the producers on each other.’412 Due to this 
                                                
408 ‘What is essential is that the commodity disappears as a social relation, all other 
reactions of reified consciousness are secondary things’ (Backhaus 2007, 7) Since this 
thesis is concerned with Adorno’s theory of fetishism I refrain from examining his 
account of reified consciousness in phenomena such as positivism, class consciousness 
etc.    
409(Backhaus 2007, 6) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ Here we also see how Adorno’s concept of natural history 
is interrelated with his interpretation of Marx. 
410(Backhaus 2007, 1) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/ 
411(Adorno 2001, ‘Interruption of the Dialectic in Hegel’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
412(Adorno 2001, ‘Interruption of the Dialectic in Hegel’)  
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development, a contradictory form of atomised dependence arose in which ‘the 
production of every individual is dependent on the production of all others; as much as 
(also) the transformation of one’s products into food has become dependent on the 
consumption of all others.’413 What Adorno refers to as ‘this reciprocal dependency’ is 
‘expressed in the constant necessity of exchange and in exchange-value as an all-round 
mediator.’414  
 As a result, this constant necessity constitutes the exchange abstraction, which 
lies in ‘society itself’ and ‘becomes constitutive of society’. 415 This is because a 
necessary process of abstraction occurs in exchange:416 ‘in terms of average social 
labour time the specific forms of the objects to be exchanged are necessarily 
disregarded; instead, they are reduced to a universal unit. The abstraction, therefore, 
lies not in the abstracting mode of thought of the sociologist, but in society itself.’417 
  The development of this exchange abstraction also means that it comes to 
constitute society and is constitutive of society as such; ‘society is a system in the 
sense of a synthesis of an atomized plurality, in the sense of a real yet abstract 
assemblage of what is in no way immediately or 'organically' united. The exchange 
                                                                                                                                          
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
413(Adorno 2001, ‘Interruption of the Dialectic in Hegel’)  
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
414 This mediation is also felt conversely. in the necessary type of self-interested 
rationality that this form of social objectivity compels, which Adorno grounds on the 
following passage from the Grundrisse: ‘the private interest is itself already a socially 
determined interest and can be accomplished only under the conditions posited by the 
society and the means given by it; hence it is tied to the reproduction of these 
conditions and means. It is the interest of the private; but its content, like its form and 
means of realization, are given by means of social conditions independent of all.’ 
(Adorno, 2001, ‘Interruption of the Dialectic in Hegel’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
415 ‘The abstract element here is not an idea which is content with the trifling 
observation that everything is connected to everything else. It is something which I 
believe to be a central feature of any theory of society [...] The abstraction in question 
here is really the specific form of the exchange process itself, the underlying social fact 
through which socialization first comes about.’ (Adorno 2000 Lecture Four) 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/adorno34_soc_4.html  
416 ‘In developed societies the exchange takes place, as you all know, through money as 
the equivalent form. Classical political economy demonstrated, as did Marx in his turn, 
that the true unit which stands behind money as the equivalent form is the average 
necessary amount of social labour time, which is modified, of course, in keeping with 
the specific social relationships governing the exchange.’ (Adorno 2000 Lecture Four) 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/adorno34_soc_4.html 
417(Adorno 2000 Lecture Four) 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/adorno34_soc_4.html 
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relationship largely endows the system with a mechanical character.’418  This means 
that ‘something like a 'concept is implicit in society in its objective form’’419also 
providing the grounds for Adorno’s dialectical fusion of Hegel’s notion of the concept 
with Marx’s social theory, shedding ‘light on why Hegel, its apologist, and Marx, its 
critic, converge in the conception that what the former named the World-Spirit, 
possesses a preponderance of being-in-itself.’420 
  Adorno’s description of how this concept functions as an ‘all around mediator’ 
reflects his description of Marx’s theory of fetishism as an alien, autonomous, inverted 
form of domination. This can be seen in Adorno’s characterisation of this ‘mediating 
conceptuality’421 as an alien form of conceptuality that is ‘independent both of the 
consciousness of the human beings subjected to it and of the consciousness of the 
scientists.’422 It is also reflected in his characterisation of its autonomous and 
dominating properties as a ‘conceptuality which holds sway in reality’,423 and which is 
‘the objectively valid model for all essential social events’,424 so that ‘society obeys this 
conceptuality tel quel.’425 Finally, it is evident in his statement on the inverted status of 
society in which ‘the fetish character of commodities […] historically has become the 
prius of what according to its concept would have to be posterius.’426  
  This Hegelian-Marxian interpretation of the fetish form of the exchange 
abstraction also serves as the ground to further differentiate Adorno’s theory from 
that of Benjamin’s and Lukács’. Adorno distinguishes his theory from Benjamin’s 
through the heightened importance that his macrological theory of the exchange 
abstraction grants to that abstraction’s mediation of every fragment of social totality; 
and he differentiates himself from Lukács in several respects. Firstly, on a 
methodological level, he moves away from using the concept of the commodity in 
                                                
418(Adorno 2000 Lecture Four) 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/adorno34_soc_4.html 
419(Adorno 2000 Lecture Four) 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/adorno34_soc_4.html 
420(Adorno 2001, ‘Interruption of the Dialectic in Hegel’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
421(Adorno 2001, ‘Interruption of the Dialectic in Hegel’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
422(Adorno 1981, 80)  
423(Adorno 1981, 80) 
424(Adorno 1981, 80) 
425(Adorno 1981, 80) 
426(Adorno 1983, 248) 
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favour of using exchange as the basis for the critique of capitalism as a socio-cultural 
totality. Secondly, on a theoretical level, this is reflected in his move away from his use 
of Lukács’ early conception of second nature to his conception of the exchange 
abstraction, and in a further move, away from describing the objective and 
autonomous aspect of social domination through alienation towards addressing it via 
abstraction, autonomisation, personification and inversion.  This is coupled to his 
criticism of the ‘tireless charge of reification’ for its ‘idealist’, ‘subjectivist’ and un-
dialectical focus, which conflates domination with objectification, bases itself on the 
‘isolated category’ of ‘thingly’ appearance and ‘blocks’ a properly dialectical diagnosis of 
social domination.427 These deficiencies of Lukács’s theory of reification are contrasted 
with Marx’s properly dialectical and objective theory of the fetish character of 
commodities.428  
 Adorno’s late work thus conceives of fetishism in terms of the fetish form of 
the exchange abstraction, which provides a basis for his fusion of Hegel and Marx and 
his account of the social constitution and the constituent properties of social 
domination. I will now turn to the later work by showing the way in which Adorno 
uses the conception of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction in his dialectical 
theory of social domination. 
 
3 Adorno’s Dialectical Social Theory of Domination 
 
 Adorno’s dialectical social theory of domination can be seen to apply this 
Hegelian-Marxist theory of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction to the social 
                                                
427 ‘The trouble is with the conditions that condemn mankind to impotence and apathy 
and would yet be changeable by human action; it is not primarily with people and the 
way conditions appear to people.’ (Adorno 2001, ‘Objectivity and Reification’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt 
428 ‘The fetish-character of commodities is not chalked up to subjective-mistaken 
consciousness, but objectively deduced out of the social a priori, the process of 
exchange. Already in Marx the difference is expressed between the preponderance of 
the object as something to be critically established and its remnants in the existent, its 
distortion by the commodity-form’. (Adorno 2001, ‘Objectivity and Reification’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt Following from his criticism of 
reification, Adorno also uses Marx to back up his point that the focus of criticism 
should be on how the object is socially mediated rather than on the object itself, by 
arguing contra Lukács that the late Marx developed a concept of emancipation that 
consisted in a form of mediation with the object, as opposed to the eradication of the 
subject/object divide proposed by Lukács and the young Marx. 
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totality. Adorno’s theory is dialectical because it treats society as a dialectical totality 
that is collectively composed by subjects who are in turn composed by that society.429 
Since, as I have shown, Adorno holds that society is constituted and constitutive of 
exchange, exchange is conceived as the mediating pole of the supra-individual and 
individual phenomena that Adorno analyses. It forms part of a constellation that also 
includes his theory of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction.430 
 The importance of exchange to Adorno’s later theory can also be seen in 
relation to the range of phenomena that he addresses in relation to it. This includes: 
 
1) The social form of late capitalist society. Here exchange forms society along 
the subjective/objective lines that I am outlining in this chapter. 
2) The grounds for the derivation of social categories in terms of the individual 
functioning as a category of abstraction; transcendental individual over 
individual.431  
3) The grounds of derivation from 1) to forms of social totality and consciousness 
which mirror the structure of exchange, i.e. identity thinking,432 Logic.433 The 
                                                
429 ‘Subject and object diverge in this society, and, to an unprecedented degree, living 
people are the objects of social processes which, in their turn, are composed of 
people.’ (T. W. Adorno 2002, 137) 
430 The dialectical nature of Adorno’s social theory means that there is no clean 
separation between objective/subjective and supra-individual/individual. What is 
objective it is ultimately the ground for subjectivity, and what is supra-indivdual is 
ultimately the ground for individuality, and vice versa. This will become clear in the 
course of my exposition; I separate the two here for the sake of clarity.    
431 ‘As the extreme borderline case of ideology the transcendental subject comes to 
within a hair of the truth. The transcendental universality is no mere narcissistic self-
exaltation of the I, not the hubris of its autonomy, but has its reality in the domination 
which ends up prevailing and perpetuating itself through the exchange-principle. The 
process of abstraction, which is transfigured by philosophy and solely ascribed to the 
cognizing subject, plays itself out in the factual exchange-society. (Adorno 2001, ‘On 
Interpretation of the Transcendental’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt 
432 ‘The exchange-principle, the reduction of human labor to an abstract general 
concept of average labor-time, is Ur-related to the identification-principle. It has its 
social model in exchange, and it would not be without the latter, through which non-
identical particular essences and achievements become commensurable, identical.’ 
(Adorno 2001, ‘On the Dialectics of Identity’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt 
433 ‘As the exchange-principle the bourgeois ratio came to resemble that which it made 
commensurable – wished to identify – with itself, the real one of the systems, with 
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subsumption of the qualitatively different under a quantifying abstraction. This is 
also related to what Adorno describes as the exchange of like for like. 
4) The subsumption of the qualitatively different within an homogenous 
equivalence. 
5) The subsumption of the particular within the universal. 
6) The universal fungibility of all – or at least practically all – aspects of the social 
totality. 
7) The precedence that exchange-value has over use-value in consumption.  
8) The traditional Marxist conception of the origination of surplus-value and class 
exploitation (which is also the ground for Adorno’s more traditional use of 
ideology and immanent critique in terms of false claims not living up to reality). 
9) The Benjaminian conception of exchange as myth and ever-sameness.  
10)  Fair exchange as the utopian promise that will transcend exchange.  
11)  The model for the philosophy of history. 
12)  Psychological forms of derivation as described in human emotions or by using 
the Freudian typology. 
13) The destruction of experience.   
14)  What resists exchange and is thus made important in relation to it: non-
identity, forms of resistance. 
 
 In what follows I will now focus on how the objective supra-individual and 
subjective individual aspects of Adorno’s dialectical social theory of domination draw 
on his theory of the fetish-form of the exchange abstraction in conjunction with other 
theories. 
 
3.1 Objective Supra-Individual 
 
The supra-individual level of Adorno’s dialectical social theory of domination derives 
from the alien, abstract, autonomous and inverted aspects of his Hegelian-Marxist 
interpretation of fetishism. These elements are deployed in Adorno’s Hegelian, 
                                                                                                                                          
increasing albeit potentially murderous success, leaving less and less outside.’ (Adorno 
2001, ‘On the Dialectics of Identity’).  
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt 
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Marxian and Weberian analysis of social institutions and in his critique of cultural 
forms.    
 As was the case with Lukács’ social analysis, the capitalist society that Adorno 
theorises is different than the early liberal type of capitalism that Marx sought to 
theorise in its ideal average.  Foremost among these differences are several 
developments that Adorno explicates through his theory of the fetish-form of the 
exchange abstraction. These include the totally administered society as the outgrowth 
of Keynesian capitalist state bureaucracies, administration and rationalised Fordist 
production, and the emergence of mass societies through the integration of the 
working class.  
 Adorno analyses these forms of supra-individual objectivity by treating them in 
conjunction with the fetish form of the exchange abstraction.434 Adorno’s philosophical 
writings, particularly World Spirit and Natural History, thus interpret Hegel’s social 
philosophy – including his account of Spirit, World Spirit, law and other social 
institutions – as indicative of the autonomous, abstract and supra-individual elements 
of Marx’s theory of fetishism.435 In his cultural writings, Adorno theorises integration 
into mass society by arguing that cultural forms have been subsumed by exchange, and 
that they thus possess the same formal properties as commodities. These elements are 
incorporated within Adorno’s Weberian analysis of institutions in his sociological 
essays, such as ‘Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?’,436 and ‘Society’.437 
  Adorno responds to the sociological theories of the era in these essays by 
arguing that contemporary society has to be conceived by dialectically combining the 
Weberian theory of rationalisation with his Hegelian-Marxist theory of capital.438 The 
                                                
434 The way that Adorno does this has some similarities to Lukács, but it does not 
simply consist in generalising the properties of the commodity.  
435 Adorno’s use of the concept of ‘natural history’ in his late work is symptomatic of 
the development of his theory of social domination. Rather than using Lukács’ theory 
of second nature as the grounds for the theory, Adorno bases it on his student Alfred 
Schmidt’s interpretation of Marx’s theory of natural history. (Schmidt 1971) Adorno 
consequently uses the terms ‘natural history’ and ‘the law of value’ as equivalent to his 
theory of fetishism. For the sake of clarity, I am using the fetishism-form of the 
exchange abstraction to designate these terms.  
436 (Adorno 2001b) 
437 (Adorno 1969-70) 
438 Thus while those commentaries that treat Adorno’s theory of social domination as 
Lukács’ theory of reification are right to point out that both use their interpretations 
of Marx’s theory of fetishism and Weberian rationalisation in their accounts of social 
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Weberian element describes the rationalisation of production and institutional 
administration, which Adorno links to the ‘profit principle.’439 His Hegelian-Marxian 
conception of capitalism describes the social relations and supra-individual forms of 
domination that characterise contemporary society.440 This can be seen in Adorno’s 
comments that ‘concepts such as exchange-society might have their objectivity, 
revealing a compulsion of the generality behind the matter at hand’ and that totality is 
characterised by ‘structural laws which condition the facts’ and ‘tendencies which 
more or less stringently follow the historical constitution of the total system.’441  
 Adorno’s theory of the objective aspect of social domination is the 
consequence of these supra-individual autonomous social forms. This is encapsulated 
in the theoretical statements that Adorno provides that describe the abstract and 
inverted characteristics of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction, and which 
present them as constitutive of the social domination of totality: 
 
In Hegel’s words the all-penetrating ether of society […] is anything but ethereal, but 
on the contrary an ens realissimum [Latin: that which is real, materially existent]. 
Insofar as it is abstractly veiled, the fault of its abstraction is not to be blamed on a 
                                                                                                                                          
domination, they do not address the differences in these accounts. Nor do they 
address Adorno’s utilisation of other theories. 
439 ‘The oft-cited profit-motive has to be oriented in capitalism to the profit-principle, 
to market chances, it must avail itself of the calculating capital account; its 
organizational  form has to be that of free labor, household and firm have to be 
separated, it requires  bookkeeping and a rational legal system in accordance with the 
dominating principle of  rationality in capitalism at large.The completeness of this 
catalogue remains in doubt; it  is especially to be asked, as to whether the Weberian 
emphasis on rationality,  disregarding the class-relationship which reproduces itself 
through the exchange of  equivalents, already equates the method of capitalism 
overmuch to its Spirit, although the exchange of equivalents and its problematic would 
certainly not be thinkable without  rationality.’ (Adorno 2001b) 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1968/late-capitalism.htm 
440 ‘In the categories of critical-dialectical theory I would like to suggest as a first and 
necessarily abstract answer, that contemporary society is above all an industrial society 
according to the level of its productive forces [Adorno’s emphasis]. Industrial labour 
has become the model pattern of society everywhere and across all borders of 
political systems. It developed itself into a totality due to the fact that modes of 
procedure, which resemble the industrial ones, are extending by economic necessity 
into the realms of material production, into administration, the distribution-sphere and 
that which we call culture. Conversely, society is capitalism in terms of its relations of 
production’, (Adorno’s emphasis). (Adorno 2001b) 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1968/late-capitalism.htm  
441(Adorno 2001b) http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1968/late-
capitalism.htm  
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solipsistic and reality-distant thinking, but on the exchange-relationships, the objective 
abstractions, which belong to the social life-process. The power of that abstraction 
over humanity is far more corporeal than that of any single institution, which silently 
constitutes itself in advance according to the scheme of things and beats itself into 
human beings. The powerlessness which the individual experiences in the face of the 
totality is the most drastic expression of this.442  
 
The result is a form of supra-individual domination and powerlessness that 
Adorno characterises as ‘free floating angst’, ‘fate’ or ‘doom’: ‘Individuals are subsumed 
under social production, which exists as a doom outside of them; but social 
production is not subsumed under individuals, who operate it as their capacity in  
common.’443 
As in Adorno’s interpretation of Marx, this means that individuals are 
compelled to carry out the functions of ‘character masks’.444 Such a state of affairs 
reflects the fetish form of the exchange abstraction in which ‘the abstraction of 
exchange value is a priori allied with the domination of the general over the particular, 
of society over its captive membership.’445 This means that ‘[t]he concrete form of the 
total system requires everyone to respect the law of exchange if he does not wish to 
be destroyed, irrespective of whether profit is his subjective motivation or not.'446 As a 
result, classes and the individuals in these classes are dominated by the ‘negative 
universality’ of late capitalist totality, so that: ‘economic processes continue to 
perpetuate domination over human beings, the objects of such are no longer merely 
the masses, but also the administrators and their hangers-on’ who as ‘appendages of 
                                                
442(Adorno 2001b) http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1968/late-
capitalism.htm  
443(Adorno 2001b) http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1968/late-
capitalism.htm 
444 Adorno states that the concept of ‘character mask’: ‘applies to almost all the 
functions human beings carry out today as the way that objective social necessities 
come to assert themselves […] even in the realm which according to convention 
human beings are really more or less in control, that is to say, in which they are not 
determined by their functions but enjoy a certain measure of freedom, they continue 
to be determined by the universal. So much so that even the most specific aspects of 
their individuality are pre-formed by the universal, and this includes even those 
elements that diverge from the universal history and freedom’ (Adorno 2006, 70) 
445(Adorno 1981, 'Introduction') 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/positivismusstreit/adorno-intro1.html 
446(Adorno 1981, 'Introduction') 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/positivismusstreit/adorno-intro1.html  
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machines’ have become ‘the function of their own apparatus.’447 For Adorno, this 
indicates the general predicament of social inversion, where ‘while we imagine that we 
act as ourselves, in reality we act to a great extent as the agents of our own 
functions.’448 
 
    3.2 Subjective Domination 
 
 The concept of ‘character masks’ also indicates the way in which Adorno 
conceives the social domination of the subject. According to the dialectical logic of his 
social theory, the subjects that collectively constitute the inverted modality of capitalist 
society are themselves reciprocally constituted by the latter. In consequence, Adorno’s 
theory of the social domination of the subject is objective.  It also means that Adorno’s 
analysis treats the subject as a fragment of totality that is mediated by the latter’s 
supra-individual negative universality. On one level, Adorno’s theory of social 
domination is therefore concerned with the constitution of individuals and with their 
forced integration into mass society. On another level, his analysis focuses on how 
individuals are maimed by the totality within which they are situated. On the former 
level he uses the Hegelian and Marxian elements of his supra-individual social theory to 
argue that the ‘individual is a social category’; on the latter, he combines that theory 
with those of Heidegger’s, Kant’s and Freud’s and thereby addresses the mutilation of 
subjects. Both are theorised in conjunction with Adorno’s account of the fetish form 
of the exchange abstraction.  
 The subjective element of Adorno’s Hegelian-Marxian conception of the supra-
individual negative universality of social totality is employed as a means of theorising 
the constitution of the social category of the individual, and of thereby addressing the 
individual’s constituent experience through the concepts of the ‘bane’ and the 
‘individualistic veil’. 
 The concept of the ‘bane’ marks the point in Adorno’s fusion of Hegel and 
Marx at which the supra-individual elements of his social theory pass over into the 
subjective element in the form of the inverted internalisation of subject formation. This 
can be seen in the Hegelian element of the ‘bane’ – the latter is described as ‘the 
                                                
447(Adorno 2001b) http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1968/late-
capitalism.htm 
448(Adorno 2006, 69) 
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subjective form of the world-spirit, whose primacy over the externalised life-process is 
reinforced internally’449 – and in its Marxian element, which pertains to the sense in 
which the ‘bane’ is said to be reflective of the fetish form of the exchange 
abstraction.450 Both of these elements cohere to express the paradox of the category 
of the individual, which is premised on the atomised behaviour dictated by totality. 
This atomised behaviour forcefully integrates the individual into totality, and forms the 
basis for reified and integrated consciousness.451  
 This theory of individuality is set out in Adorno’s discussion of the ‘individualist 
veil.’ Individuality is described as a ‘veil’ because the individual subject is unaware of its 
constitution by totality. In Adorno’s view, this means that individuality is ‘illusory’; but 
at the same time, he holds that this illusion is integral to the constitution of totality, as 
it forms the grounds for the atomised and egoistic behaviour that is responsible for 
composing and perpetuating that totality.  This behaviour is reflective of the way in 
which the very category of the individual is constitutive of the social domination of 
totality: 
 
[T]he generality, through which every individual is determined as the unit [Einheit] of 
its particularity, is borrowed from what is external to it and hence also as 
heteronomous to the individual, as anything which demons were once said to afflict 
them with.452 
 
 The pernicious consequences of the individuals’ determination by totality can 
be seen in Adorno’s social criticism of Heidegger’s, Freud’s and Kant’s theorisations of 
individualism. These criticisms should be described as social because Adorno interprets 
these theories in conjunction with the exchange abstraction, thereby casting them as 
representative of the individual’s plight within the social totality. 
                                                
449(Adorno 2001, ‘The Bane’) http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt  
450‘In human experience, the bane is the equivalent of the fetish-character of the 
commodity. What is self-made becomes the in-itself, out of which the self can no 
longer escape.’ (Adorno 2001, ‘The Bane’)  
451  ‘What they can do nothing about, and which negates them, is what they themselves 
become. While the nominalistic principle simulates individualization to them, they act 
collectively. This much is true in the Hegelian insistence on the universality of the 
particular, that the particular in the inverted form of powerless individualization, 
sacrificed to the general, is dictated by the principle of the inverted universality.’ 
(Adorno 2001, ‘The Bane’) http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
452(Adorno 2001, ‘Spirit as Social Totality’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
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Heidegger 
 
 Adorno thus interprets Heidegger’s philosophical account of the existential 
malaise of the individual as indicative of a social situation in which the individual has 
been ‘incapacitated.’453 This is illustrated in Adorno’s argument that Heidegger’s 
categories, such as ‘dasein’454 and ‘being’, are reflective of the social situation in which 
the ‘subject became to a large extent ideology’; a situation that ‘conceals’ the objective 
functional context of society.’455 Like Adorno’s analysis of fetishism, Heidegger’s 
philosophy is therefore both false and true: it is false in its trans-historical 
hypostatisation, but true insofar as Heidegger’s philosophical categories are reflexive of 
the exchange abstraction that renders individuals powerless, and which causes them to 
suffer.456  
 
 
                                                
453(Adorno 2001, ‘Incapacitation of the Subject’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND1Trans.txt Adorno criticises Heidegger for the 
fetishistic naturalisation of social conditions. 
454 ‘What Hegel and Marx in their youth condemned as alienation and reification, and 
against which all are spontaneously united today, is what Heidegger interprets 
ontologically as well as unhistorically, and, in its function as a being-form of Dasein, as 
something bodily.’ (Adorno 2002b, 107-108)  
455(Adorno 2001, ‘Incapacitation of the Subject’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND1Trans.txt 
456 ‘The lament over the loss of ordering forms increases with their power. The 
institutions are mightier than ever; they have long since produced something like the 
neon-lit style of the culture-industry, which spreads over the world like the Baroque 
style once did. The undiminished conflict between subjectivity and forms reverses itself 
under the hegemony of the latter into the consciousness which experiences itself as 
powerless, which no longer trusts itself to change the institutions and their intellectual 
mirror-images, into identification with the aggressor. The lament over the loss of 
forms in the world, the prelude to the call for a binding social order, which the subject 
tacitly expects from outside, heteronomously, is, insofar as the assertion is more than 
mere ideology, not the fruit of the emancipation of  the subject but of its failure. What 
appears as formless to a constitution of the existent modeled solely after subjective 
reason is what subjugates the subjects, the pure principle of being-for-others, of the 
commodity-form. For the sake of universal equivalence and comparability it debases all 
qualitative determinations in all places, leveling tendentially. The same commodity-form 
however, the mediated domination of human beings over human beings, solidifies the 
subjects in their lack of autonomy; their autonomy and the freedom towards the 
qualitative would go together. (Adorno 2001, ‘Weakness and Support’ and 
‘Incapacitation of the Subject’) http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND1Trans.txt 
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Freud 
 
 Adorno’s interpretation of Freud presents another account of the plight of the 
individual. Adorno uses Freudian concepts to explain how social totality has 
psychologically mutilated the individual. As a complement to the individualistic veil, 
Adorno argues that the human psyche is constituted by totality. The defence 
mechanism of narcissism, in his view, represses this reliance on totality and forms the 
basis for pseudo-individuation.  
 The category of pseudo-individuation grounds Adorno’s analysis of how 
individuals are psychologically maimed by totality, and is articulated by way of a 
number of Freudian concepts. The process of socialisation makes individuals neurotic; 
their needs are repressed and displaced onto inadequate objects of substitution 
(commodified cultural forms); this leads to a generalisation of the Freudian social 
analysis that Adorno first presented in ‘On the Fetish Character’: namely, ‘regression 
under the bane.’ 
  Regression is thus theorised as the outcome of the reality principle, which is 
conditioned by the bane. This causes regression to be instantiated in pseudo-
individuation and pseudo-activity. These conditions are ultimately symptomatic of a 
situation in which people have become reliant upon the very same totality that 
dominates and compels their behaviour, up to and including their most individual and 
intimate experiences.  
 
Domination, Freedom and Self-Preservation 
  
 These analyses of the social situation of the individual can be seen to be 
brought together in Adorno’s interpretation of Kant. Adorno’s social criticism of Kant 
also reflects the way in which Adorno sees social totality as constitutive of domination 
with freedom as exemplary of its negation. As is the case elsewhere, domination is 
aligned with the fetish form of the exchange abstraction, and freedom is posited in its 
overcoming. 
 Adorno’s social criticism of Kant is again grounded on the relationship between 
the individual and society. In this instance, this relation is interpreted as reflective of 
the idea of self-preservation, and as being exemplified in Kant’s notion of the 
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transcendental subject.457 While ‘[s]ociety determines individuals, even according to 
their immanent genesis, as what they are’, their determined actions ‘appear under the 
veil of the principium individuationis.’458 This is reflected in Adorno’s social criticism of 
the Kantian transcendental subject. In Adorno’s view, the transcendental subject ‘far 
more determines the real conduct of people and society than do those psychological 
individuals from whom the transcendental project was abstracted […] they have 
turned into appendages of the social machinery.’459 This is because individuals are 
‘constrained’ to behave like ‘homo oeconomicus.’  The transcendental subject is thus 
reflexive of exchange, the rationality of which constitutes and deforms people at the 
outset, thereby ‘maiming them.’460 
 This process of deformation is tied in with Adorno’s deployment of the 
Freudian theory of ego-formation. Adorno conceives the ego as indicative of the 
compulsive character of the transcendental subject. These Kantian and Freudian 
elements lead people to hypostatise the idea of freedom, thereby conflating it with the 
determined behaviour of the individuating principle, and to act in atomised, 
instrumental and ‘radically evil’ ways to ensure their own self-preservation.461 This 
conception of freedom reflects the formal freedom that allows the genesis of the fetish 
form of the exchange abstraction. At the same time, it is indicative of the inverted 
compulsion that the fetish form of the exchange abstraction compels.462 Such a 
                                                
457(Adorno 2001, ‘Nominalist Aspect’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND3Trans.txt 
458(Adorno 2001, ‘Freedom and Organised Society’)  
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND3Trans.txt.  
459(Adorno 1983, 250) 
460 ‘The doctrine of the transcendental subject faithfully discloses the precedence of 
the abstraction, rational relations that are abstracted from individuals and their 
conditions and for which exchange is the model. If the standard structure of society is 
the exchange form, its rationality constitutes people: what they are for themselves, 
what they think they are, is secondary.’ (Adorno 1983, 250)  
461 ‘The individuated feels free, insofar as it is opposed to society and may undertake 
something against it or other individuals, although incomparably less than it believes. Its 
freedom is primarily that of pursuing its own ends, which are not immediately 
exhausted in social ones; to this extent it coincides with the principle of individuation.’ 
(Adorno 2001, ‘Self-experience of Freedom and Unfreedom’), 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND3Trans.txt.   
462 ‘Freedom of this type has escaped the natural-rootedness of society; within an 
increasingly rational one it has achieved a degree of reality. At the same time it 
remains appearance [Schein] in the midst of bourgeois society, no less than individuality 
generally. The critique of the freedom of the will, like that of determinism, means 
critique of this appearance [Schein]. The law of value realises itself over the heads of 
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condition is based on the peculiarity of the social constitution of domination; ‘human 
beings are unfree in their bondage to what is external, and that which is external to 
them is in turn also themselves.’463 
This condition of unfreedom becomes the basis for a conception of freedom as 
the negation of unfreedom: ‘Subjects become aware of the limits of their freedom as 
their own membership in nature, ultimately as their powerlessness in view of the 
society, becomes autonomous before them.’464 This conception of freedom is 
metapsychologically derived as the ‘polemical counter-image to the suffering under 
social compulsion.’465 It is also grounded in the limits of the subsuming powers of the 
commodity-form. The latter reaches its limit in its determination of that which 
ultimately determines it in turn: labour power.466 Furthermore, and by extension, this 
notion of freedom is also premised on the negation of exchange and social totality. 
 In sum, Adorno’s dialectical social theory of domination uses his theory of the 
fetish-form of the exchange abstraction to theorise supra-individual forms of social 
domination, and to thereby articulate the ways in which these forms invert to compel, 
condition and maim individuals to the point where they become reliant on the very 
forms that oppress them. This dialectical social theory is summarised as a whole in 
Negative Dialectics:  
                                                                                                                                          
formally free individuals. They are unfree, according to Marx’s insight, as its involuntary 
executors, and indeed all the more thoroughly, the more the social antagonisms grow, 
in which the conception of freedom first formed. The process by which what is 
individuated becomes autonomous, the function of the exchange-society, terminates in 
its abolition through integration. What produced freedom, recoils into unfreedom.’ 
(Adorno 2001, ‘Self-experience of freedom and unfreedom’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND3Trans.txt 
463(Adorno 2001, ‘Freedom and Organised Society’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND3Trans.txt  
464(Adorno 2001, ‘Freedom and Organised Society’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND3Trans.txt 
465(Adorno 2001, ‘Pre-egoised Impulse’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND3Trans.txt  
466 'Determinism acts as if dehumanization, the commodity character of labor-power 
developed into a totality, were human essence pure and simple, incognizant of the fact 
that the commodity character finds its borders in labour-power, which is not mere 
exchange-value but also has use-value. If the freedom of the will is merely denied, then 
human beings are reduced without reservations to the normal form of the commodity 
character of their labour in developed capitalism. No less topsy-turvy is aprioristic 
determinism as the doctrine of the freedom of the will, which in the middle of 
commodity society abstracts from this.' (Adorno 2001, ‘Self experience of Freedom 
and Unfreedom’) http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND3Trans.txt 
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[T]he economic process, which reduces individual interests to the common 
denominator of a totality, which remains negative, because it distances itself by means 
of its constitutive abstraction from the individual interests, out of which it is 
nevertheless simultaneously composed. The universality, which reproduces the 
preservation of life, simultaneously endangers it, on constantly more threatening levels. 
The violence of the self-realizing universal is not, as Hegel thought, identical to the 
essence of individuals, but always also contrary. They are not merely character-masks, 
agents of value, in some presumed special sphere of the economy. Even where they 
think they have escaped the primacy of the economy, all the way down to their 
psychology, the maison tolère, [French: universal home] of what is unknowably 
individual, they react under the compulsion of the generality; the more identical they 
are with it, the more un-identical they are with it in turn as defenceless followers. 
What is expressed in the individuals themselves, is that the whole preserves itself 
along with them only by and through the antagonism.467  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
4.1 Summary 
 Adorno’s conception of fetishism is therefore integral to his critical theory of 
social domination, accounting for its social constitution and its constituent properties. 
As I have shown, this conception of fetishism and social domination is not based on 
Lukács nor does it consist in Adorno’s theory of reification. Instead, Adorno’s theory 
can be said to unfold in two phases. Firstly, the early phase conceives of fetishism and 
social domination in conjunction with his Marxian interpretation of Lukács, Benjamin 
and the relationship between natural history and the commodity-form. This is 
exemplified in Adorno’s macrological studies of fetishism, which account for the 
constituent properties and disclose the unintentional constitution of social domination. 
In his later work, Adorno’s theory of social domination is based on his conception of 
the fetish form of the exchange abstraction, which provides a more fully-fledged 
account of social constitution and forms the basis for the constituent properties of his 
dialectical theory of social domination. In both instances, the constitution of these 
theories of social domination are accounted for in Adorno’s use of fetishism, while 
their constituent properties differ from Lukács' theory of reification, and surpass 
designation as identity thinking, or Adorno’s definition of reification. There are 
however a number of problems with Adorno’s account that undermine his dialectical 
                                                
467(Adorno 2001, ‘Law and Fairness’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND4Trans.txt 
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critical theory of society and the theory of social domination it encapsulates. In what 
follows I outline the place of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction in critical 
theory and then I move to show how Adorno’s insufficient account of the social 
genesis and derivation of the exchange abstraction undermines his critcal theory and 
his account of social domination.  
 
4.2 Critical Social Theory 
 
 Since Adorno’s conception of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction 
serves as the basis for this dialectical theory of social domination and his conception of 
freedom, it also serves as the basis of his critical social theory. In this capacity,  
exchange’s function as the socially constitutive element of dialectical social totality 
provides Adorno’s theory with a socially synthetic foundation that is able to grasp any 
element of totality in relation to the mechanism of exchange that mediates or reflects 
it. Adorno’s criticism of this social totality is founded on what he terms the identity of 
non-identity, or the equivalence of non-equivalence. This forms part of his account of 
the interrelation of the exchange abstraction's fetish form and identity thinking.468 
Adorno’s theory of exchange is thus the means through which criticism becomes a 
dialectical critical theory of society. This is because such a critical theory ‘coincides 
with a perception of the way in which the objective structure is itself conceptually 
determined’, so that ‘the concept of exchange is, as it were, the hinge connecting the 
                                                
468 Adorno conceives of this type of criticism as faithfully following Marx’s method of 
immanent critique: ‘Marx is concerned with an immanent critique of liberalism. In the 
East, Marx serves the interests of power relations, this Marx belongs to the sphere of 
pulp literature. In the West, Marx is accused that his theory is premised on subjective-
proletarian class consciousness. This is precisely what is not meant. Liberal theory is 
confronted with its own claim with regard to the act of exchange. “You say that 
equivalents are exchanged, that there is a free and just exchange, I take your word, 
now we shall see how this works.” This is immanent critique. That man becomes a 
commodity has been perceived by others. Marx: “These petrified conditions must be 
made to dance by singing to them their own melody.” (Contribution to the Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right) Not: to confront capitalist society a different one, but: to 
ask if society conforms to its own rules, if society functions according to laws which it 
claims as its own. Now, Marx does not just say, no, this is wrong, but he takes dialectic 
seriously and coquets with its terminology. In an exchange, something is the same and 
simultaneously not the same, it is and at the same time is not above board.’ (Backhaus 
2001, 5) 
http://reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/adorn
o-1962-seminar-on-marx/   
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conception of a critical theory of society to the construction of the concept of society 
as a totality.’469  
 On this basis Adorno’s critical theory ‘seeks to give a name to what secretly 
holds the machinery together’470 by disclosing the ‘non-identical’ moments that a 
totality based on exchange does not recognise.471 This makes theory critical in two 
senses: it reveals how society is constituted by showing how essence appears and 
hides itself in the pervasive fetish forms of domination that shape social life, and it 
demonstrates that these social forms are reliant upon and mask non-identical 
moments.  
 These elements are also tied into a third element of Adorno’s critical social 
theory: namely, the idea of natural history presented in Negative Dialectics. In this 
interpretation, natural history is conceived as a critical concept that operates in 
conjunction with Marx’s theory of fetishism. These theories are doubly critical. On the 
one hand, they use pejorative terms, such as fetishism and second nature, to describe 
the domination inherent within purportedly civilised societies. On the other, they 
denaturalise and de-fetishise these societies by pointing out their historicity.    
 Consequently, critical social theory sides with freedom and the idea of a just 
society. Such a society would be derived from the negation of social totality, and from 
the abolition of the exchange abstraction that is constitutive and constituted by that 
totality.472    
                                                
469(Adorno 1981, ‘Sociology and Empirical Research’) 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/positivismusstreit/adorno-empirical.html 
470(Adorno 1981, ‘Sociology and Empirical Research’) 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/positivismusstreit/adorno-empirical.html 
471 ‘The totality is to be opposed by convicting it of the non-identity with itself, which it 
denies according to its own concept. Negative dialectics is thereby tied, at its starting-
point, to the highest categories of identity-philosophy. To this extent it also remains 
false, identity-logical, itself that which it is being thought against. (Adorno 2001, ‘On 
the Dialectics of Identity’) http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt  
472 'What the critique of the exchange-principle as the identifying one of thought 
wishes, is that the ideal of free and fair exchange, until today a mere pretext, would be 
realised. This alone would transcend the exchange. Once critical theory has 
demystified this latter as something which proceeds by equivalents and yet not by 
equivalents, then the critique of the inequality in the equality aims towards equality, 
amidst all skepticism against the rancor in the bourgeois egalitarian ideal, which 
tolerates nothing qualitatively divergent. If no human being was deprived of their share 
of their living labor, then rational identity would be achieved, and society would be 
beyond the identifying thought.' (Adorno 2001, ‘On the Dialectics of Identity’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt 
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4.3 Evaluation 
  
 However, there are a number of problems with Adorno’s account of social 
constitution and the formation of the constituent properties of social domination that 
undermine this critical theory. 
 The most fundamental problem is that Adorno’s theory of the fetish form of 
the exchange abstraction is insufficiently theorised. In contrast to Lukács, Adorno does 
not confuse objectification and the abstract and autonomous properties of the social 
objectivity of things. He also distinguishes between reified social relations, fetishism 
and reified consciousness lending some complexity to elements of his theory of social 
domination through his accounts of social compulsion, the formation of subjectivity 
and psychological maiming. His use of exchange to link different fragments of society 
also provides a potentially fruitful basis for a unitary social theory. However, an 
explanation of the genesis of exchange and the extent of its pervasiveness is never 
really given.  
 At one point in Negative Dialectics Adorno implies that his theory of the fetish 
form of the exchange abstraction is taken from Alfred Sohn-Rethel.473 This has led 
some to claim that Adorno’s theory is taken from Sohn-Rethel. Yet as Helmut Reichelt 
points out, Adorno had problems with Sohn-Rethel’s theory of real abstraction.474 In 
Adorno’s view, a ‘systematic comprehensive analysis of the exchange abstraction’ was 
still ‘required.’ However, Adorno never attempted this comprehensive analysis himself, 
whilst still using the theory in the manner shown above, a move which is indicative of 
the problems with his critical social theory of domination. 
 This is because the closest Adorno came to a systematic analysis took the form 
of a series of only partial expositions on Marx’s theory of exchange (summarised 
                                                
473 ‘Alfred Sohn-Rethel was the first to point out that in the latter, in the general and 
necessary activity of the Spirit, inalienably social labor lies hidden.’  
474 Hence some letters, after those quoted by (Toscano 2011) in Adorno and Sohn 
Rethel’s correspondence, show Adorno’s difference with Sothn-Rethel (Adorno 1989, 
p. 221) This contrasts with his earlier euphoric comments in a letter dated 17th 
November 1936: ‘Dear Alfred, I don’t think I am exaggerating if I tell you that your 
letter was responsible for the greatest intellectual shock I have experienced in 
philosophy since I first encountered Benjamin’s work – and that was in 1923! This 
shock reflects the magnitude and power of your idea – but also the depth of an 
agreement which goes immeasurably further than you could have suspected or even I 
myself could have foreseen’. (Adorno and Sohn- Rethel 1991, 32)  
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above).475 As I have shown, these expositions provide an account of how the fetish 
form of the exchange abstraction is realised in exchange. They do not however 
account for Adorno’s modification of Marx’s theory through its fusion of Hegel, or for 
his transformation of Marxian categories, such as exchange and fetishism. Nor does 
Adorno provide an account of how these categories are indicative of virtually all 
aspects of social life. 
 As we have seen, Adorno provides ample material to map how exchange holds 
society together. However, he does not fully explicate why and how exchange and 
abstraction gain these socially pervasive powers. The closest he comes is in an 
assertion in the Positivist Dispute that attempts to base his social theory on what he 
characterises as the immanent, logical and contradictory nature of exchange. This is 
not however sufficiently elaborated into an account of how exchange possesses these 
immanent, logical and contradictory properties, or indeed in how it functions to 
constitute a conceptuality that ‘holds sway in reality.’  
  This is why Adorno’s attempt to utilise some of Marx’s categories in relation to 
his category of exchange whilst neglecting other important ones is problematic: for 
instead of the development of the categories of abstract labour, value, surplus value 
and capital that are, as we have seen, central to Marx’s theory of fetishism and social 
domination, Adorno opts for a socialised Hegelian reading of Marx. This involves a 
dialectically conceived notion of exchange, understood in relation to late capitalist 
social totality. Yet in this interrelated reading of Hegel and Marx, how and why 
exchange possesses its socially determinate function, and how it relates to late 
capitalist totality, is not sufficiently explained; instead it is interpreted and presupposed 
as an already existent feature of a totality that is not intelligible as a whole, whilst the 
dialectical function of totality is accounted for through Adorno’s comments on the 
properties and pervasiveness of exchange.476  
 For, as has been shown, Adorno falls back on analysing these aspects of society 
through modified Marxian terms, such as fetishism, exchange, exchange-value, etc., or 
by treating these phenomena as harmonious or reflective of exchange. Yet, these 
deficiencies in his accounts of the genesis of exchange and of its pervasiveness mean 
                                                
475 The lengthiest of these were summarised above. See also Adorno’s comments on 
the fetish form of the exchange abstraction (Adorno 1981; Adorno 2002a)  
476(Reichelt 2001) attempts to remedy these deficencies by basing Adorno’s social 
theory on his interpretation of Marx’s idea of social validity.  
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that he does not conclusively show how or why the latter mediates them. This lack of 
a theory of the genesis and pervasiveness of the exchange abstraction thus undermines 
Adorno's analysis of society. This means that it also undermines the basis of his 
criticism and critical theory of society. Criticising economic exchange transactions as 
the unequivalent exchange of equivalents reliant on categories like surplus-value is one 
thing; but it is not apparent in Adorno’s account of exchange if or how this basis can 
be generalised to other social and conceptual phenomena, let alone serve as ground 
for their criticism. This concern seems particularly pertinent if an account of the 
genesis of these phenomena is not provided, and if an explication of their 
embeddedness within relationships of equivalence and non-equivalence, of identity and 
non-identity, is similarly absent. The same is the case for the multitude of objective and 
subjective phenomena Adorno interprets as reflective or mediated by exchange.  A 
lack of such an account also undermines Adorno’s definition of how the critical theory 
of society relies on exchange. For if exchange is not comprehensively defined, then the 
theory it is based on, looses its critical acumen.477 
 These problems are further undermined by Adorno’s comments, presented 
elsewhere, which express hostility to an objective theory of society.478 Adorno often 
uses such comments to advocate his method of constellation;479 or his points that 
society is ‘intelligible’ and ‘unintelligible’480, yet they also contradict his contentions that 
the fetish form of the exchange abstraction objectively constitutes society. This also 
undermines the fact that a great many of Adorno’s constellations, as I have shown, are 
reliant upon his theory of exchange. Furthermore, while his speculative anthropology 
may serve the purpose of ideological intervention against what Adorno terms the 
                                                
477 In this regard (Rose 1979; Moishe Postone 1996) and Fetscher’s point that 
Adorno’s theory is hampered by the absence of concrete labour and surplus value is 
only partially valid. This is because it is hard to imagine how the inclusion of these 
categories could ground and explicate everything Adorno relates to exchange. 
478 See for instance (Adorno 2001b) 
479 'Precisely the increasing tendency of integration of the capitalist system however, 
whose moments intertwine into a constantly more complete functional context, makes 
the old question concerning the cause as opposed to the constellation ever more  
precarious; not the critique of epistemology, but the real course of history 
necessitates the search for constellations.’ (Adorno 2001, ‘Constellation as Science’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt  
480(T. W. Adorno 1981, 'Sociology and Empirical Research') 
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/positivismusstreit/adorno-empirical.html 
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concept of the root,481 it also often comes into contradiction with the strand of his 
theory that roots domination in exchange. This is also the case for several comments 
Adorno makes which characterise exchange as having occurred since ‘time 
immemorial’482 casting doubt on whether his analysis of exchange is specific to the 
social relations of capitalism, going against statements made elsewhere that it is, and 
undermining the historical account also outlined above that treats the properties of 
exchange as an all-around mediator as the outcome of particular historical and social 
conditions.   
 Adorno attempts to bypass these problems by placing the various strands of his 
theory into totality. This makes totality the basis of causality.483 By doing so he ends up 
in a similar position to Lukács, as he presupposes the function of totality without 
explicating its genesis or its function. Instead, like Lukács, he presupposes the 
dialectical properties of totality, and thereby links it to various phenomena. This means 
that rather than an account of how totality is socially constituted through exchange 
and how it possesses dominating powers by virtue of the autonomous properties of 
the autonomous function of the exchange abstraction, Adorno ultimately treats totality 
as a sort of deus ex machina to account for the composition, the constituent properties 
                                                
481 See (Adorno 2001, ‘Outset from the Concept’)  
482 ‘For the exchange of equivalents was based since time immemorial exactly on this, 
that something unequal was exchanged in its name, that the surplus-value of labor was 
appropriated’ (Adorno 2001, ‘On the Dialectics of Identity’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt.  
483 'Causality has withdrawn as it were into the totality; in the midst of its system it 
becomes indistinguishable. The more its concept, under scientific mandate, dilutes 
itself to abstraction, the less the simultaneous threads of the universally socialised 
society, which are condensed to an extreme, permit one condition to be traced back 
with evidence to others. Each one hangs together horizontally as vertically with all 
others, tinctures all, is tinctured by all. The latest doctrine in which enlightenment 
employed causality as a decisive political weapon, the Marxist one of superstructure 
and infrastructure, lags almost innocently behind a condition, in which the apparatuses 
of production, distribution and domination, as well as economic and social relations 
and ideologies are inextricably interwoven, and in which living human beings have 
turned into bits of ideology. Where these latter are no longer added to the existent as 
something justifying or complementary, but pass over into the appearance [Schein], 
that what is, would be inescapable and thereby legitimated, the critique which operates 
with the unequivocal causal relation of superstructure and infrastructure aims wide of 
the mark. In the total society everything is equally close to the midpoint; it is as 
transparent, its apologetics as threadbare, as those who see through it, who die out.' 
(Adorno 2001, ‘On the Crisis of Causality’) 
http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/ND2Trans.txt This seems to be another variant of 
the objective theory of society he has criticised elsewhere. 
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and the function of his social theory. As such, this conception of totality and its 
function as negative universality provides the link between disparate phenomena and 
theories which Adorno interprets as reflective of society whilst also serving to 
reconcile antagonistic and contradictory elements of his theory. Finally, it also serves 
as the means of accounting for the pervasiveness of exchange and the function of its 
autonomous and abstract fetishistic properties. Yet with so much hanging on the 
category, like the fetish form of the exchange abstraction, it likewise lacks an account 
of how it is constituted, how it functions to reproduce itself and it incorporates or 
reflects different theories of dialectics and different aspects of an eclectic array of 
theorists. 484   
  This means that despite moments of descriptive insight, and despite his 
presentation of a theorisation of exchange that serves as a potential means of 
addressing the social cohesion of domination, by virtue of this lack of a fully-fledged 
account of the constitution, constituent derivation and function of exchange and social 
totality and a systematic account of how the two relate to each other - Adorno’s 
critical theory falls short of providing an account of the social constitution and the 
constituent properties of that mode of domination, and thereby rather than being a 
critical theory of a particular society, it runs the risk of simply being a critical theory of 
society as such. 
                                                
484 In this regard Rose, Postone and Fetscher’s point that Adorno’s theory is hampered 
by the absence of concrete labour and surplus-value is only partially valid. This is 
because it is hard to imagine how the inclusion of these categories could ground 
everything that Adorno relates to exchange. 
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4. Lefebvre, Fetishism as Concrete 
Abstraction and Socially Embodied 
Domination. 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I turn to the role of fetishism in Henri Lefebvre’s theory of 
social domination. I argue that Lefebvre’s Hegelian interpretation of Marx conceives 
fetishism as a ‘concrete abstraction’ that articulates the constitution and constituent 
properties of Marx’s theory of social domination. I also argue that this conception of 
fetishism forms the basis of three attempts by Lefebvre to supplement Marx’s theory 
with an account of how these abstract properties of domination are composed, 
embedded and opposed in social life. I show this in what I designate as three phases of 
Lefebvre’s work. I close with an evaluation of Lefebvre’s theory of fetishism and social 
domination.  
 
    I Literature Review 
 
 My focus in this chapter differs from the leading commentary on Lefebvre, 
which characterises his thought thematically by casting it as being paradigmatic of the 
theory of alienation. It is also the case that the historical and theoretical works on 
Western Marxism either ignore Lefebvre, or at best include only marginal references 
to his work.485 For this reason the comparative study of Lefebvre presented in this 
thesis is the first sustained comparison of Lefebvre with Lukács and Adorno.  
However, my position places me alongside several recent analyses of particular aspects 
                                                
485 See (Jay 1986; Anderson 1979; Jacoby 1971; Kolakowski 1978a) For a recent 
historical work that gives prominence to Lefebvre, see (Schecter 2008) 
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of Lefebvre’s Marxism. Because of this, and in a manner that differs from the previous 
chapters of this thesis, this present chapter will not differentiate Lefebvre’s theory of 
fetishism from the popular interpretations thereof. Rather than offering a different 
interpretation, my aim instead will be to draw out and discuss elements of this material 
that have, as yet, received far less attention than they require and warrant. These 
aspects of Lefebvre’s work will be shown to possess similiarities and differences with 
the positions I developed in my chapters on Marx, Lukács and Adorno.  
 
1.1 Domination as Alienation 
 
 These elements of Lefebvre’s thought have not been focused on because the 
majority of Anglophone commentary interprets Lefebvre’s Marxism in the context of 
the debate between Althusserian and humanist interpretations of Marx.486 Lefebvre is 
thus portrayed as a seminal Marxist-humanist theorist and as the ‘reign[ing] prophet of 
alienation.’487 Consequently, as can be seen in Jay, the ‘key concept of alienation’ is 
treated as ‘the centrepiece of his widely influential reading of Marx.’488 This depiction 
faithfully accounts for Lefebvre’s early writings, his polemics with Althusser, and also 
describes several of the characteristics of Lefebvre’s later theory of social domination. 
Yet this line of commentary is not concerned with a sustained examination of the 
content of Lefebvre’s Marxism, or with analysing how Lefebvre’s theory of alienation 
fits into his theory of the constitution of social domination. Finally, it does not address 
Lefebvre’s conception of fetishism or ‘concrete abstraction.’ This commentary is 
therefore not concerned with how Lefebvre’s interpretation of fetishism factors into 
his theory of the constitution and the constituent properties of social domination. 
Rather, by focusing on the thematic characteristics of alienation, it neglects that (a) 
Lefebvre’s earlier writings conceive of alienation in relation to the concrete abstraction 
of commodity fetishism in order to construct a theory of how domination is socially 
embedded,489 and (b) that Lefebvre’s later theoretical accounts move away from his 
                                                
486 See (Jay 1986), (Elden 2004), (Merrifield 2006), (Shields 1999), (Anderson 1979), 
(Shields 1999)  
487(Merrifield 2006, XXXII)  
488(Jay 1986) 
489 See for example Jay’s treatment of Lefebvre which: (1) relies entirely on his earlier 
works, such as Dialectical Materialism. (2) Refrains from discussing how Lefebvre 
conceives of the social constitution of alienation in his early work: ‘The general 
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classic Marxist-humanist theory of alienation to utilise other means of conceptualising 
domination in relation to Lefebvre’s theory of the concrete abstraction of fetishism.  
 
1.2 Specific Studies of Lefebvre 
 
 However, several recent works that examine the particular theoretical aspects 
of Lefebvre’s Marxism provide a solid basis from which to differentiate his 
interpretation of Marx from this thematic humanist interpretation.490 Greig Charnock’s 
Challenging New State Spatialities: The Open Marxism of Henri Lefebvre,491 points to the 
importance of dialectical critique, alienation and fetishism in Lefebvre’s Marxism.492 
John Roberts provides an incisive analysis of Lefebvre in his work on everyday life493; 
Lukas Stanek’s Henri Lefebvre on Space494 provides an excellent examination of how 
Lefebvre’s concept of abstract space draws on Lefebvre’s Hegelian Marxist idea of 
concrete abstraction. By doing so, Stanek provides an analysis of Lefebvre’s theory of 
social domination that does not simply treat it in terms of alienation. Yet Stanek does 
not show how Lefebvre’s concept of abstract space relates to Lefebvre’s earlier 
theories of concrete abstraction. Consequently, there is still room for a work that 
adequately focuses on the role that Lefebvre’s concept of concrete abstraction plays in 
the composition and characteristics of his theory of social domination, which I discuss 
in this chapter. In doing so I will also show how Lefebvre’s conception of fetishism and 
social domination has parallels with that of Marx, Lukács and Adorno.  
 I begin by discussing Lefebvre’s non-dogmatic and non-systematic interpretation 
of Marx, and outline his Hegelian-Marxist interpretation of Marx’s critical dialectical 
method and his theory of social constitution and social domination qua his 
interpretation of praxis and alienation. I then show how Lefebvre’s conception of 
                                                                                                                                          
argument of Dialectical Materialism, which has since become common coin among 
Marxist Humanists, does not bear repeating.’  
490 In addition (Merrifield 2006) includes a number of essays that focus on particular 
aspects of Lefebvre’s thought in conjunction with his interpretation of Marx. (Roberts 
2006) also provides an excellent discussion of Lefebvre in the context of theories of 
everyday life, while (Osborne 2011) touches upon Lefebvre’s theory. 
491(Charnock 2010) Such an emphasis also differentiates Lefebvre from his Marxist 
interpreters such as David Harvey. 
492 This is done by comparing the similarities Lefebvre’s thought has with the stream of 
thinkers in the school of ‘Open Marxism.’  
493(J. Roberts 2006) 
494(Stanek 2011) 
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fetishism fuses these elements to account for the constitution and constituent 
properties of fetishism as an autonomous and alien concrete abstraction that inverts to 
dominate, but not entirely determine social life. I draw out this interpretation by 
demonstrating how Lefebvre differentiates his conception of fetishism and social 
domination from Lukács and critical theory.  
 I then move to demonstrate how Lefebvre’s interpretation of the concrete 
abstraction of fetishism fits into his theory of social domination. I argue that it serves 
as the basis for three attempts in which Lefebvre tries to supplement his interpretation 
of Marx’s theory by providing an account of how domination is constructed, 
embedded and resisted in social life. I argue that phase one consists in the classic 
humanist Hegelian-Marxist phase of Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life.  In this phase, 
Lefebvre conceives social domination in everyday life by way of the constitution of the 
concrete abstraction of fetishism. He theorises the characteristics of domination in 
everyday life by linking it to the concrete abstraction of fetishism as the objective and 
subjective alienation of the human essence of the 'total man'.495  
 I then demonstrate that phase two consists of Lefebvre’s reformulation of the 
critique of everyday life. In this phase, Lefebvre moves away from his classic Marxist-
humanist conception of social domination. Lefebvre’s model of everyday life is 
rendered more complex and the notion of total man is replaced with a typology of 
social alienation. Finally, the central categories of Lefebvre’s Hegelian-Marxism are 
modified and augmented.  However, the notion of the concrete abstraction of 
fetishism still serves as the basis for the composition and characteristics of a typology 
of objective ‘terroristic forms’ of domination that are parallel to the concrete 
abstraction of commodity fetishism. Lefebvre’s writings on cities and space mark a 
third phase in the evolution of this strand. These writings provide an attempt to 
embed Lefebvre’s theoretical interests in more concrete forms by using his conception 
of ‘concrete abstraction’ to theorise how domination is constituted, socially embedded 
and opposed in the production of the urban form of cities. Finally, I show how his 
theory of the production of space synthesises these writings on cities and everyday life. 
In doing so, I consider how concrete abstraction is instantiated and resisted in social 
life through the category of abstract space. I also show how each of these phases of 
                                                
495 As I discuss below, this term is used in Lefebvre’s early work such as Dialectical 
Materialism and The Critique of Everyday Life to conceive of humanity in an un-alienated 
state. 
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Lefebvre’s theory is marked by what I term his dualistic opposition, which accounts for 
the internal resistance between form and content by way of a schematic opposition 
between quantity and quality.   
 I close by considering how these theories construe social domination and I 
provide some criticisms of Lefebvre’s methodology and conception of social 
domination. 
2. Lefebvre’s non-systematic Marxism 
 
 What I will term Lefebvre’s non-systematic interpretation of Marx is the basis 
for a voluminous and wide array of subjects that Lefebvre covered in the more than 60 
books that he authored. In these works, Marx‘s theory is ‘not a system or dogma’ for 
Lefebvre, but rather a ‘reference’496 and a ‘starting point that is indispensable for 
understanding the present-day world.’497 This is indicative of Lefebvre’s treatment of 
Marxism in which the ‘basic concepts have to be elaborated, refined, and 
complemented by other concepts where necessary.’498 As I will show, one strand of 
Lefebvre’s work concerns how these basic concepts are conceived, refined and 
complemented in his conception of fetishism and its role in his attempts to articulate 
how domination is socially instantiated. Before doing so I will provide an overview of 
the interpretation of Marx that Lefebvre draws on.  
Lefebvre’s interpretation of the relationship between Hegel and Marx forms 
the basis of his Marxism. This relationship is designated as ‘dialectical’ by Lefebvre. In 
making this claim Lefebvre states that Marx ‘continues’ and ‘breaks’, ‘extends’ and 
‘transforms’ the Hegelian method.499 This is particularly the case for logic and dialectics 
and ‘certain concepts (totality, negativity, alienation).’500 Such a characterisation is 
reflected in Lefebvre’s influential account of how Marx stands Hegel on his head. 
Whereas Hegel’s method is idealist and mystifies reality, Lefebvre holds that Marx’s 
dialectical materialist method uses the Hegelian categories of totality, negativity and 
alienation in his ‘radical critique’ of social praxis,501 thereby demonstrating ‘how 
                                                
496(Lefebvre 1988, 77) 
497(Lefebvre 1988, 77) 
498(Osborne 2011, 19)  
499(Lefebvre 1969, 25) 
500(Lefebvre 2009, 17)  
501(Lefebvre 1969, 4)   
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dialectical reason arises precisely from […] practical social activity, by man as he is in 
everyday life.’  
Due to this interpretation, the theories of praxis and alienation are central to 
Lefebvre’s interpretation of Marx. Praxis serves as a broad category which Lefebvre 
defines as the ‘dialectical relation between man and nature, consciousness and thing.’502 
This conception of praxis thus serves as Lefebvre’s underlying theory of how society is 
constituted as an objective and subjective social process that is a ‘manifestation’ of 
‘man’s practical activity, seen as a whole (praxis).’ Thus, in contrast to Hegel’s idealism, 
the Marxian category of praxis forms the basis of ‘true materialism’, and discloses the 
‘practical relations inherent in organized human existence and studies them inasmuch 
as they are concrete conditions of existence for cultures or ways of life.’503 The 
‘Fundamental idea’ of this conception of praxis is that ‘[s]ocial relationships (including 
juridical relations of ownership and property) constitute the core of the social whole.’ 
These relations also ‘structure it, [and] serve as intermediary (that which mediates) 
between the foundation or ‘substructure’ (the productive forces, the division of 
labour) and the ‘superstructures’ (institutions, ideologies.).’504 Thus Lefebvre’s 
conception of social constitution is based on this broad conception of social praxis.  
Alienation complements the category of praxis by articulating the constituent 
properties of all previous societies constituted by social praxis. This conception of 
alienation is likewise illustrated by Lefebvre’s comparison of Hegel with Marx. 
Whereas Hegel’s account of alienation in the Phenomenology is ‘a 'disguised' and 
mystified critical analysis of these essences and moments of the mind’,505 in Marx’s 
materialist conception of praxis, humanity is ‘alienated by being temporarily dominated 
by a world that is 'other' even though he himself gave birth to it, and [is therefore] 
equally real.’506 According to Lefebvre, Marx therefore modifies the Hegelian theory of 
alienation so as to conceive it as the ‘single yet dual movement of objectification and 
externalization – of realization and derealisation’. This means that while objectification 
is necessary – ‘he [man, i.e. humanity] must objectify himself’507 – it takes on an 
alienated form in capitalism, as ‘social objects become things, fetishes, which turn upon 
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him [‘man’].’508As a consequence, and as I will now show, in interpreting fetishism as a 
‘concrete abstraction’ Lefebvre fuses these theories of praxis and alienation, and 
thereby develops an account of Marx’s theory of the composition and characteristics 
of social domination. Lefebvre’s conception of fetishism entails this fusion because in 
his view, ‘[t]he economic theory of Fetishism takes up again, raises to a higher level 
and makes explicit the philosophical theory of alienation and the 'reification' of the 
individual.’509 Fetishism is thus conceived as a concrete abstraction that is constituted 
by social praxis and that is constitutive of social domination. 
 
2.1 Fetishism as Concrete Abstraction 
 
 This notion of fetishism as a concrete abstraction likewise stems from 
Lefebvre’s interpretation of Marx’s relationship to Hegel. Following from this contrast 
between idealism and praxis, the ‘starting point’ for such a conception of abstraction is 
not the mind but practical activity.’510 Thus social praxis, which consists of ‘social 
reality, i.e. interacting human individuals and groups’, constitutes appearances which are 
something more and else than mere illusions.’511 These ‘appearances are the modes in 
which human activities manifest themselves within the whole they constitute at any 
given moment.’512 They are therefore what Lefebvre terms ‘modalities of 
consciousness’, or ‘concrete abstractions’ because these forms are ‘abstract’ yet they 
are also ‘concrete’513 since they are constituted by social praxis. Consequently, these 
concrete abstractions are ‘the very basis of the objectivity of the economic, historical 
and social process which has led up to modern capitalism.’ Furthermore, they are 
indicative of capitalism, as within the latter they function as ‘practical power’.514 This is 
because these economic categories ‘have a concrete, objective reality: historically (as 
moments of the social reality) and actually (as elements of the social objectivity).’515 
These points are summarised in Lefebvre’s exposition of how the commodity is 
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composed by social relations. His discussion also signals how the commodity possesses 
the properties of social domination by inverting to mediate the relations that 
collectively constitute them where the objective and abstract properties that the 
commodity possesses are exemplary of Lefebvre’s interpretation of fetishism: 
 
 Once launched into existence, the commodity involves and envelops the social 
relations between living men. It develops, however, with its own laws and imposes its 
own consequences, and then men can enter into relations with one another only by 
way of products, through commodities and the market, through the currency and 
money. Human relations seem to be nothing more than relations between things. But 
this is far from being the case; or rather it is only partly true. In actual fact, the living 
relations between individuals in the different groups and between these groups 
themselves are made manifest by these relations between things: in money relations 
and the exchange of products. Conversely, these relations between things and abstract 
quantities are only the appearance and expression of human relations in a determinate 
mode of production, in which individuals (competitors) and groups (classes) are in 
conflict or contradiction. The direct and immediate relations of human individuals are 
enveloped and supplanted by mediate and abstract relations, which mask them. The 
objectivity of the commodity, the market and money is both an appearance and a 
reality. It tends to function as an objectivity independent of men.516 
 
 Consequently, fetishism is also treated by Lefebvre as being constitutive of 
social domination, as its abstract, autonomous, quantitative and alienated properties 
invert and thereby intervene in society:  
 
Fetishism properly so called only appeared when abstractions escaped the control of 
the thought and will of man.  Thus commercial value and money are only in themselves 
quantitative abstractions: abstract expressions of social, human relations; but these 
abstractions materialize, intervene as entities in social life and in history, and end by 
dominating instead of being dominated.517 
 
In Lefebvre’s interpretation, fetishism is not simply the property of the 
commodity, but is compounded in Marx’s analysis where its autonomous and inverted 
properties become more pronounced. Lefebvre perceives that in the deployment of 
each category in Marx’s presentation in Capital ‘there corresponds a new degree of 
economic objectivity’ which is ‘more real because it dominates living men more 
brutally’518 Thus, ‘more even than the commodity, money and capital weigh down on 
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human relations from outside.’519  Fetishism is therefore constitutive of a supra-
individual type of social domination. This domination is characterised as a state of 
inversion in which collectively constituted ‘objects therefore determine […] socio-
economic Becoming and the social activity.’ This is because ‘social objects, such as 
commodities’ and their exchange on ‘the market [exercise…] a power over human 
beings exactly like that of the realities of the uncontrolled sector of Nature.’520 As a 
result, the concrete abstractions of commodities, money and capital ‘impose certain 
determinations on activity’ and ‘continue to determine struggles and contradictions 
within man's activity,’ from which emerge the ‘struggles of certain powerful groups: the 
social classes.’521  
  This type of social domination thus imposes itself on both sides of the class 
relation. Capitalists are deprived of everything except money, while the ‘non-capitalist 
experiences a more brutal form of privation.’ This social situation is also indicative of 
the subjective aspect of alienation, human estrangement - where ‘the essence of man 
has been handed over to a thing, to money, to the fetish’522 - and is reflected in 
everyone being alienated from human community because they are compelled to act as 
atomised individuals and to treat each other as means or instruments of self-
perpetuation.  
 Fetishism is therefore interpreted by Lefebvre as a socially constituted 
concrete abstraction that functions as an alienated, quantified, autonomous and 
inverted form of social domination mediating and compelling individuals’ action.  
 However, Lefebvre also posits limits to the extent of domination, and through 
doing so he distinguishes himself from Lukács and critical theory. This is indicated in 
Lefebvre’s description of social inversion as ‘intervening’ by ‘trying to determine’ 
individuals, which I will now bring out by highlighting how Lefebvre contrasts himself 
with Lukács and the critical theory, and what I will term the dualistic opposition that 
Lefebvre views as indicative of sociality. 
 Lefebvre was quite critical about the systemisation and pervasiveness of Lukács’ 
theory of reification. This can be seen on a theoretical level where Lefebvre argues 
that the ‘very important observations by Marx are not to be systematized as a single 
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theory of reification, which according to some constitutes the essence of Capital and of 
Marxism generally.’523 Consequently, Lefebvre asserts that ‘the thesis of reification 
misinterprets the essential meaning of the socio-economic theory expounded in 
Capital.’524 This is due to the fact that Lefebvre held that Lukács’ systematic theory of 
reification was too determinate. For although Lukács, in Lefebvre’s analysis, was 
cognisant of the autonomous properties of fetishism,525 he did not realise that this 
process of inversion and determination has a limit: 
 
The logic of commodities, however, for all its encroachments upon praxis and its 
complex interactions with other forms of society and consciousness does not succeed 
in forming a permanent, closed system. With its complex determinations human 
labour is not entirely taken over by this form, does not become an inherent element 
of its content.526  
 
 These different theoretical interpretations of Marx have repercussions as 
regards the way in which Lefebvre contrasts Lukács’ Marxian theory of social 
domination with his own.  On the one hand, Lefebvre charges that ‘the school of 
Lukács has overestimated the theory of reification to the point of making it the 
foundation of a philosophy and sociology (the two are regarded as identical in this 
systematization).’527 Lukács’ social theory is thus a purely speculative construction on 
the part of a philosopher ‘unacquainted with the working class’, entailing that ‘the 
proletariat’s class consciousness replaces classical philosophy.’528 This is likewise the 
case for the critical theory, which, like Lukács’ theory, is held by Lefebvre to work only 
at the level of words and ideas, and on the basis of a systemised conception of the 
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moribund category of ideology.529 On the other hand, in opposition to Lukács and the 
critical theory, Lefebvre’s theory of social domination accounts for the problems 
Lefebvre identifies in Lukács and in the critical theory by conceiving of an internal 
opposition between these abstract and autonomous fetishistic social forms and the 
content they cannot entirely determine.  
 It is this internal opposition that forms the basis for what I will term Lefebvre’s 
dualistic opposition between quantity and quality, in which quantified, fetishistic 
abstractions cannot entirely grasp or determine their qualitative content. Lefebvre is 
always adamant that qualitative content cannot be subsumed by quantitative forms: ‘it 
must not be forgotten that, underneath the formal appearances, the contents 
persists.’530 Therefore in contrast to Lukács, Lefebvre’s idea of internal opposition 
stresses that the ‘the abstract thing, the form (commodity, money, capital) cannot 
carry the process of reification (‘thingification’) to its conclusion.’531 This is because ‘[i]t 
cannot free itself from the human relationships it tends to delineate, to distort, and to 
change into relations between things. It cannot fully exist qua thing.’532 As a result, this 
process ‘[d]oes not impose an entirely closed system. Human labour is not entirely 
taken over by form.’533 Instead ‘the world of commodities makes its way into praxis, 
penetrating it if not taking it over entirely.’ Therefore, ‘[h]uman beings do not become 
things’.  For Lefevbre ‘this takes place only under slavery’. Rather ‘what is more likely 
is that human beings would be turned into animated abstractions, living, breathing, 
suffering fictions, did they not put up dramatic resistance to this process.’534 
 Lefebvre’s Marxism thus consists in a non-systematic Hegelian interpretation of 
Marx, in which Marx reformulates important aspects of Hegel’s idealism in his 
dialectical materialist account of social praxis and alienation. Such an interpretation is 
reflected in Lefebvre’s conception of fetishism as a concrete abstraction, which he 
argues Marx used to articulate the social constitution of the concrete abstractions of 
commodities, money and capital. At the same time, Lefebvre’s interpretation of 
fetishism is also constitutive of how he construes social domination. In his view, the 
                                                
529 ‘The fact is that the long-obsolescent notion of ideology is now truly on its last legs, 
even if critical theory still holds it to be necessary.’ (Lefebvre 1992, 44)  
530(Lefebvre 1969, 49)  
531(Lefebvre 1969, 47)  
532(Lefebvre 1969, 47)  
533(Lefebvre 1969, 47)  
534(Lefebvre 1969, 100)  
  
172 
characteristics of the autonomous, inverted, alienated and alienating social domination 
of capitalism intervenes in social life mediating and compelling individual action. 
However, Lefebvre also posits that qualitative content always internally opposes these 
quantitative forms, and that it resists becoming entirely determined by them 
preventing the transformation of humans into things. This interpretation of Marx 
serves as ‘the starting point’ that Lefebvre ‘refines’ and ‘complements’ in his attempts 
to conceive of how domination is socially embedded535 and resisted in the socially 
complex categories of everyday life, urban forms and social spaces. In what follows I 
focus on how Lefebvre’s interpretation of the constituting and constitutive aspects of 
the concrete abstraction of fetishism are drawn on and articulated in three such 
attempts. 
 Before doing so, however, it will be important to consider the context in which 
these attempts were formulated. 
As Stefan Kipfer has argued, Lefebvre’s politics shifted in response to his 
historical context.536 The same can be said of Lefebvre’s attempts to supplement his 
interpretation of Marx by conceiving how domination is embedded in social life. 
Lefebvre first came into contact with Marx and Hegel through the surrealists in 
the 1930’s. In that decade, Lefebvre and Norbert Guterman also published the first 
French translation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and the first French 
work of Hegelian Marxism: La Conscience Mystifiée, which fused Marx’s idea of 
mystification with Hegel’s unhappy consciousness. During this time Lefebvre also 
wrote the unpublished fragment: Notes on Everyday Life. 
Following a period in which Lefebvre served as the leading intellectual and 
polemicist of the French communist party (PCF), his ties to the party were severed. 
This freed Lefebvre, allowing him to re-engage with his earlier Hegelian interpretation 
of Marx. It also led him to stress a non-dogmatic and non-systematic Hegelian Marxism 
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guardism in the 1950s and 1960s; (3) a brief flirtation with the alternative Communism 
of Yugoslavia and China; and (4) his contribution to New Left politics in France both 
before and after 1968. In (Kipfer 2008, 232)  
 
  
173 
that focused on areas of social life that were anathema to party doctrine. Lefebvre’s 
project of the critique of everyday life and his utilisation of the theory of alienation are 
the prime examples of Lefebvre’s writings during this period. 
Lefebvre’s reformulation of the critique of everyday life occurred in the 
context of his engagement with the Situationists and the New Left in the 1960s. 
Lefebvre’s writings in this context incorporated the theoretical and political concerns 
of the 1960s, such as consumer societies, the bureaucratic state and the emergence of 
new social movements. This is reflected in his reformulation of social domination and 
the fragmentation and jettisoning of the explanatory power of the theory of alienation.   
These influences are also evident in Lefebvre’s writings on Cities and Space, 
which led Lefebvre to once again reformulate his theory of how capitalism is 
instantiated in social life and his concurrent conception of domination.  
It is to the first of these attempts that I now turn. 
 
  3. The Critique of Everyday Life 
 
 The critique of everyday life is perhaps Lefebvre’s most widely known 
theoretical endeavour and consists of three volumes that were published over the 
course of 50 years. Since these volumes do not encapsulate one sustained critique but 
consist in several phases in which Lefebvre offers different formulations of the critique 
of everyday life, I separate them into what I term the early classic Marxist humanist 
phase of the critique, and his later revision of the critique in the 1960s.537   
 
3.1 Notes for a Critique of Everyday Life 
 
 Two passages in Mystification: Notes for a Critique of Everyday Life show the way 
fetishism is utilised as a basis to articulate the initial formulation of the category of 
everyday life. In this phase, Lefebvre conceives domination in terms of the objective 
and subjective properties of alienation. Fetishism is used to demonstrate the social 
genesis of alienation. Its properties are also used as a basis for how Lefebvre extends 
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his interpretation of Marx’s theory of alienation by conceiving of other types of 
alienation. The former can be seen in Lefebvre’s remark that ‘[t]he theory of fetishism 
contained in Marx’s work explains how the phenomena of alienation and mystification 
are possible’538 due to the specific way that capitalist production creates the alienated 
abstract and autonomous fetishistic form of commodities: 
 
 Capitalism is a system for producing merchandise. When it turns into 
merchandise, the object becomes detached from itself, so to speak, it enters a system 
of relationships that are expressed through it, so that in the end it seems to be the 
subject of these relationships, their causal agent. Relationships between men are 
masked by relationships between objects, human social existence is realized only by 
the abstract existence of their products. Objects seem to take on a life of their own.539   
 
These forms of merchandise grant the world, social relationships collectively create, an 
‘alien power’540 that dominates human beings rendering them in a state of alienation: 
 
The market dominates human beings; they become the plaything of anything with 
which they are unfamiliar, and which sweeps them along. The market is already a 
machine and an inexorable destiny. People are now alienated, divided from themselves. 
Divisions of labour, labour itself, individual roles and functions, the distribution of 
work, culture and traditions, all impose themselves as constraints. Each person 
experiences the collective achievements of society as the work of an alien power.541  
 
 Consequently, ‘this insane, indissoluble will of the fetish by which we are 
compelled to live’542 is used by Lefebvre to provide the basis for what he envisions as a 
study of the ways in which these dominating properties of alienation are instantiated in 
the everyday life of capitalist society. Such a study is based on Lefebvre’s interpretation 
of the Hegelian category of ‘mystified consciousness’ and the Marxian one of 
alienation. It will focus on the way that human social praxis constitutes alienated, 
fetishistic forms that invert, dominate and alienate humanity in social life: ‘Alienation, 
that real abstraction, that false life that exists only through him and feeds on man - the 
‘human’ that has lost its way on the road towards his realization - inevitably is 
dispersal, and a mutual exteriority of the elements of culture.’543  
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3.2 The Critique of Everyday Life 
 
 This relationship between fetishism, alienation and everyday life is drawn out in 
Lefebvre’s first extended attempt to theorise how domination is embodied in the lived 
social and cultural forms of capitalist society in the first volume of The Critique of 
Everyday Life.544 
  This work also contains Lefebvre’s first formulation of the category of ‘everyday 
life’, which is designed to supplement Marx’s analysis by capturing how capitalism is 
instantiated and resisted in social life. Everyday life is thus defined as a ‘residual 
category’545 embedded and dialectically related to the ‘socio-economic formation.’546 
Such a residual category is ‘profoundly related to all activities, and encompasses them 
with all their differences and their conflicts; it is their meeting place, their bond, their 
common ground.’547 Accordingly, everyday life is where ‘the sum total of relations 
which make the human – and every human being – a whole takes its shape and its 
form. In it is expressed and fulfilled those relations which bring into play the totality of 
the real.’548  
  Lefebvre’s account of the composition and characteristics of domination are 
substantiated through his interpretation of fetishism. As he outlined in Notes for a 
Critique of Everyday life, this interpretation accounts for the constitution of social 
domination in everyday life, whilst its properties provide a model through which to 
theorise other forms of social alienation.  
 These kinds of alienation are premised on Lefebvre’s account of the relationship 
between fetishism and alienation and its role in social constitution. In the case of the 
former, fetishism is what links the young and old Marx:549 ‘The theory of alienation 
becomes transformed into the theory of fetishism (fetishism of commodities, money, 
capital).’550 For the latter, fetishism, according to Lefebvre, discloses how social 
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relations create alienated fetish-forms that invert to dominate both sides of the class 
relation: 
 
Money, currency, commodities, capital are nothing more than relations between 
human beings (between ‘individual,’ qualitative human tasks). And yet these relations 
take on the appearance and the form of things external to human beings. The 
appearance becomes reality; because men believe that these ‘fetishes’ exist outside of 
themselves they really do function like objective things. Human activities are swept 
along and torn from their own reality and consciousness, and become subservient to 
these things. Humanly speaking, someone who thinks only of getting rich is living his 
life subjected to a thing, namely, money. But more than this, the proletarian, whose life 
is used as a means for the accumulation of capital, is thrown to the mercy of an 
external power.551  
 
 The theory of fetishism therefore establishes how alienation is constituted in 
everyday life by accounting for the social processes that create it.  
 Furthermore, since everybody ‘moves within fetishism as a mode of existence 
and of consciousness’, the ‘theory of fetishism’ also ‘demonstrates the economic, 
everyday basis of the philosophical theories of mystification and alienation.’552  
 Lefebvre’s conception of social domination in Critique of Everyday Life is thus 
centred on the relationship between fetishism and his classical Hegelian-Marxist 
humanist conception of alienation, in which alienation consists in the notion that 
capitalist social praxis produces alien and abstract forms that try to dominate society. 
In doing so, they alienate humanity from its own essence. 
 Lefebvre proposes to study this mode of existence by outlining several types of 
social alienation that draw on and supplement Marx’s theory. Fetishism is conceived as 
one of these types of alienation – economic alienation – and is placed alongside other 
types of social alienation.553 These other types – individuality and private 
consciousness, mystifications and mystified consciousness, money-fetishism and 
economic alienation, the critique of needs, psychological and moral alienation, the 
alienation of the worker and man – mirror the properties of fetishism and attest to the 
myriad ways in which the society that humans collectively produce dominates and 
alienates them.  As a whole these types of domination disclose that ‘alienation is 
constant and everyday’, and articulate the ‘way a dehumanized, brutally objective power 
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holds sway over all social life; according to its differing aspects, we have named it: 
money, fragmented division of labour, market, capital, mystification and deprivation 
etc.’554 These forms of alienation are also granted subjective counterparts. Brought 
together, they culminate in a proto-existential situation of alienated domination that 
suffuses everyday life where ‘man is torn from his self, from his own nature, from his 
consciousness dragged down and dehumanized by his own social products,’555 so that 
‘alienation appears in day-to-day life, the life of the proletarian and even of the petty 
bourgeois and the capitalist (the difference being the capitalists collaborate with 
alienation’s dehumanizing power.’556  
 However, everyday life is also the point where Lefebvre’s dualistic opposition 
resides. In his early work, this dualistic opposition is understood to occur between the 
alienating forms that seek to dominate everyday life, which are paired with the 
quantifying and abstract aspects of the commodity, and the qualitatively humane ways 
in which this unsuccessful attempt at total domination is resisted.  
Opposed to these forms of alienation stands the qualitative side of Lefebvre’s 
dualistic opposition between quantity and quality. Lefebvre identifies a myriad of 
qualitative moments that are present in capitalist society that resist determination.557 
These oppositions are premised on the wide-ranging capacities of the ‘total man’, 
leading Lefebvre to designate different phenomena such as political and social 
institutions, human needs and creativity as qualitative forms of opposition. Some of 
these are stated in a dualistic manner by Lefebvre ‘as an opposition and “contrast” 
between a certain number of terms: everyday life and festival—mass moments and 
exceptional moments – triviality and splendour – seriousness and play, reality and 
dreams, etc.’558 As a whole, the social state of alienation is construed as part of the 
necessary process of historical ‘becoming’, in which the criticism of alienation will lead 
to its overcoming and the development of the total man, in which alienation will be 
overcome and humanity will be at one with its essence.559  
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 In sum, Lefebvre’s first formulation of the critique of everyday life is centred on 
an account of how capitalist social praxis constitutes alien and abstract fetishistic social 
forms that dominate sociality and alienate humanity from its own essence within 
everyday life. At the same time, these abstract forms are not entirely determinant and 
are opposed by the qualitative contents of human society. This classic Marxist-
humanist formulation thus extends Lefebvre’s interpretation of Marx to the realm of 
social life through the residual category of the everyday and his utilisation of fetishism. 
However, this classical humanist model is modified in Lefebvre’s second formulation of 
the critique of everyday life.   
 
4 The Critique of Everyday Life in the 1960s 
 
 Lefebvre re-envisioned his project of the critique of everyday life 15 years after 
the first volume was published. Critique of Everyday Life Volume II and Everyday life in the 
Modern World are indicative of a contextual and theoretical shift in Lefebvre’s project. 
They also reflect the development of French consumer society and Lefebvre’s dialogue 
with the Situationists and with other members of the French avant-garde. Both of 
these contextual influences are captured in Lefebvre’s adoption of Guy Debord’s 
contention that everyday life has been ‘literally colonized’560 by commodification.  
 Volume Two of the Critique thus represent the second phase of Lefebvre’s 
attempt to reformulate and supplement Marx’s categories and analysis by providing 
methodological foundations for Lefebvre’s reformulation of the critique of everyday 
life. Everyday Life in the Modern World provides an analysis of capitalist social domination 
that reflects this reformulation. Taken together, these volumes provide a more 
complex and fragmented account of social domination in everyday life. However, such 
a theory still relies on Lefebvre’s interpretation of fetishism accounting for the 
constitution and the constituent properties of concrete abstractions as what he terms 
terrorist forms of domination.  
 
4.1 Critique of Everyday Life Volume II 
 
                                                                                                                                          
level, objects are not simply means or implements; by producing them, men are 
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 Critique of Everyday Life Volume two reformulates Lefebvre’s project by outlining 
the ‘foundations for a sociology of everyday life’. These foundations are intended to 
join the Hegelian-Marxian themes of Lefebvre’s project with social complexity, as 
based on Lefebvre’s new understanding of his Hegelian-Marxism as a meta-philosophy. 
This reflects the sense in which Lefebvre was using the central concepts drawn from 
his Hegelian-Marxism to investigate social phenomena. Lefebvre’s reformulation of the 
critique of everyday life thus modifies the classic Marxist humanism of Volume One by: 
(1) amending the Hegelian-Marxist categories central to the first critique of everyday 
life and integrating them with theories taken from contemporary theoretical 
developments, such as linguistics and structuralism to provide a more extensive object 
of study; 561  (2) jettisoning the category of ‘total man’ as the basis of his conception of 
subjective domination; and (3) redefining everyday life as a level of social reality.   
 Lefebvre’s revision of the categories of praxis and alienation are integral aspects 
of this reformulation of the critique of everyday life. In both cases, Lefebvre charges his 
original formulation of these categories as being too simplistic. He argues that they can 
be rendered more complex by developing a typology of these categories. 
 Praxis thus ‘reveals an extreme complexity on very varied levels.’562 These levels 
form a totality that encompasses ‘both material production and spiritual production’ 
inclusive of the Marxian categories of the base and superstructure. All of these levels 
structure, mediate or intervene in everyday life, which is the level where a ‘range of 
effective representations, symbols, regulations, controls, models and norms which 
intervene to regulate it.’563 The typology of praxis that Lefebvre proposes thus 
constitutes this array of phenomena that intervene in everyday life. This intervention is 
constitutive of what he terms utilitarian and fetishistic consciousness, where these 
‘received representations […] are not recognized as the results of history and 
functions of an entire society.’564 
 This level is also constitutive of ‘fetishistic practice’ and ‘repetitive praxis’ which 
are formulated in Lefebvre’s revision of alienation. In this reformulation Lefebvre 
                                                
561 A summary of the complex foundations Lefebvre elaborates to critique this level 
are beyond the confines of this thesis. Furthermore many of them are not even taken 
up by Lefebvre in Everyday Life in the Modern World. For these reasons I focus on how 
Lefebvre amends his Hegelian-Marxism in these volumes of the critique of everyday 
life.561 
562(Lefebvre 2008b, 237)  
563(Lefebvre 2008b, 236)    
564(Lefebvre 2008b, 243)    
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argues that Marx’s theory of alienation focused on one specific type of alienation – 
fetishism – to the detriment of other types.565 Lefebvre proposes to supplement this 
objective sense of alienation (as a mode of socially constituted alienated and inverted 
social domination) by moving to elaborate a typology. The typology that Lefebvre 
proposes also addresses his criticism of Lukács’ sociological deficit. In contrast to 
reification, which Lefebvre argues ‘disguises the many forms alienation adopts’,566 
Lefebvre argues that alienation is ‘infinitely complex.’567 He proposes that other forms 
of alienation which range from the state to the alienation of women, children, social 
groups, the ruling class and technology should be taken into account without 
subsuming them and treating them as one type.568 This typology of alienation thus 
distinguishes between everyday alienation, reification, political alienation and others.569  
 As part of this revision of alienation, Lefebvre also builds on his conviction that 
alienation can never be totalised. He outlines a dialectic of alienation – dis-alienation – 
new alienation, which, he contends, exemplifies everyday life in capitalist society. In this 
way alienation is never conceived as total, and it never determines or entirely captures 
human social activity. 
 This reformulation of alienation is embodied in Lefebvre’s new conception of 
everyday life. On this level, Lefebvre’s dualistic opposition is no longer considered in 
terms of alienated and non-alienated essence. It is now construed in the opposition 
between the category of the everyday (which consists in abstract quantifying forms of 
domination) and everydayness (which entails qualitative needs, desires and possibility). 
This opposition is extended to a number of new everyday phenomena that Lefebvre 
introduces into his account. These phenomena are instances of the way in which 
society mediates individuals, thereby enclosing them in abstract everydayness through 
which individuals resist in a qualitative manner. These phenomena reflect the influence 
of other thinkers on Lefebvre, as they include the Nietzschean oppositions between 
                                                
565 ‘Marx tended to push the many forms of alienation to one side so as to give one 
specific definition in terms of the extreme case he chose to study: the transformation 
of man’s activities and relations into things by the action of economic fetishes […] 
reduced to economic alienation within and by capitalism, alienation would disappear 
completely and in one blow.’ (Lefebvre 2008b, 207)     
566(Lefebvre 2008b, 208)    
567(Lefebvre 2008b, 208) 
568(Lefebvre 2008b, 209)    
569 Lefebvre also proposes defining these types in terms of the distinctions Marx makes 
between Entfremdung, Entäusserung, Verdinlichung etc.  
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repetition and creativity, and types of quantitative and cyclical time.570  
 These amendments are characterised in a Hegelian-Marxist vein by designating 
everyday life as the content of this variety of abstract forms. This opposition between 
form and content is also representative of the dialectic of alienation-dis-alienation. It is 
also reflective of the dual opposition between everyday and everydayness in which 
fetishistic concrete abstractions are constitutive of everyday life but they cannot fully 
determine the content of social activity:   
 
In the everyday, alienations, fetishisms and reifications (deriving from money and 
commodities) all have their various effects. At the same time, when (up to a certain 
point) everyday needs become desires, they come across goods and appropriate them. 
Therefore critical study of everyday life will reveal the following conflict: maximum 
alienation and relative disalienation […] The theory of alienation and reification must 
take this dialectic into account if it is not to lapse into that speculative form of 
reification known as dogmatism. There is a ‘world’ of objects, but it is also a human 
world, and an area of desires and goods, an area of possibilities, and not simply a 
‘world’ of inert things.571 
    
 Critique of Everyday Life Volume II thus lays out Lefebvre’s revision of the critique 
of everyday life by transforming the categories of praxis and alienation into a series of 
types aimed at capturing the complexity of everyday life. However, it never goes past 
the point of proposing ways of studying these phenomena, or of applying them to an 
analysis of social domination. However, these revisions to Lefebvre’s conception of 
everyday life and the fragmented status of alienation are reflected in Everyday Life in the 
Modern World.  
 
4.2 Everyday Life in the Modern World 
  
 This is because the Hegelian-Marxian elements of Lefebvre’s reformulation of the 
Critique of Everyday Life are drawn out in comments on contemporary capitalism. His 
definition of the latter – ‘forced bureaucratic consumption’ – reflects the concerns 
with consumer society and bureaucracy outlined in volume II. These elements of 
Lefebvre’s analysis of society are enumerated in terms of the historically 
unprecedented quantitative economic expansion that has produced ‘little change’ in 
the class relation. Rather, for Lefebvre, such an expansion has led to the administration 
                                                
570 For example see (Lefebvre 2008b, 47-51) 
571(Lefebvre 2008b, 66-67)  
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and institutionalisation of social life and the attempted systemisation and control of 
everyday life.  
 Lefebvre provides an analysis of this phase of capitalism by conceiving of different 
social phenomena he sees as indicative of what he terms ‘terroristic forms of 
domination.’ These forms are indicative of ‘terrorist society’ and exemplify ‘forced 
bureaucratic consumption.’ As a whole, ‘terrorist society’ consists of: (a) social 
production that is oriented for the ends of one class, impoverishing the other class;  
(b) widespread biological, physiological, natural educational and developmental 
repression; (c) the phenomena described by Lefebvre’s fragmented and revised 
typology of alienation; (d)  the reproduction of (a)(b) and (c) through ideology and 
compulsion in everyday life. These factors lead to the diffuse nature of ‘terrorist 
society’ in which ‘pressure is exerted from all sides on its members’ and ‘comes from 
everywhere and from every specific thing; the system’ and is ‘submit[ting] every 
member to the whole.’572   
 Lefebvre’s study of terrorist forms aims to understand ‘the conditions from 
which terrorism arises.’573 Once again, these terrorist forms reflect Lefebvre’s 
conception of fetishism as a concrete abstraction. They are conceived as constituted 
by the logic of the concrete abstraction of the commodity world,574 whilst their 
properties are established through analogy with the properties of the concrete 
abstraction of the fetishism of the commodity form.575 He proposes to conduct this 
                                                
572(Lefebvre 1984, 47)   
573(Lefebvre 1984,150)   
574 ‘The following theory taken from Marx’s Das Kapital seems apt and conclusive: 
trade is a form, distinct from its contents (social labour), and its contingent retinue 
(negotiations, palavers, words and sentences, gestures and rituals). This dialectical 
theory reduces the act of trading to its simple form […] such a form, furthermore, is 
only isolated from its content and contingencies at a first operation […] this allows the 
linking of form to a gradual emergence and creation of its own social experience so 
that it becomes, in fact, the experience […] trade as a form contains a logic; as the 
product of labour it produces sequences, intelligibly linked actions; it is both a social 
and an intellectual phenomenon.’ (Lefebvre 1984, 104-105)  
575 ‘Our inquiry into the manner in which forms exist has led to an investigation of 
social reality. Ought we to reconsider and modify our concept of 'reality'? The 
existence and the effects of forms are unlike those of sensorial objects, technical 
objects, metaphysical substances or 'pure' abstractions; though they are abstract they 
are none the less intellectual and social objects, they require sensorial, material and 
practical foundations but cannot be identified with such vehicles. Thus trade value 
requires an object (a product) and a comparison between objects in order to appear 
and express its content which is productive collective labour and a comparison 
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study by transforming the residual category of everyday life into ‘space.’ For Lefebvre, 
everyday life is now the space where these terrorist forms of capitalism are embedded 
in what he terms the ‘lived.’ 
 These forms and the space that they ‘infiltrate’ are thus representative of 
Lefebvre’s dualistic opposition between the everyday and everydayness, quantity and 
quality. One example of this can be seen in the following opposition between two 
‘distinct’ types of leisure: the quantitative type, in which ‘leisure’ is ‘integrated with 
everyday life (the perusal of daily papers, television etc.) and is conducive to profound 
discontent, and the qualitative side; ‘the prospect of departure, the demand for 
evasion, the will to escape through worldliness, holidays, LSD, debauchery of 
madness.’576  
  On the quantitative side stands Lefebvre’s revised diagnosis of alienated sociality, 
which is exemplary of the typology proposed in volume two.577 In this society of forced 
bureaucratic consumption, alienation has become a ‘social practice’.578 Everyday life is 
now the site where this social practice tries to integrate people into the ‘[a]bstract, 
quantitative ‘pure formal space’ that defines the world of terror[istic]579 forms which is 
not the space of false consciousness but of true consciousness or of the conscience of 
reality, isolated from possibility.’580 Such terrorist forms are inclusive of commodified, 
pervasive and administered society. They also reflect Lefebvre’s adaptation of 
                                                                                                                                          
between labours. However, object and content without form have neither a 
specifically intellectual nor a specifically social reality. To a certain extent form defines 
a thing's significance; yet it possesses something both more and less, some thing 
different from what is signified; it constitutes an object's significance but also 
appropriates it, allows itself to be signified and absorbs the signifier […] They are real 
but not in the terms of other types of reality; they are projected on the screen of 
everyday life without which they would have nothing to explore, define and organize.’ 
(Lefebvre 1984, 186)   
576(Lefebvre 1984, 85)   
577 ‘The theory of alienation is reputed to be out of date; indeed, certain forms of 
alienation may perhaps have vanished […] New types of alienation have joined ranks 
with the old, enriching the typology of alienation; political, ideological, technological, 
bureaucratic, urban etc. We would suggest that alienation is spreading and becoming 
so powerful that it obliterates all trace or consciousness of alienation […] what is new 
is that the theory of alienation […] has become a social practice, a class strategy 
whereby philosophy and history are set aside so as to confuse the issue and 
successfully inhibit any consciousness of the actual state of total alienation.’ (Lefebvre 
1984, 94)   
578(Lefebvre 1984, 94)  
579(Lefebvre 1984, 77)     
580(Lefebvre 1984, 89)    
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structuralist methodology and include exchange, maths, writing, linguistics, contracts 
and practical-sensorial objects.  Yet these terrorist forms cannot reduce the 
‘irreducible’ qualitative aspects of the lived.581 For while these forms aspire to a 
concrete existence they are ultimately reliant on human social actions that they cannot 
entirely determine. Since the interrelation between these forms is not total,582 these 
forms cannot determine content. Ultimately, these forms ‘simultaneously organize’ 
everyday life and ‘are projected upon it, but their concerted efforts cannot reduce it; 
residual and irreducible, it eludes all attempts at institutionalization, it evades the grip 
of forms.’  
  Lefebvre’s re-envisioning of the critique of everyday life in the 1960s as another 
attempt to supplement and revise Marx’s analysis thus moves away from his classic 
Marxist humanism. The theory of alienation is fragmented on an objective level and 
supplanted on a subjective level by the jettisoning of the ‘total man’. Yet at the same 
time, there are continuities in Lefebvre’s attempt to conceive of (1) the constitution 
and constituent properties of a complex socially embedded theory of domination in 
analogy with the properties of the concrete abstraction of commodity fetishism and 
(2) an internal opposition between form and content and quantity and quality in 
everyday life demonstrating that the concrete abstractions are not entirely 
determinate. As I will now show, Lefebvre’s work on cities and space represents 
Lefebvre’s attempt to transpose these elements to the categories of the urban form 
and of abstract space in order to articulate a more concrete theory of how 
domination is socially instantiated in conjunction with concrete abstraction. These 
theories situate the everyday in a more sophisticated analysis of social life. At the same 
time, they further supplement Marx’s analysis, by providing a theory of the social 
spaces that concrete abstractions pervade and interrelate with.  
 
5. Fetishism and Social Domination in Cities and Space. 
 
                                                
581(Lefebvre 1984, 189) 
582(Lefebvre 1984, 188) See also: ‘There is no single absolute chosen system but only 
sub-systems separated by cracks, gaps and lacunae; forms do not converge, they have 
no grip on the content and cannot reduce it permanently; the irreducible crops up 
after each reduction […] only a relative, temporary reduction can be achieved […] 
urban life is the setting for this.’ (Lefebvre 1984, 190)  
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5.1 The Urban Form 
 
 Lefebvre’s writings on urbanisation and cities were undertaken shortly after the 
publication of Critique of Everyday Life Volume II and Everyday Life in the Modern World. In 
these works Lefebvre examines the historic and social process of what he refers to as 
the ‘urban revolution.’ In order to do so, Lefebvre employs many of the same aspects 
of his metaphilosophical Hegelian-Marxism that he brought to the Critique of Everyday 
Life. In particular, he conceptualises this historical and social process by adapting his 
interpretation of Marx’s theory of fetishism – an interpretation that treats the latter as 
a socially constituted, concrete abstraction that constitutes society – and uses this in 
order to characterise the urbanisation of cities. This urbanisation is then opposed to a 
qualitative idea of urban dwelling.   
 This can be seen in Lefebvre’s designation of what he terms the ‘urban form’ as a 
concrete abstraction. For Lefebvre, the ‘urban form’ is the result of the ‘urban 
revolution’ of social space that has occurred in the contemporary phase of capitalism. 
This process has modified the relationship between town and country as well as the 
structure of cities and has remodelled all of them in the image of ‘industrial 
urbanisation.’ This process of industrial urbanisation corresponds to the Keynesian 
state-capitalist mode of production imposed upon urban spaces. Urbanisation 
homogenises urban regions, rendering previously distinct and localised areas into one 
undifferentiated abstract mass of space. This space swallows up and obliterates city 
neighbourhoods and the historical difference between the town and country.583  
 Urbanisation is implemented by what Lefebvre refers to as ‘Urbanism’. He 
defines this as ‘the form of organisational capital […] in other words, a bureaucratic 
society of controlled consumption’ that supplements ‘the logic of commodities’ because it 
                                                
583 Lefebvre periodises this historical development as follows: ‘First period. Industry 
and the process of industrialization assault and ravage pre-existing urban reality, 
destroying it through practice and ideology, to the point of extirpating it from reality 
and consciousness. Led by a class strategy, industrialisation acts as a negative force 
over urban reality: the urban social is denied by the industrial economic. Second 
period (in part juxtaposed to the first). Urbanization spreads and urban society 
becomes general. Urban reality, in and by its own destruction makes itself 
acknowledged as socio-economic reality. One discovers that the whole society is liable 
to fall apart if it lacks the city and centrality: an essential means for the planned 
organization of production and consumption has disappeared.’ (Lefebvre 2003, 81)  
  
186 
‘controls consumption of space and habitat’584 The urban form is therefore a concrete 
abstraction because it is constituted in tandem with the neo-capitalist state, and 
mirrors its characteristics. It resides in the place where production becomes 
socialised, and where social relationships occur.585 Consequently, urbanisation is a 
concrete abstraction constituted by social praxis, which possesses abstract, 
quantitative properties that intervene in social life: 
 
The urban is, therefore, pure form: a place of encounter, assembly, simultaneity. This 
form has no specific content but is a centre of attraction and life. It is an abstraction, 
but unlike a metaphysical entity, the urban is a concrete abstraction, associated with 
practice. Living creatures, the products of industry, technology of wealth, works of 
culture, ways of living, situations, the modulations and ruptures of the everyday- the 
urban accumulates all content.586  
 
 This abstract urban form is embedded in several levels of social space. This 
theorisation of social space articulates Lefebvre’s attempt to situate everyday life 
alongside the function and pervasiveness of the ‘logical’ function of other concrete 
abstractions, such as the world of commodities, the state and the urban space that 
they inhabit.   
 The first level of the urban form is thus the level of the concrete abstractions of 
exchange, networks and urban phenomena. This is the level shaped by the logic of 
these abstractions, which as abstract alien forms try to dominate urban life. This level 
is thus the level of the form of organised capital, consisting in the ‘totalizing repressive 
space of the logic of commodities present in every object that is bought, sold and 
consumed’ as well as the logic of urbanism and of the state-planned bureaucratic 
society of controlled consumption.  
 The second level consists in the social terrain that these abstractions inhabit. 
Like the category of everyday life, what Lefebvre terms the ‘urban fabric’ can be said to 
consist in how these abstractions are embedded in the constitutive structure and 
                                                
584(Lefebvre 2003, 164)   
585 ‘Space is no longer only an indifferent medium, the sum of places where surplus 
value is created, realized, and distributed. It becomes the product of social labour, the 
very general object of production, and consequently of the formation of surplus value. 
This is how production becomes social within the very framework of neo-capitalism’ 
(Lefebvre 2003, 155) ‘However, the urban is not indifferent to all differences, precisely 
because it unites them. In this sense, the city constructs, identifies and delivers the 
essence of social relationships.’ (Lefebvre 2003, 118)   
586(Lefebvre 2003, 119)  
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terrain of the city. The urban fabric is thus where the logic of level one is socially 
embodied in the fragmented, homogenous, alienated and opaque industrial urban form 
of the city. But it is also where these ‘logics’ clash with resistant qualitative elements of 
the urban fabric, such as grass-roots collective self-management.  
 In the complementary collection of essays Writings on Cities, Lefebvre further 
develops this notion of studying how social forms are embedded in urban 
environments. These forms possess a ‘double existence as mental and social’587 and 
overlap with the ‘terrorist forms’ described in Everyday Life in the Modern World.  These 
forms would presumably be situated at the level of the urban fabric and are coupled 
with oppositions in the urban environment that the urban form cannot determine – 
such as the right to the city, that contest the abstract logic of commodities and of 
bureaucratically controlled consumption.  
 Level three is where this embodiment is resisted by qualitative human capacities 
that cannot be entirely determined. Lefebvre holds that there are elements in the 
urban fabric that cannot be reduced to quantified abstractions, which resist these 
abstractions. These elements of the ‘non-reducible’ tie in with the strand of Lefebvre’s 
thought that conceives of creativity and expression as qualitative oppositions to 
abstraction.  
 We can then see how Lefebvre’s writings on urban form and cities develop and 
concretise the themes of the critique of everyday life. Rather than treating it as a 
residual category, Lefebvre embodies the lived experience of everyday life in the social 
space of the urban form. Like everyday life, the urban form is defined as an historically 
specific, multi-level phenomenon that is analogous and supplementary to Lefebvre’s 
interpretation of Marx’s theory of fetishism. As a consequence, urban space is 
theorised as a concrete abstraction that functions as an abstract, alien form. This form 
attempts to dominate the social environment of those who construct it. This 
attempted dominance cannot achieve complete closure, however, because of the types 
of resistance inherent within the urban city.  The idea of urban space would be drawn 
on in The Production of Space.  
 
 
 
                                                
587 These forms include logic, mathematics, contracts, practico-material objects which 
are socially embodied quantitative forms equivalent to exchange and the urban form. 
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5.2 Space 
 
 This is because The Production of Space synthesises Lefebvre’s earlier projects: the 
‘theory of social space encompasses on the one hand the critical analysis of urban 
reality and on the other that of everyday life.’ For both ‘everyday life and the urban, 
indissolubly linked, [are] at one and the same time products and production, [and they] 
occupy a social space.’588 Lefebvre’s analysis of space is therefore a theory that is 
focused on accounting for the constitution and constituent properties of social life. 
This can be seen in his statement that his study is ‘concerned with the whole of 
practico-social activities, as they are entangled in a complex space, urban and everyday, 
ensuring up to a point the reproduction of relations of production (that is, social 
relations).’589 Lefebvre’s theory of social space thus represents another attempt to 
conceive of the constitution of socially embedded domination by locating his earlier 
projects in the production of social space.590 
  The Production of Space also marks the point where Lefebvre formally integrates 
Nietzsche into his Hegelian Marxian social theory. Lefebvre aligns Nietzsche with the 
aspects of his own thought that oppose rational calculation and celebrate artistic 
activity, creativity and desire. This strand of Lefebvre’s thought was originally aligned 
with his theory of the total man, and became more pronounced in Lefebvre’s writings 
in the 60’s.591 Lefebvre conceptually aligns this Nietzschean strand with his Hegelian 
Marxism by using it to articulate another facet of his dualistic opposition between 
abstract/concrete, quantity and quality. Nietzsche is incorporated into Lefebvre’s 
theory by formulating what he terms the ‘metaphilosophical’ ‘triadic dialectic’. As in his 
earlier work, the triadic dialectic reads the Hegelian conception of the concrete 
universal through Marx’s concept of ‘social practice.’ In The Production of Space this 
Hegelian-Marxism is transformed into a triad by adding Nietzsche’s conception of ‘art, 
poetry, and drama.’ This Nietzschean aspect of the triadic dialectic is also used by 
                                                
588(Lefebvre 1996, 185)  
589(Lefebvre 1996, 185)  
590 As with his other theorisations, Lefebvre views his theory of social space as 
complementary to Marx’s critical method. This can be seen in his statement that a 
‘comparable approach’ to ‘Marx’s fundamental critique of capitalism’ is ‘called for 
today, an approach which would analyse not things in space but space itself, with a 
view to uncovering the social relationships embedded in it.’ (Lefebvre 1996, 89) 
591 This can be seen in the third level of non-reducibility of the abstract urban form and 
the hedonistic opposition to terrorist forms. 
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Lefebvre to incorporate the linguistic field and signs as aspects of social praxis that 
function in space.592 Lefebvre thus conceives of social space as the place where these 
three interrelated types of social activity emerge as representational, represented and 
abstract space. In what follows I focus on the latter.  
 Lefebvre’s concept of abstract space is premised on his Hegelian-Marxian theory 
of social constitution. This leads Lefebvre to conceive of social space as the location of 
social and cultural life where social labour and social contradictions ‘emerge’ and 
‘regulate life’. This is reflected in Lefebvre’s two conceptions of how abstraction 
emerges in space: (1) the abstraction of humanity from nature, and (2) the social forms 
that social interaction with nature manifests itself in.593 
 The abstraction of humanity from nature is exemplary of the Nietzschean aspect 
of Lefebvre’s thought, which views rationality as a pernicious type of abstraction that 
separates humanity from nature. Rationality is abstract, according to Lefebvre, because 
it functions ‘by virtue of the forced introduction of abstraction into nature’, resulting in 
a type of violence that is inherent to rationality.594 This process of abstraction thus 
separates and fragments human interaction with nature and emerges in social space.
 Lefebvre’s other conception of abstraction concerns how this process of human 
interaction with nature is contained in social space. In capitalism this occurs in abstract 
space, which is the space where capitalist social forms emerge.595 Like his previous 
work, the constitution and constituent properties of abstract space are derived from 
Lefebvre’s interpretation of the concrete abstraction of commodity fetishism. 
However, in The Production of Space the genesis of these properties is theorised as 
                                                
592 The way that this is integrated, in Lefebvre’s notion of the linguistic field, lies 
outside of the concerns of this thesis. 
593 ‘As it did not denote a particular ‘product’—a thing or an object—but a cluster of 
relationships, this concept required that the notions of production and product, and 
their relationships, be enlarged […] space can no longer be conceived of as passive or 
empty, nor as having, like ‘products’ no other meaning than that of being exchanged 
and disappearing. As a product, interactively or retroactively, space intervenes in 
production itself: organization of productive work, transport, flow of raw materials and 
energy, product distribution networks. In its productive role, and as producer, space 
(well or badly organized) becomes part of the relations of production and the forces of 
production. Thus the concept cannot be isolated or remain static. It becomes 
dialectical: product-producer, underpinning economic and social relations. Does it not 
also play a part in reproduction, reproduction of the productive apparatus, of enlarged 
reproduction, or relations which it realizes in practice, ‘on the ground?” (Lefebvre 
1992, 208)  
594(Lefebvre 1992, 210) 
595(Lefebvre 1992,100)  
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being interrelated with the world of commodities. 
 Lefebvre thus characterises the commodity as a ‘concrete abstraction’ composed 
by social praxis, which constructs an abstract world that functions in terms of the logic 
of commodities. The commodity is thus abstract ‘on account of its status as a thing, 
divorced, during its existence, from its materiality, from the use to which it is put, 
from productive activity, and from the need that it satisfies.’596 It is concrete ‘just as 
certainly, by virtue of its practical power’, which is ‘entirely social.’597 From this it 
follows that since the concrete abstraction of the commodity is an object produced by 
social labour, it must necessarily function in space.598  
 
The commodity is a thing: it is in space, and occupies a location so that social relations, 
which are concrete abstractions, have no real existence save in and through space. 
Their underpinning is spatial.599  
 
 There is therefore ‘a language and a world of the commodity. Hence also a logic 
and a strategy of the commodity.’600 However, while ‘the genesis and development of 
this world, this discourse and this logic were portrayed by Marx’,601 capitalism has 
expanded, and is pervasive. This means that the ‘[t]he actualization of the worldwide 
dimension, as a concrete abstraction, is under way’. 'Everything' – the totality – ‘is 
bought and sold.’ As a consequence, Marx’s analysis of the commodity must be 
supplemented by an account of the space it inhabits: ‘the commodity world brings in 
its wake certain attitudes towards space, certain actions upon space, even a certain 
concept of space,’602 that Lefebvre terms abstract space. Abstract space is thus 
generated by social labour and possesses the same characteristics as the commodity: it 
is a concrete abstraction that possesses quantitative, homogenous and equivalent 
properties. At the same time, abstract space is conceived as the space where these 
abstract forms emerge and try to regulate life in social space. 
This process takes place in what Lefebvre terms contradictory space. 
Contradictory space is reflective of the dualistic opposition of the commodity form in 
which the ‘paradigmatic (or 'significant') opposition between exchange and use, 
                                                
596(Lefebvre 1992, 340)  
597(Lefebvre 1992, 340) 
598(Lefebvre 1992, 340) 
599(Lefebvre 1992, 341) 
600(Lefebvre 1992, 341) 
601(Lefebvre 1992, 350)  
602(Lefebvre 1992, 342)  
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between global networks and the determinate locations of production and 
consumption, is transformed here into a dialectical contradiction, and in the process it 
becomes spatial.’603 Abstract space is thus opposed by a qualitative and differentiated 
type of space that exists within and in opposition to abstract space that Lefebvre terms 
concrete space. Social space is therefore contradictory and marked by a number of 
dualistic oppositions that play out in a number of areas in Lefebvre’s analysis.604 This is 
brought out in Lefebvre’s analysis of the levels of social space. On these levels abstract 
space is instantiated in myriad abstract and quantitative phenomena - ranging from 
forces of production, to consumption, political, ideological and reproductive space - 
and opposed by the concrete content this abstraction cannot determine.605  
 Abstract space thus structures these levels in the forms of what Lefebvre refers 
to as the ‘great fetishes’ of neo-capitalism.  Lefebvre utilises the Trinity Formula as the 
analogical basis for his theory of how these great fetishes of abstract space, abstract 
labour, bureaucracy and the state are interrelated, and as a means of theorising their 
abstract, autonomous, quantitative and inverted characteristics. 606 This analogical basis 
stems from Lefebvre’s interpretation of the Trinity Formula as an interrelated triadic 
theory of value, ‘according to which there were three, not two, elements in the 
capitalist mode of production and in bourgeois society’; a theory that overcomes the 
binary limits of Marx’s analysis.607 This is replicated in Lefebvre’s theory of the 
relationship between capital, space and the state, where ‘the capitalist 'trinity' is 
established in space and interrelated to the state and fetishised abstract space.’608 
These abstract social entities combine as a whole to structure social life: 
 
Neo-capitalist space is a space of quantification and growing homogeneity, a 
commodified space where all the elements are exchangeable and thus interchangeable; 
                                                
603(Lefebvre 1992, 360) 
 
605(Lefebvre 1992, 330)  
606(Lefebvre 1992, 282) 
607(Lefebvre 1992, 325)   
608 ‘That trinity of land-capital-labour which cannot remain abstract and which is 
assembled only within an equally tri-faceted institutional space: a space that is first of 
all global, and maintained as such - the space of sovereignty, where constraints are 
implemented, and hence a fetishized space, reductive of differences; a space, secondly, 
that is fragmented, separating, disjunctive, a space that locates specificities, places or 
localities, both in order to control them and in order to make them negotiable; and a 
space, finally, that is hierarchical, ranging from the lowliest places to the noblest, from 
the tabooed to the sovereign.’ (Lefebvre 1992, 283)   
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a police space in which the state tolerates no resistance and no obstacles. Economic 
space and political space thus converge toward the elimination of all differences.609  
 
 Such elements of abstract space are managed and used as instruments of 
repressive rule by bureaucratic political power, which, while not a ‘substance or pure 
form’, it does ‘make use of realities and forms’ by creating, controlling and fragmenting 
space.610 
The abstract forms of neo-capitalism are embedded in what Lefebvre terms 
spatial practice: a wide-ranging category that ‘subsumes the problems of the urban 
sphere (the city and its extensions)’ and ‘everyday life’ both of which are in ‘thrall to 
abstract space.’ Spatial practice is thus where abstract space transforms611 ‘lived 
experience’ and ‘bodies’ into ‘lived’ abstractions’.612 Consequently, ‘under the 
conditions of modern industry and city life, abstraction holds sway over the 
relationship to the body.’613  
These levels of domination are interrelated and condition each other. 
On the one hand ‘everything (the “whole”) weighs down on the lower or “micro” 
level, on the local and the localisable – in short, on the sphere of everyday life.’ On the 
other hand ‘[e]verything (the “whole”) also depends on this level: exploitation and 
domination, protection and – inseparably – repression.’614  
As a consequence, this multi-level theory of domination leads Lefebvre to treat 
social alienation as pervasive, yet at the same time inadequate for capturing the 
complexity of such all-encompassing domination: 
 
At this level it becomes apparent just how necessary – and at the same time how 
inadequate – the theory of alienation is. The limitations of the concept of alienation lie 
                                                
609(Lefebvre 1992, 92) 
610(Lefebvre 1992, 320-321)  
611 ‘So what escape can there be from a space thus shattered into images, into signs, 
into connected-yet-disconnected data directed at a 'subject' itself doomed to 
abstraction? For space offers itself like a mirror to the thinking 'subject', but, after the 
manner of Lewis Carroll, the 'subject' passes through the looking-glass and becomes a 
lived abstraction.’ (Lefebvre 1992, 313-314) 
612 ‘In face of this fetishized abstraction, 'users' spontaneously turn themselves, their 
presence, their 'lived experience' and their bodies into abstractions too. Fetishized 
abstract space thus gives rise to two practical abstractions: 'users' who cannot 
recognize themselves within it, and a thought which cannot conceive of adopting a 
critical stance towards it.’ (Lefebvre 1992, 93) 
613(Lefebvre 1992, 204-205)  
614(Lefebvre 1992, 368)  
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in this: it is so true that it is completely uncontested. The state of affairs we have been 
describing and analysing validates the theory of alienation to the full – but it also makes 
it seem utterly trivial. Considering the weight of the threat and the level of terror 
hanging over us, pillorying either alienation in general or particular varieties of 
alienation appears pointless in the extreme. The 'status' of the concept, or of liberal 
(humanist) ideology, is simply not the real issue.615  
 
However, on the other side of his dualistic opposition, Lefebvre uses the 
theory of concrete space to outline a number of types of opposition to abstract space. 
These qualitative, localised, differentiated aspects of concrete space persist throughout 
the areas and levels of social space. They are also reflective of the different theoretical 
elements in his triadic dialectic. Lefebvre’s notion of re-appropriating space and 
workplace democracy are aligned with the Marxian elements of his theory. His 
espousal of difference over homogeneity draws on the Nietzschean aspects of his 
thought. Lastly, other types of opposition, such as the qualitative space of leisure, the 
consumption of exchange value, and libidinal release, promote a type of opposition to 
abstraction through a politicisation of desire. 
Lefebvre’s theory of abstract space thus draws on his interpretation of 
fetishism as a concrete abstraction; it forms the basis of his theory of how social 
domination is constituted, constitutive and resisted in space. At the same time, the 
theory of space also incorporates Lefebvre’s earlier theories of everyday life and of the 
urban form by showing how these theories are instantiated in abstract space. This 
formulation of abstract space thus supplements Marx by showing where the abstract, 
quantitative and homogenous ‘great fetish’ forms of domination emerge, and how they 
attempt to regulate life where they are socially embedded in contradictory social 
space. At the same time, abstract space is opposed by the qualitative contents of 
concrete space. Lefebvre’s theory of space thus represents an attempt to ground and 
concretise his persistent concerns with utilising the concrete abstraction of fetishism 
as the basis for a theory of social domination that supplements Marx’s analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
615(Lefebvre 1992, 371)  
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6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
 In this chapter I examined the role of fetishism in Henri Lefebvre’s theory of 
social domination. I began by showing how Lefebvre’s non-systematic interpretation of 
Marx conceived of fetishism in: (a) a double-faceted manner that accounted for how 
social praxis constituted the alienated concrete abstraction of fetishism and (b) their 
constituent function as an autonomous, alienated form that intervened in social life 
setting up (c) Lefebvre’s dualistic opposition where quantitative forms cannot entirely 
determine content. I argued that this conception of fetishism and social domination 
runs through Lefebvre’s work, where it serves as a basis for his attempts to ‘elaborate, 
refine and complement’ Marx’s analysis by conceiving how domination is constituted, 
embedded and resisted in social life. I demonstrated this in three phases. My 
examination of the classic Marxist humanist phase of the critique of everyday life 
showed how Lefebvre conceived of his Hegelian-Marxian theory of objective and 
subjective alienation in tandem with his interpretation of fetishism and the total man. I 
then moved to Lefebvre’s writing in the 60s, in which Lefebvre revised the critique of 
everyday life by reformulating the central categories of his Hegelian-Marxian 
metaphilosophical social theory in his analysis of the forced bureaucratic consumption 
of the 1960s capitalism. Such an analysis used fetishism as a basis for Lefebvre’s 
supplementary theory of terrorist social forms that were embodied in myriad different 
types of alienation, all of which were no longer based on a conception of human 
essence. I finished by showing how Lefebvre transposed these theoretical interests in 
his writings on cities and space. These writings jettisoned the theory of alienation as an 
explanation of domination, but they still used a conception of fetishism as a form of 
concrete abstraction and as the basis of a theory that sought to construe how the 
social constitution of domination was embedded in cities and space. In all of these 
phases, Lefebvre’s theory of fetishism as a concrete abstraction was deployed to 
conceive the composition and properties of social domination, which was viewed as 
being instantiated in social life in terms of the internal opposition between quantity and 
quality. This demonstrates that Lefebvre’s theory of social domination is more 
complex than a theory of alienation, with his theory of fetishism as a concrete 
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abstraction holding a previously unrecognised importance within his work, in a manner 
that has parallels with Marx, Lukács and Adorno. 
 
6.2 Evaluation 
 
 However, there are also some problems with this theory of fetishism and social 
domination.  
This can first be seen in Lefebvre’s interpretation of Marx. Lefebvre’s 
interpretation is certainly admirable in stressing a non-dogmatic treatment of Marx. It 
is also forthright about how the gaps in Marx’s theory make it necessary to 
supplement Marx with other theories or other theorists. Finally, in contrast to Lukács, 
it stresses the distinction between alienation and objectification, whilst providing an 
interpretation of fetishism that goes beyond commodity fetishism by stressing the 
compounded fetishistic properties of money and capital.  
Unfortunately, the non-systematic manner in which Marx is interpreted and 
supplemented is problematic. 
In the first place, Lefebvre’s non-systematic interpretation prevents him from 
accounting for how certain categories fit into Marx’s attempt to systematically portray 
how capital functions at its ideal average. Providing such an account could have lent 
coherence to his social analysis. Instead, much like Lukács and Adorno, this social 
analysis focuses on extrapolating from certain categories such as the commodity or the 
Trinity Formula. This means that Lefebvre’s account of the genesis of the forms that 
underlies his analysis relies on a vague and unsubstantiated terminology, such as praxis, 
social labour or socio-economic form which are treated as constitutive of theories of 
social constitution. Furthermore, even when Lefebvre’s revises his classical humanist 
analysis, he does not fundamentally re-evaluate these broad categories. Rather, he 
argues that a typology should be devised that might encompass them. Whilst these 
revisions do add complexity, the fact that they are not accompanied by a revised 
account of how they constitute or are constitutive of society as such undermines the 
explication of Lefebvre’s theory. 
This is likewise the case for the supplementary types of concrete abstraction 
that Lefebvre proposes or develops. As I have shown, they are accounted for by 
analogy or by positing that they are interrelated to particular Marxian categories. 
These accounts of concrete abstraction are potentially illuminating in some cases, such 
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as when Lefebvre describes how cities or space participate in abstraction. In other 
cases, the treatment of these forms as analogous to fetishism is questionable, such as 
when he talks of the terrorist forms of mathematics. In either case, the genesis of such 
forms and the corresponding accounts of why these forms possess fetishistic 
properties are often hard to decipher. It is not enough to simply posit that they 
interact with the logic of the commodity world, when the function of such a logic is 
not accounted for. Yet, Lefebvre’s theory too often relies on positing such 
interrelations. 
In the second place, this non-systematic interpretation is often combined with 
Lefebvre supplementing Marx with an eclectic array of theories in his various attempts 
to conceive of how domination is socially embedded with some degree of social 
complexity. However, rather than capturing social complexity or domination, it is 
often the case that this combination of diversely drawn theoretical borrowings clash 
with each other. This is noticeably the case in the construction of his triadic dialectic, 
where little justification is given for how or why the dialectic should or could be 
triadic. Nor are there adequate justifications for the theoretical incongruities between 
Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche that Lefebvre discusses. The same is the case for the 
eclectic array of theories that Lefebvre draws from structuralism, Heidegger and 
others. This means that his attempt to capture social complexity is often undermined 
by his predilection for theoretical eclecticism. 
These reasons may go some way towards explaining why Lefebvre’s social 
theory often consists in proposals and revisions rather than substantial analysis. Yet, at 
the same time, and as I have shown, it can also be said that the fundamental structure 
of Lefebvre’s social theory is too simplistic. This is because, on the one hand, the basic 
categories of this social theory are non-deterministic and open enough to capture 
social complexity; but on the other, they are often too loose to explain any degree of 
determinacy. This is the case for the categories that Lefebvre constructs, such as 
everyday life, that are often too vague and residual to articulate how or where 
domination is socially embedded. Instead, these residual categories often simply seem 
to serve the sole purpose of embodying Lefebvre’s interests, or of acting to 
encapsulate contemporary society. This is arguably less the case for notions such as 
the urban form, which has a more tangible object of study. However, once everyday 
life and the urban form are synthesised into Lefebvre’s theory of space, the latter runs 
the risk of being so broad as to be indeterminate.  
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In addition, the dualistic opposition that runs throughout Lefebvre’s theory is 
equally problematic. Whilst on one hand this opposition does have the virtue of 
positing some form of social life that has not been subsumed or determined by the 
commodity form, the manner in which it does so is reductive and questionable. This is 
because it seems that Lefebvre treats any form of quantification or abstraction as 
dominating or dehumanising, and any type of qualitative behaviour as resistant and 
humane. Such an opposition leads Lefebvre to bundle together disparate phenomena 
due to this reductive assessment of whether they are quantitative or qualitative. This 
leads Lefebvre’s account of quantitative phenomena to include a disparate array of 
elements such as rationality, mathematics, and types of homogeneity, which are 
treated as equivalent to abstractions that compel human behaviour. Thus logic and the 
logic of the commodity-form are treated as equivalent. Conversely, on the qualitative 
side, phenomena as disparate as consumption, festivals, artistic creativity, grass roots 
democracy and urban living are seen as equivalent and inherently oppositional to social 
domination. This array of elements in Lefebvre’s dualistic opposition can thus be seen 
to threaten to: (a) trivialise or over-account for domination by treating different types 
of abstraction and quantity as bad, whilst (b) over-valorising qualitative human 
capacities as inherent types of resistance, when some of them are bound to occur in 
any social formation. 
As a result, and despite some interesting innovations that could potentially 
articulate where a theory of domination is socially embedded in the contemporary 
urban forms or abstract space, Lefebvre’s theory of fetishism and social domination is 
problematic. In the first place, his interpretation of how fetishism accounts for social 
constitution and domination is under-theorised. In the second place, this interpretation 
is used as the basis for a series of theorisations that are ultimately unable to provide an 
account of how the constitution of domination is socially embedded, and which at 
points even fails to offer a plausible account of domination. The end result is that these 
attempts to supplement his non-systematic interpretation of Marx are undermined by 
the lack of a systematic account of his theories. Yet, at the same time, aspects of these 
supplementations might be drawn on for a contemporary theory of fetishism and 
domination; a possibility that I will now discuss in my conclusion.  
 
 
  
198 
 
 
Conclusion 
   
                                       Introduction 
 
 Contemporary critical theory, as first noted in the introduction, is faced with a 
dilemna. Whilst I contend that Marx’s theory of fetishism provides an apt description 
of the current socio-economic crisis in which collectively constituted economic 
entities have acted like subjects beyond indivduals’ control compelling rafts of cuts, 
debt, rising unemployment and misery, contemporary critical theory has shied away 
from employing this theory. This has made its contemporary practitioners ill-suited to 
analyse the current epoch that was ushered in 2008 and seems to have no end in sight.  
 As it was also pointed out in the introduction, the important work of Axel 
Honneth and of Moishe Postone can be seen as symptomatic of recent attempts to 
revitalise critical theory by reinterpreting what is seen as its fundamental category, 
reification. Yet the manner in which Honneth and Postone do so - despite the specific 
strength of each theory - also has particular problems that make their 
reinterpretations inadequate for such a contemporary Marxian critical theory of 
fetishism and social domination. For on the one hand, whilst Honneth perceptively 
points out the theoretical inadequacies of Lukács, and by extension of the first 
generation of the Frankfurt School’s theory of reification, these very same 
inadequacies lead him to jettison an account of supra-individual domination in favour 
to his intersubjective interpretation of reification. On the other hand, Postone 
endeavours to revitalise such a supra-individual account of social domination through 
his reinterpretation of Marx. Yet by failing to adequately account for its theoretical 
basis and its social extensiveness, Postone’s reinterpretation falls into many of the 
same problems Honneth highlights in Lukács’ theory of reification. This means, that 
like Habermas and Post-Habermasian critical theory, both Honneth and Postone’s 
attempts are inadequate for a critical theory that uses fetishism to articulate a theory 
of social domination relevant to the present moment.   
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 In this thesis I moved toward developing such a contemporary type of critical 
theory that draws on Marxian and Marxist theories of fetishism and social domination 
by providing a comparative history of fetishism and social domination that was 
oriented on drawing out, examining and evaluating the role of fetishism in Marx, 
Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre’s theories of the constitution and the constituents of 
social domination. Rather than an account that examined fetishism in the context of 
alienation or reification this comparative study focused on how fetishism was used as a 
theory to articulate the collective constitution of social phenomena that possess 
autonomous and inverted properties that structure, compel and maim individuals. 
While the term ‘social domination’ was intended to convey that there is an integral 
link between how these thinkers conceive of the way a society is structured and of 
these fetishistic types of domination that are held to be characteristic of this society.  
 I separated fetishism from reification for several reasons: (1) since as Honneth, 
Colletti, Elbe and others have pointed out, theories of reifcation provide a theory of 
domination that is too pervasive and inadequately grounded. So I hold that 
disentangling fetishism from reification provides sufficient theoretical grounding for a 
critical theory that is more nuanced and better articulated than theories of reification. 
At the very least I argued that providing a work that disentangles these two concepts, 
which are often conflated in secondary literature, offers a basis for the possibility that 
this type of theory can be developed, as I attempt to do below. As was articulated in 
this thesis, and which I recap below, this disentanglement can be seen in (2) the 
separation of the interpretation of what I termed ‘fetishism as reification’ - which 
attributes domination to the transformation of processes into things and the 
thingification of humans - from accounts of fetishism which emphasise the autonomous 
function of things and the manner in which they compel individuals’ actions, (3) 
orienting my study in a different manner than accounts of ‘fetishism as reification’ or 
‘fetishism as alienation’ by focusing on fetishism in the context of how it articulates the 
constitution and the constituent properties of social domination.  
 These underlying concerns and my theoretical orientation were substantiated 
in the preceeding study which critically examined how Marx, Lukács, Adorno and 
Lefebvre conceived of fetishism and where I provided an account of how each thinker 
used fetishism in their respective theories of the composition and characteristic 
properties of social domination. I also provided an account of how each thinker’s 
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conception of fetishism and social domination differs from each other’s. Finally, I 
considered the coherence of these theories. 
 In what follows, I conclude my study of fetishism and social domination in Marx, 
Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre by drawing out and substantiating these aspects. I do this 
in three parts. In the first part I draw together and compare my analysis of fetishism 
and social domination in Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre. I also compare this 
analysis with the typology of approaches to fetishism and the histories of reification I 
offered in the literature review.  This proves that I offered an original interpretation of 
how each thinker has conceived of fetishism in their theories of the constitution and 
the constituents of their theory of social domination.  
 In part two, I move to consider the relevance of these theories of fetishism and 
social domination by considering the coherence of each thinker’s conception of 
fetishism and their theories of social domination. To do so I draw out my criticisms of 
each thinker and I consider whether these theories offer a coherent and cohesive 
critical social theory of fetishism that provides a rigorous account of the composition 
and characteristics of social domination. I conclude that in spite of the particular 
insight each thinker has into the manner in which social domination is constructed and 
the properties it possesses, each of these theories ultimately fails to provide a 
coherent and fully-fledged theory.   
 This leads me to part three in which I consider the relevance of these theories 
of fetishism and social domination for a contemporary critical Marxian social theory. I 
argue that in order for a critical theory of society to account for both the constitution 
and the constituents of social domination from a more cohesive standpoint, the 
question of genesis must be addressed. I also contend that failing to do so leaves 
criticism reliant on the standard account of fetishism which can be said to suffer from 
the same type of weakness Honneth, Elbe, Colletti and others highlight in their 
criticism of reification. The inherent tension that exists in conceiving that social 
relations underlie forms of domination without furnishing an adequate account of how 
these social relations constitute these forms of domination. Furthermore, while I 
believe this use of fetishism has some traction, I also think it does little to distinguish 
itself from other accounts of social constructivism, undermining its critical potential. 
This leads me to close part three by moving towards a full length articulation of a 
contemporary critical theory of fetishism and social domination that builds on this 
thesis. I do this by considering how elements of these theories might be integrated 
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into a contemporary critical theory that provides an account of the genesis, 
pervasiveness and the reproductive logic of fetish- characteristics of social domination. 
To do so I outline a speculative model that integrates aspects of Marx’s, Lukács’s, 
Adorno’s and Lefebvre’s theories of fetishism and of social domination substantiated in 
this thesis.  
 
1. Comparing Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre 
 
 As I demonstrated in my literature review there is a wealth of commentary on 
fetishism. The ensuing typology I constructed showed that the majority of this 
literature falls into a number of descriptive types, which treat fetishism as a type of 
mystification or domination. Since my focus was on the latter aspect of fetishism, I 
provided a summary of treatments of domination, which engaged with fetishism as a 
type or subset of larger descriptive analytic categories such as ‘fetishism as alienation’ 
or ‘fetishism as reification’. I also provided an account of the histories that pertain to 
these types that provided continuous and discontinuous accounts of the concept of 
‘fetishism as reification’ in Marx, Lukács and Adorno. I concluded that these accounts 
did not provide an accurate or in-depth explanation of how each respective thinker’s 
conception of fetishism related to each other or how these different conceptions of 
fetishism factored into their respective theories of construction and the properties of 
social domination. I therefore oriented my study by focusing on fetishism as a distinct 
concept and I provided a comparative account of how this distinct concept is 
conceived and deployed in theories concerned with the composition and the 
characteristics of social domination. To do so my chapters on Marx, Lukács Adorno 
and Lefebvre focused on: (1) how each particular thinker conceived of fetishism, (2) 
how these particular conceptions of fetishism fit into each particular writer’s theory of 
the constitution and the constituent properties of theories of social domination.  
 I began by focusing on Marx’s conception of fetishism and social domination.  
Then I moved (a) to differentiate my focus on fetishism from the interpretations of 
‘fetishism as alienation’ and of ‘fetishism as reification’ which I have presented in my 
literature review and (b) to ground my subsequent comparative study of Lukács, 
Adorno and Lefebvre.  In order to do this I began by placing Marx’s early work in 
relation to his late work where I moved to distinguish my interpretation of fetishism 
from Althusserian and classical Marxist Humanist interpretations of Marx. In contrast 
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to: (1) the Althusserian interpretation I showed the continuity in Marx’s conceptual 
structure of social domination and (2) the classical Marxist humanist interpretation of 
‘fetishism as alienation’ I showed that Marx’s theory of alienation differed from his 
theory of fetishism by lacking the explanatory categories of abstract labour, capital, 
surplus value and his monetary theory. I also showed that his constituent account of 
the social domination of alienated labour was premised on conceiving labour as an 
external alien thing coupled with his account of the estrangement of human essence 
rather than his later account of social domination in which people are compelled as 
the personifications of economic categories.    
 I then moved to demonstrate how Marx conceived of fetishism in his theory of 
the composition and the characteristics of social domination. I began by defining how 
Marx conceived of the object and method of Capital and his theory of value. I then 
outlined how Marx’s monetary theory of value conceived of capitalism as a socially 
specific: (a) class-based form of labour allocation, (b) collectively constituted form of 
social domination. I demonstrated the former with an overview of his form-analysis of 
money, commodities, the class relation and a general formula of capital and the latter 
in my theory of fetishism where I demonstrated that: (1) Marx’s theory of fetishism 
provides an account of the social constitution of forms of value that integrates his 
form-analytic critique of political economy with the reified social relations and the 
personification of things. (2) What I termed ‘fetish-characteristic forms’ describes the 
autonomous and personified constituent properties of these forms of value that invert 
to dominate and compel individuals’ action. (3) Marx’s account of these fetish-
characteristic forms and their constituent domination proceeds from the commodity 
through money and capital - where these forms become more autonomous at the 
same time as their dominating properties become more concrete and socially 
embedded - and culminates in Marx’s account of the Trinity Formula which provides 
an account of the constitution, the constituents and of the reproduction of the 
enchanted, perverted topsy-turvy world of capital.  
 This showed that Capital possesses the elements of Marx’s conceptual 
structure of domination. In which Marx: (a) uses his critical-genetic method to account 
for the social constitution of capital by deriving it from the dynamic and contradictory 
process in which social labour appears and hides itself in the socially specific forms of 
value, (b) conceives of Capital as constitutive of sensible-suprasensible alienated and 
inverted forms of abstract domination that are collectively constituted and reproduced 
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by the socially specific type of social labour that appears in these forms of value. It also 
shows that the manner in which this is explicated differs from his account in The 
Manuscripts. In the first place, Marx provides a more sophisticated account of Capital as 
a form of social domination that includes abstract surplus value and his monetary 
theory of value. In the second place, rather than simply an account of the external 
alien thing, Marx’s account of the constitutive properties of this social domination is 
premised on his more sophisticated account of the fetish characteristic personification 
of things collectively constituted by atomised production for exchange that inverts, 
dominates and compels individuals on both sides of the class relation.  
I concluded by arguing that this conceptualisation demonstrated that Marx’s 
conception of fetishism formed an inherent part of his theory of the composition and 
the characteristics of capitalist social domination. I also pointed out that this theory of 
fetishism is more complex than the accounts of fetishism as alienation and reification. 
For rather than: (a) simply pointing out that capitalist production consists in workers 
being alienated from the things they produce or (b) that fetishism simply consists in 
social relations being transformed into things, Marx’s theory of ‘fetish characteristic 
forms’ explains how reified social relations constitute personified things that function 
autonomously to invert and compel individual behaviour. Finally, in contrast, to the 
accounts of fetishism and social domination that were subsequently presented, I also 
pointed out that Marx’s conception of fetishism and its role in the constitution and the 
constituents of his theory of social domination was more complex than a mere 
generalisation of the properties of commodity fetishism. Instead his theory of fetishism 
proceeded to articulate the constitution and constituent fetish characteristic 
properties of more autonomous forms of value alongside a more complex and 
concrete account of their dominating properties. That section concluded with Marx’s 
most concrete analysis of reality in the perverted topsy-turvy world of the Trinity 
Formula in which the fetishistic aspects of the Trinity Formula were derived from the 
socially specific character of capitalist social production forming an integral aspect of 
its constitution and reproduction through the distribution of surplus value and its 
constituents of domination in the autonomous and personified properties these 
streams of value possess in their reliance on the proletariat’s reproduction of its own 
misery. 
 In chapter two I turned to the role that Lukács’s conception of fetishism plays 
in his theory of reification.  In contrast to ‘continuity’ accounts of ‘fetishism as 
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reification’ I provided an analysis of how Lukács’s theory of social domination is based 
on his peculiar account of fetishism. In order to do this I began by outlining the 
Weberian and Simmelian and Hegelian-Marxian strands of his work. I then turned to 
the Reification essay where I demonstrated how Lukács’s interpretation of fetishism as 
reification fused his Hegelian-Marxian and Weberian and Simmelian strands while also 
providing the grounds of the constitution and constituent properties of his theory of 
reification. I argued that Lukács’s account of reification is based on his distinctive 
interpretation of commodity fetishism, which replaces an account of the abstract, 
alienated and personified character of things, with an account of objectified sociality. I 
then showed how this conception of objectification forms the basis for a double-
faceted conception of fetishism that accounts for social constitution in terms of a 
process of objectification and the corresponding false objectivity of things that veil 
their content. I also showed that such an interpretation leads Lukács to analyse these 
objectified social forms as possessing the rationalised autonomous properties that fuse 
his Hegelian-Marxian and Weberian and Simmelian strands. I demonstrated this claim 
in my account of how this interpretation of commodity fetishism is constitutive of 
Lukács’s theory of reification through his generalisation of the properties of the 
commodity form to the practical and theoretical types of reification that encompass a 
wide array of social institutions and types of consciousness. My account culminated by 
synthesising these elements in my characterisation of reification as mystified 
domination. I ended by demonstrating how the standpoint of the proletariat accounts 
for the constitution of the objectified and thing-like properties of reified totality. As a 
result, rather than reification consisting in a theory that is continuous with Marx’s 
account of fetishism, reification or alienation, I concluded that Lukács’s distinctive 
interpretation of the properties of fetishism is central to his account of the 
constitution and the constitutive properties of his theory of the dominating 
mystificatory properties of reified totality.  
 In chaparter three, in contrast to accounts of ‘fetishism as reification’, I argued 
that Adorno’s conception of fetishism was integral to his critical theory of social 
domination. I showed that this conception of fetishism and of social domination was 
not based on Lukács’ or Adorno’s theory of reification. Instead I argued that Adorno’s 
theory of fetishism and social domination fitted into two phases: his early phase which 
conceived of fetishism and social domination in conjunction with his Marxian 
interpretation of Lukács and Benjamin and the relationship between natural history 
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and the commodity form. I then showed how this was exemplified in Adorno’s 
macrological studies of fetishism. I then argued that the later phase of Adorno’s theory 
of social domination is based on his conception of what I termed the fetish-form of the 
exchange abstraction. This notion serves as the basis for a dialectical theory of social 
domination that integrates an account of supra-individual social objectivity by 
conceiving Marx’s, Hegel’s and Weber’s social theories as contributory to the 
constitution of the fetish form of the exchange abstraction. The Adornian theorisation 
was accompanied by an account of the constitution of subjectivity conceived by 
interpreting Freud’s, Kant’s and Heidegger’s theories as reflective of this fetish form. 
This demonstrated the important role that Adorno’s distinct conceptions of fetishism 
play in his theory of social domination.  
 In chapter four I argued against commentators that interpret Lefebvre’s work 
purely through the category of alienation. I showed that Lefebvre’s conception of 
fetishism as an alien, abstract and autonomous ‘concrete abstraction’ that inverts to 
dominate but not entirely to determine society, runs through his work where it serves 
as a basis for a series of attempts to conceive how domination is socially embodied. I 
demonstrated this in what I designated as three phases of Lefebvre’s work. I showed 
that phase one consisted in Lefebvre’s classic Marxist humanist formulation of the 
critique of everyday life. During this phase, I contended that Lefebvre conceived of 
social domination in analogy with the concrete abstraction of commodity fetishism as 
the objective and subjective alienation of the human essence of total man. I argued 
further that phase two, which marks Lefebvre’s reformulation of the critique of 
everyday life, moves away from his classic Marxist humanist conception of social 
domination. This is because, as I demonstrated, Lefebvre enumerates a typology of 
objective terroristic forms of domination that are parallel to the concrete abstraction 
of commodity fetishism and replaces the standpoint of total man with a typology of 
social alienation. I also showed that Lefebvre’s writings on cities and space mark a third 
phase in the evolution of this strand. These writings use Lefebvre’s conception of 
concrete abstraction to theorise how domination is socially embedded in the 
production of social spaces while jettisoning the theory of alienation due to its lack of 
explanatory power. This demonstrated the important role that Lefebvre’s 
interpretation of fetishism played in his series of attempts to theorise how domination 
is socially embedded. 
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 As a consequence, while these accounts have no doubt shown that these 
conceptions of fetishism possess characteristics that are accounted for in the types of 
‘fetishism as alienation’ and of ‘fetishism as reification’, I have provided a specific 
account of (1) fetishism and (2) the role it played in the constitution and the 
constituent elements of each thinker’s theory of social domination, (3) the respective 
differences in each of these conceptions and theories of fetishism and of the 
composition and characteristics of social domination.  
 Furthermore, this comparative historical/genealogical account offers a 
substantial original contribution to the literature because it differs considerably from 
both the continuous and the discontinuous historical accounts that treat fetishism. In 
contrast to Vandenberghe, my contribution offers a distinction between fetishism and 
his all-subsuming category of reification. By providing a close and comparative 
examination of fetishism and social domination in the manner that I have done it also 
helped in elaborating starkly the elements that were lacking in Vandenberghe’s analysis. 
In contrast to Rose, my standpoint also provided a more substantive account of how 
each thinker conceived of fetishism and of social domination. This is because I 
provided: (a) a different and more comprehensive evaluation of the role fetishism plays 
in Marx’s theory of value, (b) an examination of fetishism on the basis of how each 
thinker defined it rather than assuming it as an unsubstantiated distinction, (c) a more 
complex criticism of the failings of each thinker. As a result I believe I have provided a 
substantial original contribution in the form of a comparative study of fetishism and 
social domination in Marx, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre.  
 
 
2. Evaluating Fetishism and Social Domination in Marx, Lukács, 
Adorno and Lefebvre 
 
 I now move to consider the relevance of these theories of fetishism and social 
domination by dicussing the coherence of each thinker’s conception of fetishism and 
the manner in which they articulated it in terms of their theory of the constitution and 
the constituents of social domination. In order to do this I will recap my criticisms and 
then move to consider these theories’ coherence and possible relevance.  
 As I showed in chapter one there are important limitations and inconsistencies 
that undermine the coherence and relevance of Marx’s theory. The limitations stem 
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from the unfinished, ambiguous and inconsistent status of Capital. The inconsistencies 
stem from the object of Capital, which as a study of capitalism as its ‘ideal average,’ 
renders its relationship with a theoretical account of society and empirical reality 
problematic. This means that despite the fact that Marx offers the most sophisticated 
account of fetishism in relation to the social constitution and the constituent 
properties of social domination, it is significant that not only Marx’s theory remained 
unfinished but that it also leaves out of consideration a significant amount of social 
phenomena.  
On the other hand Lukács’, Adorno’s and Lefebvre’s theories provide accounts 
of many of the social elements that are lacking in Marx. Yet, as I also showed, the 
means by which they do this differ from the method Marx uses in the Trinity Formula 
to embody his theory of fetishism in society. This is because each thinker provides an 
account of fetishism and social domination by expanding their interpretations’ 
provenance of Marx’s account of commodity fetishism to the whole gamut of aspects 
of society their theories cover. In doing so, as Postone and many value-form theorists 
point out, each thinker can be said to have underplayed important aspects of Marx’s 
interpretation of commodity fetishism - where categories such as abstract labour, or 
accounts of atomised production for exchange - are not fully accounted for. They can 
also be said to have differed with Marx’s account of fetishism in the Trinity Formula, 
which demonstrates how the component parts of social reality are interrelated in the 
constitution, reproduction and social domination of capital. Furthermore, in their 
more excessive passages in which their theories of social domination are premised in 
order to articulate the dialectical characteristics of capitalist totality, each thinker 
might be said to have fallen prey to Marx’s criticism of using dialectics as an ‘abstract, 
ready-made system of logic’616 as their basis for ‘vague presentiments’617 about the 
composition and the characteristics of social domination. These criticisms are not 
intended to castigate Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre as being bad Marxists. Rather, since 
they do not develop alternative explications or bases for these theories of fetishism 
and social domination, it is meant to point out the flaws and problems with their 
particular theories of fetishism and social domination. This can be seen in more detail 
by recounting the problems I identified with each respective theory.    
                                                
616(Marx 1983, 261) 
617(Marx 1983, 261) 
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 In the case of Lukács, as I showed in chapter two, there are several problems 
with his account of fetishism, of social constitution and the constituents of social 
domination. The first is the result of his conception of fetishism resting on 
objectification rather than on an account of the autonomous personification of things. 
Such a conception leads Lukács to treat domination in terms of objectification per se, 
rather than supplying an analysis of how the activity of objectification fleshes out and is 
characteristic of social domination. This is reflected in his second problem 
which consists in his deficient account of social constitution that never provides a 
sufficient articulation of how the class relation constitutes the pervasive properties of 
reified totality. Both of these factors lead to the third problem – it is unclear how and 
why reification is so pervasive and by what means it produces and reproduces itself.    
 In my account of Adorno I also put forward several criticisms. In the first place, 
I argued that Adorno’s theory of the fetishism-form of the exchange abstraction, 
although in some ways an advance on Lukács’s theory due to the socially synthetic 
potential of a theory of exchange, and his account of social compulsion, was 
insufficiently theorised, lacking a developed account of: (a) how it was constituted and 
(b) how and why it was constituent of so many pervasive forms of social domination. 
As I also showed, this account was contradicted and undermined by other aspects of 
Adorno’s theory which held that an objective theory of society was not possible or 
speculated that the origin of these problems were tied to his mythical account of 
anthropology. I argued that as a whole these elements undermine the coherence of 
Adorno’s statements that the fetish-form of the exchange abstraction is constituent of 
society and ultimately they undermine the critical theory of society that is based on it.  
 Finally, my account of Lefebvre also made several criticisms of his theory. In the 
first place, I criticised the manner in which Lefebvre’s non-systematicity led to a 
confluence of irreconcilable tensions in his theory. I showed how this was noticeable in 
Lefebvre’s account of the genesis of concrete abstraction and in the ways it was 
utilised in his critiques of everyday life and in his writings on cities and space. In the 
second place, I also criticised the structure of Lefebvre’s theory for its reliance on 
broad categories, such as that of ‘everyday life’ and in his simplistic opposition between 
quantity and quality, which tended to group disparate phenomena together and treat 
them reductively. These points detract from Lefebvre’s account of social constitution 
and the constituent properties of social domination undermining the plausibility of his 
account of fetishism and social domination.   
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 Consequently, it is safe to say that all four theories suffer from some type of 
incoherence that undermines their applicability to society. While Marx provides the 
most sophisticated explication of the constitution and of the constituent properties of 
social domination, his theory is still problematic in that it is marked by instances of 
ambiguity, contradiction and incompleteness. Furthermore, it does not account for 
important social phenomena such as the state or provide much of an account of how 
domination is socially and culturally embodied.  On the other hand, Lukács’, Adorno’s 
and Lefebvre's attempts to fill these gaps via different accounts of social domination 
that rely on methods of analogical generalisation of fetishism to Hegelian-Marxian 
conceptions of society as dialectical totalities, do not provide coherent accounts of 
how these social phenomena are derived or related to their theories of fetishism.  As 
a consequence it seems that despite many instances where these descriptions of 
fetishistic domination are compelling and seem to accurately describe the function of 
aspects of society taken individually, they are not based on a coherent theory that 
provides an explication for how these fetishistic forms are socially constituted, and as a 
result fail to articule how they are constitutive of social domination. 
 
 
3. Towards a Contemporary Critical Theory of Fetishism and Social 
Domination 
 
 What then does this mean for the theory of fetishism and its contemporary 
relevance for a critical social theory? In the first place I would argue that the term is 
still useful as a critical category. For it seems to me that such a use of fetishism still 
accurately describes our current situation in the society we constitute collectively. 
Particularly in a time of social crisis, it functions like an alien, autonomous entity that 
inverts to dominate individuals. However, the profundity of this criticism in the 
context of theories of social construction and the egregious use of the category of 
fetishism in many different fatuous ways undermine the distinctive efficacy of such a 
critical category. As a result the concept of fetishism threatens to only be of partial use 
in a critical social theory. For such a use of the notion of fetishism can criticise the 
pernicious effects of elements of society as the unintended outcome of collective 
action. However, in order to differentiate itself from the fatuous uses of fetishism or 
indeed other theories of social construction - which by treating everything as socially 
  
210 
constructed they threaten to undermine the specific pernicious forms of social 
construction fetishism identifies - such a theory of fetishism and of critical social 
theory needs to rely on a more coherent account of how these social phenomena are 
constituted and how they function in particular societies. 
 In this purview the possibility arises that elements of Marx’s, Lukács’, Adorno’s 
and Lefebvre’s theories of fetishism and social domination might be combined to 
provide a more coherent and relevant account of fetishism and of the constitution and 
the constituents of social domination for a contemporary critical theory. In what 
follows I gesture towards such a possibility, which tries to integrate Marx’s account of 
fetishism and social domination in the Trinity Formula with elements drawn from 
Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre’s theory. 
 However, in doing so, I think several factors need to be taken into account. In 
the first place such a theory will have to take a position on the interpretation of Marx 
it bases itself on. As I have shown it is not adequate to say that I will simply be using 
Marx’s theory of fetishism since this theory includes ambivalences and is inconsistent. 
Therefore, I propose to base such an interpretation on: (a) Marx’s monetary theory of 
value and (b) to try to extrapolate a critical theory of fetishism and social domination 
on a model akin to that of the Trinity Formula. Such an orientation will therefore focus 
on how different aspects of society are shown to be interrelated and how they factor 
into the constitution, reproduction and domination that occurs by virtue of the 
distribution of revenue to different streams that takes place in the process of capital 
valorisation.  
 In the second place such a theory should try to accord with the historic 
particularity of the society it is theorising about. This would entail taking account of 
the points made by political Marxists and which were raised in my criticisms of Marx. 
As Heide Gerstenberger points out, one should not simply take an abstract and a-
historical model of fetishism and social domination and apply it to an empirically 
complex and historically determinate social reality.618 In order to try to account for 
                                                
618 In Gerstenberger’s words ‘this historical type of analysis is indicative of any 
analytical conception which presupposes the possibility of conceiving of logical analysis 
as separate from historical analysis and hence of any possibility of 'combining' both 
forms of analysis. Such presuppositions result in transforming specific historical into 
general forms of modes of production or else explaining them in terms of specific 
combinations of different modes of production. Form-analysis which does not 
eliminate social practice from materialist analysis can be conceived of as the analysis of 
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empirical and historical complexity it would instead be wise to endevour towards the 
type of historically rooted theory provided by Jairus Banaj,619 in which various types of 
social relations are integrated into the movement of the ‘laws of motion’ of the world 
capitalist system. Doing so would also address the charges of the sociological deficit 
and reductivist one-dimensionality levelled at Lukács’ and Adorno’s social theories by 
Lefebvre and others. It could also provide a means of grounding the ideal account of 
capital Marx provides for the contemporary capitalist society.  
 Such an approach would then mean that many of the historical bases of Marx’s, 
Lukács’, Adorno’s and Lefebvre’s thought would have to be historicised. I claim this is 
particularly the case with the latter two. In Adorno’s case a great deal of his theory 
can be said to reflect the golden age of Fordism on which his suppositions of 
integration, stability and the role of critical theory as a message in a bottle rested. 
Many of these theories and their underlying assumptions have been outdated by the 
rise of neoliberalism and the corresponding fall in real wages that have occurred over 
the past 30 years, the decimation of the social wellfare state and the ongoing social and 
economic crisis.620 For Lefebvre the same case can be made for his criticism of the 
Keynesian state and his advocacy of many of the forms of qualitative resistance he 
advocates, which as Stanek points out, have subsequently been integrated into what 
Boltanski called The New Spirit of Capitalism.621 When Silicon Valley companies such as 
Google, in opposition to the rationalised types of Fordist production, base their 
corporate models on flex-time and encourage creativity in spaces designed to 
correspond to their immediate environement, many of Lefebvre’s theories of 
qualitative resistance loose their critical acumen. I would also argue that such a 
periodisation could point out that the tenor of criticism should no longer be aimed at 
pointing out that culture and society are commodified. This is no longer open to 
debate. Rather it is now a question of demonstrating the genesis and pernicious 
                                                                                                                                         
historical processes of social formation. I do not think it possible to lay down generally 
valid rules about just, how much 'history' has to be integrated into Marxist form 
analysis. The critical measure would always have to be the possibility of recognising 
those historical prejudices which lead us to define the result of very specific processes 
of social formation as general forms of a mode of production, thereby transforming 
materialist analysis into philosophy of history.’ (Gerstenberger 2011, 172) 
619(Banaji 2011) 
620 For an account of these developments see (Brenner 2009), (McNally 2009, 2010)  
621(Boltanski and Chiapello 2007) 
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consequences of this process in contrast to those who advocate the social benefits of 
commodified culture.   
 In the third place I think it is safe to say that whilst less expansive than theories 
of ‘fetishism as reification’, Lukács, Adorno and Lefebvre used the notion of fetishism 
in a too extensive manner aiming to account for too many social phenomena. This is 
particularly the case for the strand of fetishism this study bypassed - mystification and 
ideology - which I hold grants too much emphasis to the demystifying properties of the 
dialectic, especially when such demystifying properties are based on a theoretical 
account of dialectics that, as I have shown, is in itself lacking. At the same time this 
type of fetishism also tends to rely on too reductive an account of other people’s 
consciousness, on assumptions of what everybody’s consciousness consists in and on 
reductive accounts of other disciplines under the rubric of generalisations such as 
‘positivism’. 
 However, it is also the case that contemporary society might be said to 
uniquely resemble important aspects of Lukács’, Adorno’s and Lefebvre’s theory. This 
is due to the unparalleled privatisation ushered in by neoliberal policies and the 
pernicious repercussions such policies have had as part of the fall-out of the ongoing 
socio-economic crisis. This would seem to suggest that aspects of these theories are 
perhaps uniquely suited to provide an account of the constitution and constituent 
properties of how fetishism and social domination factor into contemporary society. 
 As such it might be possible that Marx’s monetary theory of value and the 
Trinity Formula can provide a general model of how fetishism is constitutive of a 
society that has become so pervasively commodifed. It might be also possible that 
elements of Lukács’, Adorno’s and Lefebvre’s theory could be used to address the gaps 
in Marx’s theory by articulating the ‘reification of the relations of production and the 
autonomy they acquire vis-a-vis the agents of production’622 and the way in which these 
‘connections appear to them as overwhelming natural laws, governing them 
irrespective of their will’623 which Marx’s theory did not articulate.  
 Thus Marx’s account of the Trinity Formula could be used to provide a 
concrete model of how labour is apportioned according to autonomous requirements 
of capitalist valorisation. This is the case for several reasons: (1) the Trinity Formula 
provides a concrete account of the constitution and constituents of social domination. 
                                                
622(Marx 1993, 776) 
623(Marx 1993, 776) 
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(2) This account provides a schema of how the different elements of the Trinity 
Formula function in an interrelated, socially specific manner in the perverted forms of 
revenue that surplus value is distributed in. (3) These perverted forms of revenue 
account for the constitution and reproduction of the Trinity Formula, the 
personification of capitalists and of landowners and the misery of the proletariat. (4) It 
also forms the basis for how subjects are socially embodied in the perverted topsy-
turvy world of capital. It therefore seems that this model might provide a good basis 
for integrating other elements of society into an account of how the socially specific 
form of capitalist social production constitutes and reproduces itself. This model could 
be applied to the social and cultural aspects of the theories Lukács, Adorno and 
Lefebvre offer, taking into consideration the context of neoliberal commodification. 
Rather than generalising or relying on underdeveloped notions of commodity fetishism 
- these elements could be integral components of an account on how elements have 
autonomous and inverted properties by participating in the process of value 
distribution and realisation via money and how these processes are indicative of 
contemporary society. In addition such a theory could draw on Marx’s insight into the 
fundamental importance of the social division of labour and the highly contingent 
function of capitalist society. 
 On a supra-individual level such a theory could account for the function of the 
state by way of Bonefeld’s624, Roberts’625 and Gerstenberger’s626 work which has shown 
that the neo-liberal state plays the role of enforcing and disciplining privatisation. At 
the same time it could also be argued that the pervasiveness of exchange that Adorno 
analysed, only now becomes as pervasive as his theory, in an exaggerated way, 
assumed it to be. It may also be argued that Lukács’ conception of crisis gives a good 
description of the relation between these rationalised parts and the irrational whole as 
seen in the local, national and international responses to the crisis. Moreover, 
Lefebvre’s concept of ‘abstract space’ and his ideas proposing a sociological study of 
abstract forms might be a good example of how to embed such theory in empirical 
reality whilst allowing for some type of internal resistance and contestation. In 
addition, Lefebvre’s proposed study of social forms of domination might provide a 
                                                
624(Bonefeld 2013) 
625(A. Roberts 2011) 
626(Gerstenberger 2012) 
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fruitful way of studying how these aspects of society and culture fit into the 
constitution, reproduction and social domination of capitalism.  
 Whilst on the individual level of subjectivity the pervasiveness of 
commodification and financialisation on individuality and subject formation, discussed 
in works such as The Financialization of Everyday Life627 and Capitalism with Derivatives,628  
might provide documentation of how individuals are compelled by the imperatives they 
collectively construct in a manner that reflects aspects of Lukács’, Adorno’s and 
Lefebvre’s accounts. The same is true for the suffering and subjectivity such 
imperatives create which might be better illustrated by drawing on these theories. 
 One possible example of such a productive combination of these theories 
could be an analysis of the contemporary forms of cultural production and 
consumption discussed in theories of post-Fordism, Immaterial Labour and Consumer 
Culture. Whilst these theories provide adequate descriptions of the complexity of the 
global production process, global supply chains and the integral importance of cultural 
intermediaries in realising exchange, they do so on the premiss that these 
developments have made Marx’s theory of value obsolete. 629   
 Yet this is not the case with the monetary theory of value, which unifies 
production and circulation, as embedded in the Trinity Formula. Instead such a model 
could be said to be amenable to integrating these contemporary forms of production 
and consumption and by doing so also to integrate elements of Lukács’, Adorno’s and 
Lefebvre’s accounts. For instance, an emphasis on Marx’s theory of value being 
contingent on realisation in exchange which unites production and circulation, might 
be said to include the role of cultural intermediaries in advertising, IT, the creative 
industries and public relations as essential to the valorisation process, not as a type of 
immaterial labour that breaks with Marx’s analysis. Furthermore the continuing 
primitive accumulation630 through privatisation of public spaces or entities, often 
referred to as the commons, might also be aligned with the role that private land and 
rent play in the Trinity Formula, in which these newly privatised entities become 
                                                
627(Martin 2002) 
628(Bryan and Rafferty 2006) 
629 For leading work in cultural theory see (Lash and Lury 2007; Lash and Urry 1987) 
For other work on brands and immaterial labour see (Arvidsson 2006). For consumer 
culture theories, see (Lury 2011; Sassatelli 2007) 
630 For other notable attempts to utilise ‘primitive accumulation’ as a lens for 
contemporary analysis see (Werner Bonefeld 2011a; Federici 2004; Mezzadra 2011) 
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outlets for the distribution of surplus value, by virtue of the way in which such 
privatisation makes phenomena necessary to social reproduction reliant on the 
exchange of money.631 The manner in which this process also transforms these entities 
into abstract, inverted and autonomous entities could also be born out. If a more 
detailed analysis were to bear this out, this would mean that these contemporary 
forms of production, consumption and privatisation could be seen as constituted and 
reproduced by the same logic that is present in the ‘Trinity Formula’.  
 In addition these developments could be said to carry with them particular 
objective and subjective types of domination. The former, which would extend the 
logic of compulsion addressed in Marx’s concept of the ‘character mask’ to these 
cultural intermediaries, is particularly evident in the profession of public relations in 
which practioners are embodied representations of the company, surrendering their 
very agency and subjectivity to the process of valorisation. The latter is also evident in 
this process of subject-formation of cultural intermediaries, which also has its parallels 
in the financialisation of everyday life, in the way subjectivity becomes a domain of the 
imperatives of contemporary capitalism.  
 A further analysis of these phenomena might then be said to provide an 
account of fetishism and social domination that reflects Marx’s account of the Trinity 
Formula in the way that such institutions are collectively constituted but function in an 
autonomous manner as integral aspects of the reproduction and distribution of surplus 
value that invert and compel the actions of individuals in the complex process of the 
production and realisation of exchange. Additionally, such a situation speaks to the 
elements of Adorno’s theory described in Society or Late Captialism or Industrial Society? 
In which the extensive prevalence of exchange behaves as a conceptuality that holds 
sway in reality compelling and maiming the action and formation of individual 
subjectivity. Finally, the constitution of such institutions might be said to be instantiated 
as abstract spaces that are increasingly removed and out of control of the people who 
inhabit and resist them. As a whole the independent functioning of these processes 
and types of capital in the context of an analysis of the crisis might also be said to 
resemble Lukács’s account of the rational irrationality of capitalism. 
                                                
631 One prominent example could be the move to privatise public water as analysed in 
(Salina 2008). Another development might include the increasing privatisation of the 
internet in a time when flexible employment makes an internet connetion necessary. 
Finally, these developments could be related to accounts of debt and privatisation 
described in places such as (Federici 2008) 
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 If such an account and model can be substantiated in a longer work and applied 
to other areas of social life, it also raises the possibility of offering a variant of critical 
social theory that accounts for the supra-individual aspect of domination that 
Honneth’s inter-subjective reformulation of reification eschews, whilst also accounting 
for historical specifity of this particular crisis-ridden form of social domination, which 
would seem to go against Honneth’s narrative of history unfolding progressively. 
Furthermore, as it would be based on money and attempts to grasp the dynamics of a 
particular capitalist society, it could also offer a more concrete explication of social 
domination than Moishe Postone’s account which relies on self-reflexivity and the 
seemingly all-encompassing negativity of abstract labour, without providing an account 
of how abstract labour is socially embodied or factors into compulsion and social 
reproduction. Finally, such an account would go against interpretations or criticisms of 
‘fetishism as alienation’ and of ‘fetishism as reification’ by offering a theory of social 
domination that articulates how it is socially constituted and what properties these 
forms of domination possess as autonomous entities that invert to dominate and 
compel the society that collectively constitutes it without simply relying on accounts of 
alienated human essence or dehumanisation. This would make such a model relevant 
to contemporary critical social theory, whilst also making such a contemporary critical 
social theory relevant to the contemporary crisis-prone society, the possibility of 
which has been raised by this thesis and which I hope to focus on in my future work. 
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